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ABSTRACT
Due to extensive challenges to the efficient development and fielding of operationally
effective and affordable weapon systems, the U.S. employs a complex management
framework to govern defense acquisition programs. The Department of Defense and
Congress recently modified this process to improve the levels of knowledge available
at key decision points in order to reduce lifecycle cost, schedule, and technical risk to
programs. This exploratory research study employed multiple methods to examine the
impact of systems engineering reviews, competitive prototyping, and the application
of a Modular Open Systems Approach on knowledge and risk prior to funding system
implementation and production. In-depth case studies of two recent Major Defense
Acquisition Programs were conducted to verify the existence and relationships of the
proposed constructs and identify potential barriers to program success introduced by
the new process. The case studies included program documentation analysis as well as
interviews with contractor personnel holding multiple roles on the program. A
questionnaire-based survey of contractor personnel from a larger set of programs was
executed to test the case study findings against a larger data set.
The study results indicate that while some changes adversely affected program risk
levels, the recent modifications to the acquisition process generally had a positive
impact on levels of critical knowledge at the key Milestone B decision point. Based on
the results of this study it is recommended that the Government improve its ability to
communicate with contractors during competitive phases, particularly with regard to
requirements management, and establish verifiable criteria for compliance with the
ii

Modular Open Systems Approach. Additionally, the Government should clarify the
intent of competitive prototyping and develop a strategy to better manage the
inevitable gaps between program phases. Contractors are recommended to present
more requirements trade-offs and focus less on prototype development during the
Technology Development phases of programs.
The results of this study may be used by policy makers to shape future acquisition
reforms; by Government personnel to improve the implementation of the current
regulations; and by contractors to shape strategies and processes for more effective
system development. This research may be used by the Government to improve the
execution of acquisition programs under this new paradigm. The defense industrial
base can use this research to better understand the impacts of the new process and
improve strategic planning processes. The research methodology may be applied to
new and different types of programs to assess improvement in the execution process
over time.

iii

This work is dedicated to my wife Sarah who supports me in all that I do;
my children Isaac, Eric, and Daphne who inspire me to succeed;
my mother Judy who taught me the value of an education;
and the brave men and women of the United States Armed Forces whose efforts and
sacrifices make this research both necessary and possible.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Tim Kotnour, for his guidance, patience, and
encouragement; the committee members, Dr. Karwowski, Dr. Mollaghasemi, and Dr.
Farr for their input, time, and consideration; the UCF IEMS faculty and staff for their
knowledge and support; my graduate advisor at the University of Florida, Dr. Mesut
Yavuz, for his suggestion to pursue a doctoral degree; all of teachers who have
contributed to this achievement by providing me with enlightenment and support
throughout my life; and my colleagues that donated their valuable time to provide
information and insight to this study.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................... ix
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................... xi
LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................. xiii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................1
1.1 Problem Statement ................................................................................................1
1.2 Topic Relevance....................................................................................................4
1.3 Research Question and Subquestions ...................................................................6
1.4 Conceptual Model .................................................................................................7
1.5 Initial Research Hypotheses ..................................................................................8
1.6 Research Objectives ..............................................................................................9
1.7 Research Limitations ............................................................................................9
1.8 Research Methodology .......................................................................................10
1.9 Definitions of Terms ...........................................................................................13
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................14
2.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................14
2.2 The Defense Acquisition Process .......................................................................15
2.2.1 Defense Acquisition Process Structure .......................................................16
2.2.2 Defense Acquisition Program Success Criteria...........................................20
2.2.3 Regulation of Defense Acquisition .............................................................23
2.3 Acquisition Process Transformation Drivers ......................................................24
2.3.1 Threat Environment .....................................................................................25
2.3.2 Defense Industrial Base ...............................................................................26
2.3.3 Budget Pressures .........................................................................................29
2.3.4 Program Risk ...............................................................................................30
2.4 Acquisition Process Transformation ...................................................................32
2.4.1 Modifications to Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 ....................34
2.4.2 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 ....................................36
2.4.3 Evolutionary Acquisition Approach ............................................................38
2.5 Enablers for Effective Evolutionary Acquisition ................................................39
2.5.1 Systems Engineering ...................................................................................40
vi

2.5.2 Product Maturity Verification .....................................................................44
2.5.3 Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) ...............................................46
2.6 Literature Gap .....................................................................................................50
CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY .............................................................................54
3.1 Introduction .........................................................................................................54
3.2 High-Level Research Methodology ....................................................................54
3.3 Research Conceptualization ................................................................................55
3.4 Research Operationalization ...............................................................................57
3.4.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1) .......................................................................................59
3.4.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2) ........................................................................................65
3.4.3 Hypothesis 3 (H3) ........................................................................................69
3.4.4 Additional Barriers and Enablers ................................................................72
3.5 Research Design..................................................................................................72
3.5.1 Case Study Approach ..................................................................................74
3.5.2 Survey Approach .........................................................................................77
3.5.3 Case Studies and Surveys as Complementary Methods ..............................77
3.5.4 Pilot Study Approach ..................................................................................78
3.5.5 Quality of Research Methodology ..............................................................80
3.6 Data Collection and Analysis Process ................................................................89
3.6.1 Case Selection Process ................................................................................89
3.6.2 Program Documentation Review Process ...................................................91
3.6.3 Interview Process ........................................................................................93
3.6.4 Single and Cross-Case Analysis Process...................................................102
3.6.5 Survey Process ..........................................................................................103
3.7 Conclusion and Recommendation Development ..............................................113
CHAPTER IV: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ..........................................................115
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................115
4.2 Program Selection .............................................................................................115
4.3 Study Pilot Activity Results ..............................................................................116
4.4 Case Study Results ............................................................................................118
4.4.1 Case Study A .............................................................................................118
vii

4.4.2 Case Study B .............................................................................................132
4.4.3 Cross-Case Analysis Results .....................................................................141
4.4.4 Case Study Results Summary....................................................................147
4.5 Impacts of Case Study Results on Survey ........................................................149
4.6 Survey Analysis Results ...................................................................................151
4.6.1 Survey Data Validation .............................................................................152
4.6.2 Evaluation of Relationships among Variables ..........................................161
4.6.3 Potential Barriers to Program Success ......................................................172
4.6.4 General Impressions of TD/EMD Program Structure ...............................181
4.6.5 Survey Results Summary ..........................................................................182
4.7 Results and Analysis Summary ........................................................................183
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................184
5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................184
5.2 Integrated Summary of Findings ......................................................................184
5.3 Conclusions .......................................................................................................187
5.3.1 Conclusions Regarding Hypotheses ..........................................................188
5.3.2 Conclusions Regarding Barriers to Success ..............................................190
5.4 Updated Research Model ..................................................................................197
5.5 Recommendations .............................................................................................198
5.5.1 Recommendations to Improve Program Outcomes...................................198
5.5.2 Recommendations to Improve Research Methodology ............................203
5.5.3 Recommendations for Future Research ....................................................203
5.6 Research Summary ...........................................................................................207
APPENDIX A: DOCUMENT ANALYSIS FOR CASE A ......................................209
APPENDIX B: DOCUMENT ANALYSIS FOR CASE B .......................................216
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT ...................223
APPENDIX D: SURVEY INSTRUMENT ...............................................................225
APPENDIX E: IRB APPROVAL LETTER .............................................................237
REFERENCES ..........................................................................................................239

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.2-1: Stresses on Acquisition Process and Typical Results .............................. 5
Figure 1.4-1: Conceptual Model .................................................................................... 8
Figure 1.8-1: Research Methodology .......................................................................... 12
Figure 2.2-1: The Three Integrated Components of DoD Acquisition. ....................... 16
Figure 2.2-2: Categories of Acquisition Governed by DODI 5000.02. ....................... 17
Figure 2.2-3: Major Defense Acquisition Program Context Model ............................ 19
Figure 2.2-4: Regulation of the Defense Acquisition Management System ............... 23
Figure 2.4-1: Logic Model for the DoD Acquisition Process Modification ................ 33
Figure 2.4-2: Transformation of the Defense Acquisition Management System ........ 35
Figure 3.2-1: Research Methodology .......................................................................... 54
Figure 3.3-1: Conceptual Model .................................................................................. 56
Figure 3.4-1: Research Model...................................................................................... 58
Figure 3.5-1: Integrated Research Methodology ......................................................... 74
Figure 3.6-1: Interview Subjects and Associated Perspectives ................................... 97
Figure 3.6-2: Interview Administration Process .......................................................... 99
Figure 3.6-3: Single and Cross-Case Analysis Process ............................................. 102
Figure 3.6-4: Drivers and Results of the Survey Development Process .................... 106
Figure 3.6-5: Survey Data Collection Model ............................................................. 108
Figure 3.6-6: Survey Data Analysis Process.............................................................. 110
Figure 4.4-1: Comparison of Document Review Results .......................................... 142
Figure 4.4-2: Revised Research Model as a Result of the Case Study Findings ....... 149
Figure 4.6-1: Distribution of Program Roles within the Respondent Population ...... 154
Figure 4.6-2: Respondent Experience Statistics for Program Survey Samples ......... 155
Figure 4.6-3: CFA Model at Construct Level ............................................................ 158
Figure 4.6-4: CFA Model at Operationalized Measure Level ................................... 160
Figure 4.6-5. Impact of PDR prior to Implementation Approval on Program Risk .. 165
Figure 4.6-6. Improvement of Program Risk Due to Prototype ................................ 166
Figure 4.6-7. Improvement in Program Risk as a Results of MOSA Scope ............. 169
Figure 4.6-8. Adverse Effect of Competition on Government-to-Contractor
Communication. ......................................................................................................... 173
ix

Figure 4.6-9. Adverse Effect of Competition on Contractor-to-Government
Communication. ......................................................................................................... 174
Figure 4.6-10. Acceptance of Contractor-proposed Requirements Changes during
Technology Development Phase................................................................................ 175
Figure 4.6-11. Requirements Stability after PDR. ..................................................... 175
Figure 4.6-12. Degree that the Prototypes Represent Intended Production Design. . 177
Figure 4.6-13. Degree of Adverse Effect Due to Prototype Focus. .......................... 178
Figure 4.6-14. Program Risk Due to Transition between Program Phases ............... 180
Figure 4.6-15. Government and Contractor Development Processes Alignment ...... 181
Figure 4.6-16: Overall Program Risk Improvement due to TD/EMD Structure ....... 182
Figure 5.4-1: Updated Research Model Based on Conclusions ................................ 197

x

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.6-1: Description of Research Products ............................................................. 9
Table 2.6-1: Literature Gap Summary ......................................................................... 52
Table 3.4-1: Systems Engineering Reviews During Technology Development ......... 61
Table 3.6-1: Overview of Data Collection Methods .................................................... 89
Table 3.6-2: Case Selection Objectives, Constraints, and Mitigation ......................... 91
Table 3.6-3: Documents Reviewed for Case Studies................................................... 92
Table 3.6-4: Document Rating Scale Adapted for Documentation Reviews .............. 93
Table 3.6-5: Interview Questions for Case Study Participants .................................... 94
Table 3.6-6: Rating Scale for Survey Items ............................................................... 107
Table 3.6-7: Thresholds for Correlation Evaluation .................................................. 113
Table 4.2-1: Assessment of Candidate Programs ...................................................... 115
Table 4.3-1: Modifications to Interview Questions ................................................... 117
Table 4.4-1: Document Rating Scale Adapted for Documentation Reviews. ........... 119
Table 4.4-2: Case A Document Review Results ........................................................ 120
Table 4.4-3: Case Study A Results Summary............................................................ 131
Table 4.4-4: Case B Document Review Results ........................................................ 133
Table 4.4-5: Case Study B Results Summary ............................................................ 140
Table 4.4-6: Cross-Case Analysis Results Summary ................................................ 148
Table 4.5-1: Survey Questions to Assess Barriers on Programs ............................... 150
Table 4.6-1: Response Characteristics for the Survey Sample .................................. 152
Table 4.6-2: Cronbach’s  Analysis Results for the Survey Instrument ................... 156
Table 4.6-3: Questions Removed from Survey Analysis with Rationale .................. 157
Table 4.6-4: CFA Fit Statistics for the Research Constructs ..................................... 159
Table 4.6-5: CFA Fit Statistics for the Operationalized Measures ............................ 161
Table 4.6-6: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Loadings for the Survey Questions ...... 162
Table 4.6-7: Thresholds for Correlation Evaluation .................................................. 163
Table 4.6-7: Tau Rank Correlation Matrix for Hypothesis 1..................................... 163
Table 4.6-8: Tau Rank Correlation Matrix for Hypothesis 2..................................... 166
Table 4.6-9: Tau Rank Correlation Matrix for Hypothesis 3..................................... 168
Table 4.6-10: Tau Rank Correlation Matrix for the Operationalized Measures ........ 170
xi

Table 4.6-11. Perceived Purpose of Prototype........................................................... 176
Table 4.6-12. Summary of Survey Findings .............................................................. 183
Table 5.2-1. Integrated Findings of the Research Study............................................ 185
Table 5.2-2. Correlations among Operationalized Measures Related to Hypotheses 187

xii

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Acronym

Definition

CMMI

Capability Maturity Model Integration

CFA

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

COTS

Commercial Off-The-Shelf

CSF

Critical Success Factor

DAG

Defense Acquisition Guidebook

DAPAR

Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Report

DAWIA

Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act

DoD

Department of Defense

DODI

Department of Defense Instruction

DTM

Directive-Type Memorandum

EMD

Engineering and Manufacturing Development

FASA

Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act

FY

Fiscal Year

GAO

Government Accountability Office

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GOTS

Government Off-The-Shelf

IOC

Initial Operating Capability

JCIDS

Joint Capability Integration & Development System

MDAP

Major Defense Acquisition Program

MOSA

Modular Open Systems Approach

MRL

Manufacturing Readiness Level

NASA

National Aeronautic & Space Administration

NDAA

National Defense Authorization Act

NDIA

National Defense Industrial Association

OSJTF

Open Systems Joint Task Force

PPB&E

Planning, Programming, Budget & Execution

RDT&E

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

TD

Technology Development

TRL

Technology Readiness Level

USD (AT&L)

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics

W-SARA 2009

Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009

xiii

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Problem Statement
The acquisition of military systems by worldwide federal defense departments
presents challenges that are unique and distinct from those of commercial enterprises.
In particular, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) faces unprecedented barriers to
the execution of effective weapon-system procurement due to its size, prominence,
strategy of technological superiority, and level of global commitments (Schwartz,
2009). The U.S. defense acquisition system faces the challenges of reconciling the
impacts of the varying perspectives, goals, and values possessed by a diverse range of
process stakeholders (Meier, 2009) while attempting to satisfy the demanding
technical requirements of the systems imposed due to environmental conditions and
necessary capabilities. The DOD's need to integrate systems into an extremely large,
complex network consisting of layers of new and legacy components, coupled with its
desire to incorporate advanced technology into products in order to maintain
technological superiority conspires to present seemingly insurmountable technical and
organizational barriers to the efficient acquisition of defense products (Defense
Acquisition Performance Assessment Report [DAPAR], 2006). The vast amount of
capital that is transferred among entities involved in this process leads to a need for a
rigidly structured management system with high levels of visibility in order to limit
the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse.
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The U.S. defense acquisition process is executed in a unique environment with cost,
schedule, and administrative regulations and oversight proscribed by law with high
visibility and integral involvement of political elements. This environment includes a
monopsony market with the U.S. Government as the sole customer served by an
oligopoly of major defense contractors (Watts, 2008). This situation exists due to
consolidation of existing major defense firms and high barriers to entry into the largescale prime-item development market.
As a result of these and other factors, the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
which is charged with observing and reporting on the effectiveness of the defense
acquisition system, has reported that for the 96 Major Defense Acquisition Programs
(MDAP) in the 2009 U.S. portfolio, the average delay in projected delivery of
capabilities is 22 months and the average projected total acquisition cost overrun is
25% from initial baselines (GAO, 2009). In recent years, multiple high-profile
individual programs have been canceled or significantly reduced in scope due to
technical and resource management issues. These include the Air Force's F-22 Raptor
Fighter Jet Aircraft, the Army's Future Combat System, the Navy's DDG-1000
Destroyer, and the Marine Corp's VH-71 Presidential Helicopter programs. In 2010,
the DoD modified the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program to extend the development
phase, delaying the onset of Full Operational Capability in order to reduce overall
program risk (DoD FY 2011 Budget, 2010). One of the key culprits in the failure of
weapon development programs is the acquisition system itself, which contributes to
consistent budget overruns for system acquisition programs due to ineffectiveness and

2

inefficiency (GAO, 2008). Proper structuring and implementation of the acquisition
process is necessary for the U.S. maintain a strong inventory of effective weapon
systems to enable the defense of the interests of the U.S., therefore fixing the DoD
acquisition process is a critical national security issue (Defense Science Board [DSB],
2009)
The upward-spiraling costs and multiple failures of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs (MDAP), coupled with shifts in the global defense environment have caused
the DoD to repeatedly reexamine its acquisition process. The most recent changes to
the acquisition process are in the form of regulation modifications in December 2008
coupled with the passage of the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA)
in May 2009. These measures placed an increased focus on system engineering,
elicitation and inter-service coordination of requirements from end-users, proof of
technology maturity, leveraging of commercial markets and standards, and realistic
cost estimation (DoD 5000.02, 2008; WSARA, 2009).
With these reforms the U.S. Government has announced a strategic intent to reduce
total ownership costs, shorten development times, and increase success rates for
acquisition programs through the acquisition of knowledge early in the development
cycle. The objectives of the process reforms are to reduce technical, schedule, and cost
risk through employment of mature technologies and more realistic initial cost and
schedule baselines. These have long been stated goals, but the DoD lacked a
comprehensive strategy to drive actions. These changes can be characterized as a
transformation from the traditional DoD acquisition approach focused on
3

technological superiority with little regard for technical feasibility or integration costs
to an Evolutionary Acquisition Approach that is capable of delivering highly
upgradeable 80% solutions in months rather than 99% solutions in years (DoD,
2010). The DoD system development and procurement budget segments are primarily
made up of individual acquisition programs that succeed or fail based in large part on
product maturation, system integration, requirements management, and program
management factors. Therefore, the success of these reforms will be dependent on the
response of individual programs, especially major weapon system development
programs (GAO, 2010a).
1.2 Topic Relevance
Due to the criticality of weapon system procurement to military capability and the
rapidly changing operational environment, the Defense Science Board considers
improvement of the DoD acquisition process to be a national security issue (Defense
Science Board, 2009). Economic downturns, the execution of intense overseas
operations, and the near tripling of weapon system acquisition spending since the turn
of the century put enormous pressure on the defense budget. The defense budget is
further stressed due to the fact that defense spending is considered "discretionary" as
opposed to mandatory spending which includes Social Security and Medicare. As
these entitlements, which are required by law to be funded, continue to grow due to an
aging population and increasing health care costs, less is available for discretionary
but vital activities such as national defense.
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In 2010, the United States government allocated $533.8 billion to the DoD, $80 billion
of which was to be spent on development and procurement of Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (DoD, 2010). The budgets for defense programs are allocated
from a common pool with the rest of the United States discretionary spending. As a
result of this fact, every dollar allocated to the DoD that is wasted by an inefficient
and ineffective acquisition program is a dollar that is unavailable for research,
development, maintenance, or operations cost. Additionally, if the DoD were able to
meet its commitments within a smaller budget, the resulting savings could be
reallocated to other Government programs or used to further research and
development programs and extend capabilities of existing systems. Figure 1.2-1
depicts the stresses placed on the acquisition system and typical results.

Figure 1.2-1: Stresses on Acquisition Process and Typical Results

An additional reason for this research is the knowledge gap that exists with regard to
DoD acquisition policy impacts and effective implementation of these reforms at the
program level. Furthermore, not enough time has passed since the process
5

modifications were enacted for a responsive body of research to accumulate or for
programs executed under these new guidelines to be adequately studied. A major
contributor to the persistent inadequacy of the acquisition process is the lack of
alignment of the process owners, program personnel, and system stakeholders
(Defense Science Board, 2009). Understanding of the impacts of the process changes
is critical because both the Government and industry must effectively implement the
reforms at the program level. Once the reforms are implemented on programs, their
impact must be studied to determine whether to maintain, modify or abandon the new
course. This research is relevant to industry because despite the significant research
available that examines the challenges facing defense acquisition programs, the vast
majority of the literature approaches the problem from the viewpoint of the
Government. There is little publicly available research that focuses on the perspective
of defense contractors. Additionally, the companies that make up the aerospace and
defense industry need information on the impact of reforms so that they may align
their competitive strategies to the new environment.
1.3 Research Question and Subquestions
The research questions are the driving reason for undertaking the case study. These
questions are the starting point that shapes the objectives and outputs of the study, as
well as all other parameters of the research design. The research question provides
focus in the face of a potentially overwhelming volume of data (Eisenhardt, 1989). It
bounds the inquiry by identifying the specific problem elements to be studied. These
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boundaries focus the study to ensure that it is feasible and executable within available
resources. The primary question to be addressed by this research is as follows:
"What are the critical success factors for the implementation of an Evolutionary
Acquisition approach?"
The subquestions are used to guide the literature review that provides context to the
investigation. The subquestions that arise from the research question include the
following:


What were the characteristics of the previous environment?



Why is a transition to a modified process necessary?



What are the goals of the transformation?



What are the characteristics of Evolutionary Acquisition implementation?



What are the enablers for effective implementation of Evolutionary
Acquisition?

1.4 Conceptual Model
The conceptual model for the research is a depiction of the constructs and their
interactions as identified through review of the literature review. The conceptual
model for this study is presented in Figure 1.4-1
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Figure 1.4-1: Conceptual Model

The model incorporates the constructs, processes, and outcomes to be explored by this
research. The model presents how the complexity of the system to be developed
influences a program's development approach, which in turn drives the emphasis on
early systems engineering activity, the level of maturity of the components selected
for implementation, and the adherence to Modular Open Systems principles. These
elements impact the level of program knowledge regarding system development,
implementation, integration, and sustainment which are prime factors in the ultimate
outcome of the program.
1.5 Initial Research Hypotheses
The hypotheses of this research are as follows:
H1.

Execution of systems engineering activities prior to full implementation

commitment increases development knowledge.
H2.

Verification of product maturity prior to system detailed design increases

implementation knowledge.
H3.

Application of a Modular Open Systems Approach during development

increases integration & sustainment knowledge.
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1.6 Research Objectives
This research seeks to examine the response of individual programs to these new
requirements to determine the effectiveness of the changes. The results of the review
of individual programs are checked against a wider pool of experience via a survey
instrument. The products of this research are described in Table 1.6-1.
Table 1.6-1: Description of Research Products
Products

Description

Literature Review

Survey of the body of knowledge related to
defense acquisition and the identified constructs.

Research Models and Hypotheses

Description of elements of acquisition process and
their relationships to guide future work

Research Methodology and Instruments for
Assessing Impacts of Process Modifications

1. Program documentation analysis sheet
2. Interview questions and protocol
3. Survey instrument

Barriers to Successful Implementation of the
Evolutionary Acquisition Approach

Identified program elements that hinder successful
programs executed under the modified process.

Suggested Topics for Future Research

Areas related to the problem and conclusions that
would benefit from further research

1.7 Research Limitations
The research does not directly address financial impacts related to independent cost
estimates, unit pricing, or incremental funding all of which are also within the scope
of the recent acquisition process changes. It also does not cover the procurement of
minor weapon systems, automated information technology systems, or services. The
scope of this research does not include acquisitions by other foreign defense
departments or U.S. Government Agencies, though NASA, intelligence agencies, the
Department of Homeland Security, and international defense services may face similar
challenges and could benefit from this research. The changes to the acquisition
9

process covered by this research are those made to the DoD 5000 Series documents in
December 2008 and those specified by the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act
of 2009. Changes incorporated into National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) are
acknowledged, but not directly addressed. As the technical aspects of the execution of
the acquisition process are the primary concern of this research, the requirements
generation and budgeting aspects of the defense acquisition system are examined only
tangentially. Furthermore, the objective of this research is not to propose changes to
the enterprise-level acquisition process, but rather to focus on the impacts of changes
already implemented at the program level.
The subjects of the research are contractors that have participated on programs
executed under the revised acquisition process. As the new regulations have increased
the amount of competition on programs, the contractors are often hesitant to provide
details of the programs for fear that sensitive data may be exposed to competitors or
the Government. Government personnel were not able to participate due to regulation
controlling information related to competition among multiple contractors on the
programs.
1.8 Research Methodology
The research begins with analysis of the DoD acquisition environment including the
challenges faced by the process and measures of success. The changes to the
acquisition process are also investigated. These steps address the structure of the
process, the environmental drivers for the changes to the process, and the intent of the
changes, and the nature of the changes. These components of the research are
10

primarily supported by a review of the relevant body of knowledge and documentation
from recent acquisition programs.
Data is collected from system development practitioners and experts in various aspects
of the acquisition process to determine the perception of the changes and their
predicted impacts at the program level. Based on this insight, suggested tactics for
successfully aligning programs with the goals of the overall acquisition process are
proposed and analyzed to yield conclusions regarding improvement of the likely
outcomes of programs in the current environment. This methodology is presented in
Figure 1.8-1 and includes the following steps:
1. Identify Research Topic: Develop problem statement and research questions
2. Define Scope: Identify research objectives and limitations
3. Review Body of Knowledge: Perform literature review and identify a gap in body
of knowledge to be addressed
4. Conceptualize Research: Develop conceptual model and hypotheses
5. Operationalize Research: Define relevant metrics used to measure the identified
constructs and relationships
6. Design Research Methodology: Create data collection instruments for the metrics
7. Collect Data: Gather information from sources for analysis
8. Analyze Data: Review data collected to assess hypothesized relationships
9. Develop Conclusions: Present findings and recommendations for future research

11

Figure 1.8-1: Research Methodology

The research topic and scope are identified in Chapter I. The literature review is
provided in Chapter II. The conceptualization and operationalization processes and
research instruments are described in Chapter III as well as the overall research
design. A summary of the data collected and the results of the analysis are contained
in Chapter IV. Chapter V provides the research conclusions and the revised
hypotheses and conceptual model, as well as suggestions for future research.
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1.9 Definitions of Terms
Table 1.9-1: Definitions of Terms
Term

Definition

Commercial-Off-theShelf (COTS)

System components and interface definitions that may be incorporated into
the system design without the need for further development.

Construct Validity

"Identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being studied"
(Yin, 2009, Pg. 40)

External Validity

"Defining the domain to which a study's findings can be generalized" (Yin,
2009, Pg. 40)

Initial Operational
Capability

The point in the system acquisition process when some units and/or
organizations have received the system and are able to employ and
maintain it. (DAU, 2011)

Internal Validity

"Seeking to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are
believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious
relationships" (Yin, 2009, Pg. 40)

Major Defense
Acquisition Program

A program that is estimated to require eventual total expenditure for
research, development, test, and evaluation or procurement that exceeds a
pre-determined threshold. May be designated by the Secretary of Defense
or acquisition chief for the acquiring service. (U.S. Code X, Section 2430)

Manufacturing Readiness
Level

A ten-level ordinal metric used to define manufacturing readiness and risk
at the system or subsystem level based on the demonstrated maturity of
production processes and equipment for a system. (MRL Deskbook, 2011)

Modular Open Systems
Approach

Business and technical strategy characterized by modular design and the
use of open standards for key interfaces used for developing or
modernizing a system to support evolving capabilities over the system lifecycle (OSJTF, 2004).

Reliability

“Demonstrating that the operations of a study - such as the data collection
procedures - can be repeated, with the same results" (Yin, 2009, Pg. 40)

Systems Engineering
Review

A multi-disciplined technical review to ensure that the system development
can progress within acceptable technical, cost, and schedule risks and that
appropriate baselines are established. Reviews held during the Technology
Development phase include System Requirements, System Functional, and
Preliminary Design Reviews. (Defense Acquisition University, 2011)

Technology Readiness
Level

Nine-point metric representing the maturity of a technology based on the
level of demonstration of the technology in relevant environments
(Mankins, 1995).
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This literature review addresses the structure, environment, goals, and results of the
U.S. defense acquisition system, specifically the process for executing Major Defense
Acquisition Programs to procure weapon systems. It also provides analysis of the
impact to both the DoD and the defense industry of the modified systems acquisition
process as defined by DoD regulations and federal law with a focus on the aspects of
project/program management, systems engineering, and present strategies for the
improvement of major weapons system acquisition project outcomes.
The criticality, uniqueness, dynamics, and scope of the DoD acquisition environment
make it a compelling subject area for study. Much has been written about the
inefficiencies of the method of weapon systems procurement in the U.S., however
most available research has been conducted by the government, as opposed to industry
or academia. The primary sources of information regarding the implementation of the
Defense Acquisition Management System are Government-funded education and
research centers; however studies of commercial project management, engineering
management, and project strategy in other domains are applicable to defense
acquisitions. Think tanks and industry groups also provide valuable insight into the
state of defense acquisition.
Despite this existing research, and due in large part to the dynamic nature and
environments of defense acquisition programs, the path to effective weapon system
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procurement and fielding is not completely understood. Gansler and Lucyshyn (2005)
stressed the importance of creating a more efficient Defense Acquisition System and
advocated increasing the percentage of the DoD acquisition budget allocated for
research into the defense acquisition process. Their paper posits that a modest increase
in research funding could significantly improve the outcomes of projects while
enabling the organizations that execute the process to become more agile and capable
to adapt to environmental change.
The goal of this literature review is to establish a foundation for the research by
identifying relevant constructs and their interrelationships based on existing
information related to defense acquisition and adjacent subject areas that facilitates the
development and investigation of the research hypotheses. The structure of the
literature review is guided by the research subquestions identified in Chapter I. It
examines the process of defense military system acquisition, the impetus for
transformation to Evolutionary Acquisition, the process changes, and enabling
characteristics for successful implementation of the new paradigm.
2.2 The Defense Acquisition Process
The United States defense acquisition process is more complicated than that of most
nations due to the country's leadership position in the global community as the sole
remaining superpower, the extensive infrastructure required, and the sheer size of
major acquisition programs. The DoD's strategy of military technological superiority,
the exclusivity of the materiel solutions, and the size of the U.S. Department of
Defense budget both in absolute magnitude and in relation to gross domestic product
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(GDP) necessitate the use of a complex system of systems with multiple levels of
oversight to effectively manage the procurement of weapon systems (Schwartz, 2009).
In order to implement and execute an effective system acquisition program, it is
critical to understand the structure of the overall acquisition process, the objectives
against which program success is evaluated, and the regulation of the process.
2.2.1 Defense Acquisition Process Structure
The U.S. Defense Acquisition System (also known as "Big-A" acquisition) is
segmented into three primary components: The Joint Capabilities Integration
Development System (JCIDS) which is responsible for identifying and validating
requirements; the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPB&E)
process which allocates resources within the acquisition system; and the Defense
Acquisition Management System (also known as "little-a" acquisition) which governs
the process of developing and acquiring materiel solutions. Figure 2.2-1 depicts the
three components of "Big-A" acquisition (Schwartz, 2009). This research focuses on
the Defense Acquisition Management System ("little-a" acquisition).

Figure 2.2-1: The Three Integrated Components of DoD Acquisition.
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The primary categories of acquisition administered by the Defense Acquisition
Management System are services, automated information systems, and weapon
systems (DoDI 5000.02, 2009). The DoD routinely purchases services from the
private sector to augment its own capabilities and the expertise of civil servants. The
contracts for this type of acquisition are not subject to the same requirements as those
for purchasing weapon systems or automated information system. The procurement of
automated information systems, primarily in the form of information technology
systems, comprises a large portion of the DoD's acquisition budget. It presents a
different set of obstacles than those posed when buying weapon systems. The primary
challenges faced by the information system acquisition process are obsolescence,
integration with other enterprise systems, and order sizes. These are similar to
challenges faced by weapon systems acquisition programs, though they occur on
different scales, in different environments, and with different implications. This
research does not directly address the acquisition of either services or automated
information systems, and instead focuses on the acquisition of major weapon systems
as depicted in Figure 2.2-2.

Figure 2.2-2: Categories of Acquisition Governed by DODI 5000.02.
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In the U.S., efforts to acquire new weapons systems, which include any system used in
combat operations such as vehicles, sensors, ordinance, and tactical communication
equipment, are partitioned into programs that are responsible for the budget, schedule,
technical capability, and integration of systems with the rest of the defense
infrastructure. Major Defense Acquisition Programs are those weapon-system
acquisition programs that are "estimated by the USD (AT&L) to require an eventual
total expenditure for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) of more
than $365 million in fiscal year (FY) 2000 constant dollars or, for procurement, of
more than $2.190 billion in FY 2000 constant dollars" (DoD 5000.02, 2008, pg. 33). A
program can also be designated as a Major Defense Acquisition Program by the USD
(AT&L) or the head of acquisition for a service if it is judged to warrant special
interest at the DoD or service level.
Accountability is of particular concern with government programs because they are
more open to public exposure (Elder and Garman, 2008). While all DoD programs are
subject to a variety of stakeholders and Governmental regulation, MDAP's warrant
particularly close attention from both the DoD and industry due to their cost, size, and
complexity. A context model for the typical environment of a major defense
acquisition program is presented in Figure 2.2-3.
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Figure 2.2-3: Major Defense Acquisition Program Context Model

In this model, the warfighter is the source of new capability identification that is
provided to the program in the form of system requirements. Other inputs are received
by the program from various Government stakeholders including funding, oversight,
and system requirements. Factors that are external to the U.S. Government include
available technology, the state of the overall world-wide defense market, the
commercial market for similar system components, and the environment internal to
defense product suppliers. If successful, the output of the process is a weapon system
that provides effective capability to the warfighter, is suitable for deployment in the
operational environment, is able to be fielded in a timely manner, and is affordable
enough to be procured in the requisite numbers.
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2.2.2 Defense Acquisition Program Success Criteria
In order for the acquisition management system to be successful at the macro (DOD)
level, strategies and tactics must be developed for implementation at the micro
(program) level. While a step in the right direction, the reforms that are to be
implemented at the enterprise (DoD) level will not be effective if they are not
supported by the programs that make up the DoD acquisition portfolio as success at
the enterprise level requires alignment of organizational components with the
overarching goals of the organization (GAO, 2010b).
The goal of any project is to achieve technical objectives within the allotted time
period and within the allocated budget (Kerzner, 2006). The interaction of the
traditional success criteria of cost, schedule, and technical project performance is often
represented as a triangle due to the inability to modify the magnitude of any factor
without affecting at least one other factor. These metrics are also applied to weapon
system acquisition programs to provide managerial insight into the execution of the
program. While well established as appropriate for tracking the progress of a program
during execution, cost, schedule, and technical performance are historical metrics that
do not necessarily correlate to future performance. Additionally, the inadequacy of
initial cost and schedule estimates established during program planning are rooted in
the amount of knowledge available when they are calculated. This management
approach leads to a misalignment between the initial planning process and the actual
success of the project (Atkinson, 1999).
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The shortcomings of traditional project management data for use as leading metrics
indicate that additional identifiers of program health are needed for planning and
execution purposes. This research incorporates the use of critical success factors to
identify leading metrics that can be established during the program planning phase to
support successful program execution. Critical Success Factors, as originally defined
by Rockart (1979) are the areas of operation where results must be positive for the
organization to achieve goals and attain satisfactory performance. If these activities
are not completed properly, the project will struggle. Rockart focuses on the use of
Critical Success Factors to identify data collection requirements so that the correct
areas are being properly monitored. Critical Success Factors are situational and
distinct for each project, though there are often overlapping areas for similar
organizations or across industries. Development of a project’s Critical Success Factors
requires data from multiple sets of data, including those from outside of the
organization.
Pinto and Prescott (1988) conducted a field study and data analysis to determine the
relationship of critical success factors to the life-cycle stage of a project. The results
indicate that critical success factors are dynamic in that they evolve as the project
proceeds. Boynton and Zmud (1984) posit that Critical Success Factors should be
identified at the managers' personal level and then consolidated from across the
enterprise to define organizational Critical Success Factors. They suggest that Critical
Success Factors are useful for both identifying project strategies and potential
implementation issues during the planning process. Properly applied, Critical Success
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Factors can act as a link between tactical and strategic goals. They are important for
the development of an understanding of key aspects of the organization and the
program manager's role in it. It is also important that the correct factors be identified
to avoid false indications of success or failure.
Though the majority of research into Critical Success Factors concentrates on private
sector applications, there have been some investigations of their applicability to
military projects. Elder and Garman (2008) investigated the differences between
Critical Success Factors in Government-funded projects (specifically Air Force
software projects) and private sector projects. They concluded that much of the
research into the use of Critical Success Factors in private-sector projects can be
generalized to apply to public-sector programs.
Dobbins and Donnelly (1998) developed a generalized iterative process for the
identification of Critical Success Factors specifically for defense program
management. In contrast to other sources, they assert that Critical Success Factors
should be stated in terms of activities rather than vague areas in order to ensure that
they are measurable. The process attempts to account for the integration of the factor
set through the performance of an evaluation to ensure that the factors are internally
consistent and do not conflict. This process supports risk management in that it allows
for the probability achieving each Critical Success Factor to be assessed.
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2.2.3 Regulation of Defense Acquisition
The U.S. Government regulates the Defense Acquisition Management System in three
primary ways. The first is the DoD 5000 Series of documents that specify how the
acquisition process is structured. The second is through public laws, mostly included
in U.S. Code 10, that levy statutory requirements on the implementation of the
acquisition process. The third is the annual National Defense Authorization Act
(Schwartz, 2009). This governance structure is depicted in Figure 2.2-4.

Figure 2.2-4: Regulation of the Defense Acquisition Management System

Modifications to the DoD 5000 documents impose regulatory changes to the system
while the passing of laws by Congress establishes statutory requirements. Recently,
both paths to acquisition reform have been exercised. In December 2008, the DoD
5000 documents were significantly modified for the first time since 2003. In May,
2009, the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 was signed into law. In
response to the mandate by congress, the USD (AT&L) released a Directive-Type
Memorandum (DTM) in December 2009 to outline how the statutory changes are to
be implemented. These changes were driven by major shifts in the DoD's operational
environment, available industrial base, budget priorities, and philosophy towards risk
management.
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2.3 Acquisition Process Transformation Drivers
The defense acquisition process is consistently attacked for producing ineffective
weapon systems behind schedule while exceeding cost estimates. The DoD has
admitted that the acquisition process does not satisfy the needs of modern system
procurement due to the amount of time and effort required to navigate the process
(DoD FY2011 Budget, 2010). Rouse, Kollar, and Pennock (2006) assert that the U.S.
Acquisition Process is a strong candidate for the application of transformation efforts
and provide a process for determining where resources should be applied to the
process in order to effect the most positive change.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2009) found that the estimated total
acquisition cost growth of the DoD's portfolio of major weapons acquisition programs
has grown from $42 billion in 2000 to $295 billion in 2007 (a 602% increase) even
though the number of major acquisition programs increased from 75 to 95 (a 27%
increase). Additionally, the average schedule delay in reaching IOC increased from 16
months to 21 months. In addition to unacceptable cost and schedule performance, a
high percentage of weapon system programs have been found operationally
insufficient in recent years. An area that is particularly deficient is sustainability which
impacts the availability of the system to the warfighter once fielded and increases
operations and maintenance costs (Defense Science Board - DT&E, 2008). The
following sections identify commonly cited factors that contribute to the insufficiency
of the acquisition system as implemented.
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2.3.1 Threat Environment
Since World War II and throughout the Cold War, the U.S. weapons acquisition
process was intended to respond primarily to the threats posed by a single adversary
with comparable resources and capabilities, the Soviet Union (DAPAR, 2006). As a
result of the decreased prominence and danger posed by a monolithic opponent and
the increase in uncertainty due to non-state actors and asymmetrical warfare, the U.S.
military has shifted its focus from how to counter specific, known threats and towards
the procurement of capabilities that can be applied to a wider range of scenarios.
(Bitzinger, 2009). This change in focus from a threat-based acquisition approach to a
capabilities-based approach requires the acquisition of new systems and a
transformation in the way that those systems are produced and procured. Among the
changing requirements for systems are interoperability and communication, requiring
systems to work together and share information among platforms and services towards
a common goal (Dombrowski, Gholz, and Ross, 2002).
This effect is compounded by the focus on new system development and the current
threat environment with its decreased equipment attrition rates that do not require
immense production runs of systems. The resulting profits from development
contracts are small and there is no guarantee of production contracts (Watts, 2008).
This environmental change requires the industry to adapt due to the fact that the
Government is no longer willing to pay for maintenance of overhead expenses (Carter,
2010) or excess capacity, despite the fact that large production runs are the key source
of profit for defense companies. Additionally, the shrinking defense budget leads to
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extreme levels of financial risk for contractors because it costs millions of dollars to
position for and execute a contract bid.
The DoD has not properly managed the industrial base in the face of a changing
environment to maintain an effective and efficient source of military capability. The
Defense Science Board (2008) recommended that the U.S. Government transform the
defense industrial base, its own business processes, and the DoD/industry relationship
in order to cope with a flat or declining budget and an urgent need to modernize
existing weapon systems.
2.3.2 Defense Industrial Base
The acquisition process is not wholly self-contained within the Government and must
support and be supported by a robust industrial base that is charged with delivering
systems. A dedicated industrial base must be maintained to support the comparatively
long life cycles and environmental extremes to which defense systems are subjected
relative to commercial products requiring that issues that are not present in privatesector system development such as military sustainment and disposal be addressed
during the development and procurement process (Watts, 2008). Since World War II,
the development and production capacity provided by the U.S. industrial base have
provided a strategic advantage to the DoD (Watts, 2008). The U.S relies on the
defense industrial base to deliver capability to the warfighter so much so that the
continued security and prosperity of the U.S. requires a healthy industrial and
technology base (DoD FY2011 Budget, 2010). For the military to be successful in
transforming the way it fights, the industrial base must make corresponding changes to
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the methods used to develop systems and capabilities (Dombrowski, Gholz, and Ross,
2002).
The Defense Science Board (2008) has called for a redefinition of the customersupplier relationship between DoD and industry that emphasizes competition to lower
costs while improving delivered systems. Gansler and Lucyshyn (2005) also point out
that the Government must properly manage the industrial base and ensure that
profitability is attainable in order for the relationship to properly function. If the
Government fails to do so, the result could be a reduction in the development
capabilities available to the Government due to vendors leaving the market or being
forced to merge with a more successful company.
Bitzinger (2009) examined the transformation of the Department of Defense's strategy
during the 2000’s and predicts that despite the popular conception that the "Revolution
in Military Affairs" during the first decade of the 21st century would bring about
wholesale changes in the structure of the defense industry, large traditional defense
firms (e.g., United Technologies, Raytheon) continue to be the dominant players in the
U.S. market. Oligopolies have developed in response to a monopsony market with
fewer opportunities and high overhead due to required research and development costs
and government oversight. For example, two firms, Northrop Grumman and General
Dynamics, own all of the U.S. military shipyards; Lockheed Martin is the only U.S.
contractor with fifth-generation fighter jets under development, the F-22 Raptor and
the F-35 Lightening II; and Boeing is the only current producer of large jet aircraft
(Watts, 2009).
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The GAO (2005) stated that the DoD expected significant savings due to industry
consolidation, however Smirnoff and Hicks (2007) developed an empirical model
based on a review of service-specific cost data from 1979-2002 to explore the causes
of cost overruns on defense programs and found no evidence that defense industry
consolidation led to reductions in program costs overruns. Instead, the consolidation
of the defense industrial base has reduced the U.S.’s ability to procure systems in a
competitive environment to reduce costs and the barriers to entry of commercially
oriented companies into the U.S. military market have never been higher. The
relatively small numbers of units acquired per program eliminates economies of scale
while the criticality of performance to personnel safety requires an extreme level of
precision and attention to detail while maintaining a systems view and focusing on
long-term capability to be provided (Watts, 2008). Companies that do not conduct a
large percentage of their business with the Government often have trouble balancing
the satisfaction of unique Government technical and procedural requirements while
remaining competitive in the commercial marketplace, which may limit the military’s
ability to leverage the latest technology in a timely manner (Aerospace Industries
Association, 2008).
Lack of options limits competition and requires the Government to award sole-source
contracts, pay for development of these capabilities with less-experienced companies,
or procure systems from foreign firms which contributes to the erosion of the U.S.
industrial base. The Government further exacerbates this problem by routinely
awarding contracts solely on the basis of program needs without consideration for the
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impacts to industrial base capability (Watts, 2008). The lack of competition and
increased importance of winning each program pursued has led to more aggressive
bids by contractors, causing to increased execution risk and exacerbating program cost
and schedule growth (Meier, 2009).
2.3.3 Budget Pressures
The near-term funding levels for the DoD is not expected to continue its historical
trend of yearly increases. This change is due to the reprioritization of the U.S. budget
with a focus on domestic issues such as health care, an increase in operational cost,
and the increases in the costs associated with system acquisition. The impact of this
situation is that less money available due to higher deficits, which causes budget
instability. The DoD asserts that budget stability is critical to the efficient
development and procurement of weapon systems. The biggest hurdle to budget
stability, however, is the inaccuracy of cost estimates with a heavy bias toward underbudgeting (DoD FY2011 Budget, 2010).
Smirnoff and Hicks (2009) found that funding instability led to cost overruns on
defense procurement programs. One of the primary issues with the identification of
initial cost and schedule estimates is that it must occur at the beginning of the program
when the least is known about the program (Atkinson, 1999). This fact is exploited by
both Government program offices and defense contractors by providing low-cost
estimates with poorly defined or high levels of risk. This approach consistently leads
to problems during execution. Congress is more likely to approve additional funds for
a program with high sunk costs than a new-start program with high development costs
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regardless of actual risk level. Additionally, the DoD and Congress have been
reluctant to cut funding from a program during execution due to the perceived
importance of the delivered capability (Kwak and Smith, 2009).
2.3.4 Program Risk
Per the DoD Risk Management Guide (2006, pg 1), “risk is a measure of future
uncertainties in achieving program performance goals and objectives within defined
cost, schedule and performance constraints.” Risks have three primary components
that include the root cause, the probability of occurrence, and the impact or the
realization of the risk. Risks are often divided into three categories based on the
program performance measurement that is impacted upon realization of the risk (DoD
Risk Management Guide, 2006).
Cost risk is the probability and magnitude of increased cost due to uncertain future
events. The cost risk in Department of Defense programs largely stems from the
inability of the Government and contractors to produce realistic cost estimates and
scope the program to the available funding (DAPAR, 2006). This deficiency in the
process leads to the selection of low-cost bids with higher levels of risk. Unrealistic
cost and schedule baselines have been forwarded as a key cause of defense program
failure (DoD FY2011 Budget, 2010; Christensen and Gordon, 1998). Cost is often the
most important factor in source selection and is much easier to quantify than risk. Bids
including most-likely cost estimates with substantial risk reduction and management
activity are less likely to be chosen than low-cost offers with more actual risk.
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Schedule risk is the probability and magnitude of schedule slippage due to uncertain
events. Realized schedule risk leads to delays in the delivery of systems and
associated capabilities to the warfighter. According to Ford and Dillard (2009) the
goal of the acquisition process is to provide capability to the warfighter as soon as
possible after the capability need is recognized. Therefore, they assert that the most
important objective of the transition to Evolutionary Acquisition is the reduction of
cycle times between product development start and fielding.
Performance Risk is the probability and impact of problems occurring during the
development, testing, or integration of a system due to failure of the technical
performance of a product in the required environment. The realization of performance
risk often leads to the inability of the desired system to meet performance
requirements within cost and schedule constraints requiring that development be
extended along with program cost and schedule increases. The alternative is that an
inadequate system be fielded then replaced or upgraded sooner than expected.
In order to manage the significant amount of risk inherent to the acquisition of
advanced systems, the GAO recommends a knowledge-based approach to system
acquisition and development (GAO, 2008). Knowledge-based approaches are
characterized by early management and technical reviews coupled with technology
development activities to replace risk with knowledge and reduce first-time events and
program uncertainty. Knowledge-based approaches also require periodic
reassessments as knowledge is obtained, which continually reduces uncertainty as the
program progresses. Knowledge provides decision authorities with greater degrees of
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certainty, increasing the probability that the system will provide the required
capabilities to the warfighter and be delivered on cost and schedule (Defense
Acquisition Guidebook, 2011).
2.4 Acquisition Process Transformation
In response to these challenges, the DoD and Congress made substantial changes to
the defense acquisition process between 2008 and 2010. The stated goal of the DoD's
attempts to reform the way that it buys systems is "to achieve predictable cost,
schedule and performance outcomes based on mature, demonstrated technologies and
realistic cost and schedule estimates." Additionally, the DoD adds that "[o]ur intent
is to provide the warfighter with world class capability while being good stewards of
the taxpayer dollar" (FY2011 Budget, 2010, Pg. 5-3).
In 2010, the DoD took the step of canceling numerous high-profile programs due to
poor performance or misalignment of program objectives with warfighter needs.
These cancellations were made necessary due to costs and schedule overruns and
perceived unsuitability of the program objective due to either lack of jointness or a
misalignment with changing mission needs (GAO, 2010c). The cancellations are
projected to save hundreds of billions of dollars, however much of those savings will
be invested in new programs to fill the valid requirements that the canceled programs
were supposed to address (DoD FY2011 Budget, 2010). These cancellations also
represent decades of effort and billions of dollars in sunk costs that have been lost.
These programs will likely be replaced with new Evolutionary Acquisition programs
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intended to develop new systems to provide the current operational needs more
rapidly and in a more cost-effective fashion.
The DoD is attempting to institutionalize a rapid acquisition process while
maintaining disciplined systems engineering methodologies and leveraging mature
technology to increase the amount of knowledge that is available at critical decision
points. The logic guiding the implementation of the transformation effort is that
improvement of the DoD's position to effectively defend the interests of the U.S.
requires improved performance of individual acquisition programs. A logic model
representing the Government’s transition approach is presented in Figure 2.4-1.

Figure 2.4-1: Logic Model for the DoD Acquisition Process Modification

At the enterprise level, the DoD has initiated an intervention by adopting an
Evolutionary Acquisition approach to developing complex systems with an emphasis

33

on early Systems Engineering, demonstration of product maturity, and a Modular
Open Systems Approach. The immediate outcome of this action is new program
requirements with regard to these subjects. The intended intermediate effect is an
increase in program knowledge coupled with a commensurate reduction in program
risk. The goal is for the ultimate outcome to be increased program performance during
execution yielding more capability delivered to the warfighter in less time with an
increased return on investment to the taxpayer.
2.4.1 Modifications to Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02
The instruction governing the Defense Acquisition Management System (DODI
5000.02, 2008) has been modified in an effort to improve the process the DoD uses to
procure weapon systems. The changes are primarily manifested in modifications to the
requirements for programs to advance past the three defense acquisition process
milestones. These milestones are designated by the letters A, B, and C and represent
decision points at which the Government must decide if it will fund the next
development phase or cancel the program. Advancement through the milestones
indicates increased maturity of the program and thus reduced levels of risk. Figure
2.4-2 depicts the changes to the structure of the Defense Acquisition Management
System required by the modifications to DoD 5000.02 (Defense Acquisition
University, 2009).
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Figure 2.4-2: Transformation of the Defense Acquisition Management System

In the interest of reducing technical risk and requirements instability, the DoD now
requires all major programs to enter the acquisition process at Milestone A unless the
solution has already been demonstrated to be producible and effective in the relevant
operational environments. Requirements and preliminary design are now developed
and requirements, architectural, and preliminary design reviews have moved to a
Technology Development phase that precedes Milestone B. Competitive prototyping
during the Technology Development phase is now required to ensure that the
preferred solution does not rely on immature critical technology and that the system is
producible. The prototype development and test effort occurs in parallel with the
development of the production system design. Multiple competitors are selected to
participate in the Technology Development phase culminating in prototype
demonstrations and a preliminary design review.
To ensure that requirements are properly established at the beginning of the program
programs must conduct a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) prior to full program
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initiation and funding at Milestone B (DoD FY2011 Budget, 2010). This requirement
causes that the Government and vendors apply Systems Engineering activities earlier
in the program to increase knowledge and maturity of the proposed solution. Programs
that hold system engineering technical reviews prior to Milestone B encounter lower
levels of cost growth and delays to reaching Initial Operational Capability (GAO,
2009). At the end of the Technology Development phase, the competitors submit
proposals based on their system preliminary designs to be selected to finish
development of the system during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development
(EMD) phase. In order to advance past Milestone B, the proposed system cannot be
dependent on technology that has not been demonstrated in a relevant environment.
2.4.2 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009
Even though the DoD is a component of the Executive Branch of the U.S.
Government, Congressional authority to oversee the defense acquisition process is
derived directly from the U.S. Constitution, which empowers the legislature "to make
rules for government and regulation of the land and naval forces" (Constitution of the
U.S., Article X). Congress approves the DoD's budget via the Annual National
Defense Authorization Act. Reforms to DoD policy, including acquisition policy, that
are mandated by Congress are often dictated within the contents of these bills.
Additionally, Congress is empowered to pass laws that place statutory requirements in
the defense acquisition process.
The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (WSARA, 2009), which was
signed into law in May 2009, raised many changes already specified in DOD 5000.02
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from regulatory to statutory requirements. The WSARA also created multiple directorlevel positions within the DoD to oversee the acquisition and operation of defense
systems including a Director of Systems Engineering, a Director of Developmental
Test and Evaluation, and a Director of Program Cost Assessment and Evaluation.
These positions were created in order to place more emphasis on the role of these
elements within the defense acquisition process. The WSARA emphasizes the
importance of competition throughout the system life cycle to control costs and
requires demonstration of products prior to full program initiation.
In response to the WSARA-2009, the DoD issued a Directive-Type Memorandum
(DTM) on Dec 4th, 2009. This memorandum amended DOD 5000.02 to comply with
the acquisition system changes mandated by Congress. The DTM requires program
acquisition strategies to include increased considerations for competition during both
the development and Operation and Maintenance phases of the system's life cycle.
Rather than requiring specific tactics to attain this goal however, the DTM provides
suggestions for ensuring the presence of competition including requirements for the
use of Modular Open Systems Approach, procurement of complete technical data
packages to allow for build-to-print production, re-competition of subsystem-level
components and increased program oversight via business and technical reviews. The
law encourages the philosophy of fielding systems in a rapid and cost-effective
manner and upgrading them over time through component replacement or capability
extension. These new statutory requirements align with and support the DOD’s
Evolution Acquisition Approach.
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2.4.3 Evolutionary Acquisition Approach
The description of Evolutionary Acquisition contained in the DoD 5000.02 instruction
is as follows: "An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments,
recognizing, up front, the need for future capability improvements. The objective is to
balance needs and available capability with resources, and to put capability into the
hands of the user quickly. The success of the strategy depends on phased definition of
capability needs and system requirements, and the maturation of technologies that lead
to disciplined development and production of systems that provide increasing
capability over time." (DoD 5000.02, 2009, Pg. 13).
Evolutionary acquisition limits the scope of acquisition cycles in order to reduce
overall program cost, schedule, and technical risk. The key to the success of the
strategy is the proper definition of capabilities, assessment of their priority, and the
level of risk associated with their delivery, grouping them into complementary sets,
and assignment of the capabilities to deliverable increments.
The Evolutionary Acquisition approach is distinct from the "spiral development
model" which is no longer used as a strategy for system development (DAU, 2009).
Spirals are similar in that capabilities and features are added to the system baseline
over time with multiple deliveries; however the goals of spirals are not planned until
right before the spiral begins. Each increment of the process must be militarily useful
and able to be fielded to provide the warfighter with a required capability. In short, it
must provide value to the warfighter even if no future increments are fielded.
Evolutionary development seeks to provide capability to the warfighter quickly while
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incorporating the inherent upgradeability offered by the spiral development process. In
order to achieve these benefits, it is necessary to ensure that the architecture is well
defined, incorporates technology that can be implemented without extensive further
development, and allows for capability extension and the resolution of obsolescencerelated issues.
2.5 Enablers for Effective Evolutionary Acquisition
The GAO (GAO, 2008) asserts that a lack of knowledge regarding program-critical
technologies and requirements at the outset of programs contributes to cost growth. It
is common for programs to establish infeasible requirements, essentially overpromising system performance to ensure survival when competing with other
programs for funding, without identifying proper cost levels to achieve them.
In an effort to identify factors that may contribute to addressing this problem, this
research specifically concentrates on the effects of three primary technical aspects of
the process transformation as identified by the literature: 1) increased emphasis on
Systems Engineering early in the development cycle, 2) verification of product
maturity prior to implementation, and 3) employment of a Modular Open Systems
Approach. These factors have been identified by the DOD, industry, and academia as
essential elements to the successful implementation of an Evolutionary Acquisition
process.
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2.5.1 Systems Engineering
The definition of Systems Engineering varies widely among, and sometimes within,
technical organizations. To address this ambiguity, DoD 5000.02 (2008) includes an
enclosure specifically dedicated to Systems Engineering. The enclosure outlines the
high-level requirements for the integration of Systems Engineering into Defense
Acquisition programs throughout the system development lifecycle. The requirements
indicate problem areas that the DoD is currently facing as well as the overall structure
of Systems Engineering efforts in acquisition programs. The enclosure addresses
specific elements of Systems Engineering programs such as leadership positions for
System Engineering personnel, plans, and reviews. Elements specifically required to
be included in Systems Engineering efforts include Requirements Management,
System Architecture, Developmental and Operational Testing, Environmental Safety
and Occupational Health, Item Unique Identification, and Configuration Management.
Vanek, Jackson, and Grzybowski (2008) conducted an analysis on the literature
related to systems engineering processes and metrics. Their literature review
references a wide range of studies across a large segment of product development
organizations that indicate the value of systems engineering to project performance.
They state that the purpose of systems engineering as applied to product development
is to improve the outcome of the development effort. They found that application of
Systems Engineering principles is an accepted practice in the defense and aerospace
industries while it is not widely accepted in the commercial product development
sector. The difficulty in evaluating the impact of systems engineering practices on
40

project performance is that successes usually cannot be directly linked to steps in the
systems engineering process, but failures can be associated with the lack of
completion of systems engineering activities.
Kludze (2003) conducted survey research to determine the project-level impacts of
systems engineering. The study used perception of cost, schedule, and technical
performance and risk as an indirect indicator of the benefits of systems engineering. It
showed a strong belief among the 379 respondents that the application of systems
engineering principles has a positive impact on these measures and that the earlier in
the project that they are applied, the greater the derived benefit. These findings
support the tactic of incorporating more Systems Engineering scope in the beginning
stages of programs to allow for increased levels of knowledge to reduce risk levels.
The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) and the National Defense Industry
Association published a joint study (Elm, et al 2008) of the effectiveness of systems
engineering processes as applied to system development projects executed by defense
contractors. The study attempted to identify the correlation between project
performance and systems engineering capability as defined by the developing
organization’s level of competency in 12 areas of best practices identified by the SEI
as part of the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI). The SEI study found
that while a low level of project management challenge was more strongly correlated
with project success than high level of systems engineering capability, the
combination of a low-challenge project and a high systems engineering capability was
very strongly correlated with successful project performance. Another finding that is
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indicated, but not supported by sufficient data, is that the acquiring organization’s
systems engineering capabilities has an effect on project performance. This inference
is supported by the logic that the common link among failed defense programs is the
role of the Government as the acquiring organization.
Gallagher and Shrum (2004), also of the Software Engineering Institute, assessed the
application of the SEI's Capability Maturity Model directly to defense acquisition to
develop the CMMI-Acquisition Module. They found that the maturity of the processes
of both the acquirer and developer is critical to low-risk system acquisition.
Deficiencies in either process set exist, the uncertainty and unpredictability of project
outcomes increases significantly. These deficiencies are a possible source of problems
for the acquisition of military systems as may large contractors have implemented
CMMI, but the Government does not have a corresponding stable process initiative.
Dahmann, Bhatti, and Kelley (2009) applied business process modeling to the early
stages of the defense acquisition process to address the following questions:
1. "From an SE perspective, what are the important engineering activities and
products during the two early acquisition phases for implementation by an
early program office?"
2. "How do these SE activities relate to the other [Defense Acquisition
Guidebook (DAG)] activities recommended for programs at the same times?"
3. "What are the impacts of the SE activities on acquisition decisions?"
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As a result of this effort, they developed the Acquisition Guidance Model to facilitate
the application of "systems thinking" by process stakeholders. The research supports
the view that early system engineering technical reviews are critical to the success of
major defense acquisition programs. The paper also identifies challenges within
engineering management that arise from the changes in the global business
environment. A similar cause-and-effect relationship exists within the DoD
acquisition community including System Program Offices, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, test organizations, research labs, prime contractor organizations, suppliers,
and acquiring services.
The high number of stakeholders for each program may lead to requirements changes
made to satisfy parochial interests without regard for the programmatic and
technological impacts (Meier, 2009). These findings indicate a need for baselines to
be established early in the program. Configuration steering boards are employed to
ensure that requirements changes are necessary and that their impacts to the entire
program are assessed before implementation (FY2011 Budget). Configuration steering
boards and the establishments of well defined baselines early in the program provide
the benefit of requirements and design stability, which is particularly necessary in
programs with long development timelines. Such programs can fall victim to scope
creep due to evolving user needs and the advent of new technology during
development. Therefore, proper controls must be placed on the types of technologies
that can be used in development programs.
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2.5.2 Product Maturity Verification
Product Maturity is a measure of the extent to which the technologies in a product and
its ability to be manufactured have been demonstrated. The GAO recommends that a
pre-determined level of maturity be demonstrated via prototyping or other testing
before integration of the technology into product development programs. Since 2006,
when demonstration of a program's technologies in a relevant environment prior to
Milestone B became a statutory requirement, the number of programs with mature
critical technologies has increased (GAO, 2010a).
The GAO has found that programs that employ immature technology at the
origination of defense acquisition programs are associated with more severe schedule
slips, reduced capability in the delivered systems, and greater cost growth when
compared to initial plans (GAO, 2010a). The GAO recommends that the maturity of
new technologies be demonstrated prior to employment in acquisition programs.
According to the GAO, it is vital that program managers be empowered to reject the
use of immature key technologies on their programs.
Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 (2008) establishes a requirement for
competitive prototyping in acquisition programs that enter the defense acquisition
management system at Milestone A. One of the key drivers of the prototyping
requirements is the DoD's desire to gain knowledge to displace program risk (GAO,
2009). The requirement can be waived if cost of prototype development and testing
program are anticipated to be greater than the benefits to the overall procurement
program during production, operations, and maintenance. Advanced maturity of core
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product technologies is a prerequisite for the reduction of cycle times in defense
acquisition (Sherman and Rhoads, 2010). Conversely, lack of maturity increases
program risk and may result in delays in development schedules. Additionally, these
authors suggest that concurrent development activities are also critical for cycle time
reduction.
The increase in size and reduction of numbers of total programs has caused defense
firms to focus more tightly on identified future system requirements as opposed to
growing robust problem-solving and technological capabilities. In recent years,
defense firms have been less willing to invest in research and development without a
clear business case (Watts, 2008). Competitive prototyping provides a case for early
investment to lower Government risk and increase the chance of vendors being
awarded contracts. Prototypes can provide information on technical Critical Success
Factors to support an assessment of the achievability of the programs goals (Boynton
and Zmud, 1984).
An analysis performed by Dubose, et al. (2007) quantitatively relates the technology
maturity to the risk of schedule slippage in NASA acquisition programs. For the 28
programs that were examined, a lower demonstrated level of maturity was shown to
correlate to an increase in schedule slippage. The observation of this relationship
provides a measure of empirical evidence to support the intuitive assertion that
increased technological maturity decreases schedule risk.
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A paper from the Australian Defense Science and Technology Office (Moon, et al,
2005) proposes the use of technology maturity assessments as a tool for the
identification and management of risk. Australia buys more off-the-shelf and foreign
products than the U.S. due to its smaller defense budget and lower threshold for
technological superiority. Moon examines emergent properties of several systems with
respect to the maturity of their components. A multiple-pass process for using
technology maturity metrics to assess technical risk to defense programs is also
presented.
Once a technology is well understood and capable of being integrated into a system
with predictable performance characteristics, the system must be produced in
sufficient quantities and quality to be fielded. Kerr, et al, (2007), found that the U.S.
and other countries are increasing their use of technology insertion into existing
platforms as a tactic to reduce costs and development risk. The paper explains the
value of technology insertion to overcoming obsolescence-related issues and the rapid
development of new capabilities to be integrated into existing systems for delivery to
the warfighter. It also touts the return on investment governments may receive with
regard to systems' total life-cycle cost.
2.5.3 Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA)
The Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) and the related concept of Open
Architecture (OA) are the Government's preferred business and technical strategy for
system development or modernization that incorporates modular design and the use of
open standards for the implementation of key interfaces (OSJTF, 2004). Eisenmann,
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Parker, and Van Alstyne (2008) define "open" as lacking restrictions on participants in
the development of a platform or product. The paper defines the following roles with
respect to "openness": End-user, application developer, hardware/software bundle
provider (integrator), and designer (intellectual property owner). It also differentiates
between two primary strategies for opening a platform. The vertical openness strategy
includes backwards compatibility, platform and category exclusivity, and absorption
of complementing products. Horizontal openness takes the form of increased
interoperability with competitors to invoke network effects, licensing to expand a
market through differentiation, and sponsorship to reduce research and development
costs and allow for a more diverse solution space.
MOSA is characterized by a reliance on industry standard interfaces, use of off-theshelf components, and modular software and hardware development and integration.
The key benefit is that it limits the ripple effect of changes through a system. Isolating
volatile components using stable and robust interfaces, allows for modification or
replacement of those components with minimal impacts on the rest of the system
(OSJTF, 2004). This approach allows for the initial development of the system with
older, proven technology, because developers know that they can insert more
advanced technology later to offset obsolescence and extend the capabilities of fielded
systems. MOSA is appealing because it seeks to reduce both recurring and nonrecurring cost in system development, operations, and maintenance (Open
Architecture Contract Guidebook, 2004).
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Dillard and Ford (2009) found that integration of MOSA with an Evolutionary
Acquisition approach increases requirements, technology development, integration,
and manufacturing costs, but reduces problems, and thus costs, later in the program.
They also developed a model that suggests that rework due to problems discovered
during system development increases, but that quality assurance efforts would be
more effective due to the use of standards and that the total scope of development
work decreases substantially. It should be noted that the development phase of the
program is when problems are preferred to be found due to the dramatically increased
cost of rework after fielding of the system.
Simulations developed by Dillard and Ford (2009) to gauge the impact on the Javelin
missile development program indicate that the combination of Evolutionary
Acquisition and MOSA will yield more schedule benefits than the implementation of
just Evolutionary Acquisition. Additionally, Open-Systems-related work performed at
the onset of the program yields schedule and cost benefits in subsequent increments,
essentially providing a substantial return on early investment for the entire life cycle
of the system. The simulation suggests that errors in integration of systems must be
addressed by the programs to be successful. One of the impediments to the
implementation of MOSA in DoD acquisitions is the increase in initial costs.
Increased up-front systems architecture work, reduced control with regard to
standards, increased standard instability, and reduced control over designs and
requirements due to the leveraging of commercial products lead to hesitance on the
part of the DoD to fully embrace MOSA. To date, MOSA has not been completely
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integrated with the Evolutionary Acquisition approach. This fact makes it difficult to
conceptualize the way that these concepts and principles will affect each other (Ford
and Dillard, 2009).
Rendon (2009) reviewed assessments of 32 Navy acquisition programs of varying size
to determine the level of "openness" designed into the systems. These programs were
assessed for two primary factors, programmatic and technical, for the degree of
implementation of MOSA. Of the 32 programs, 16 were judged to have a high degree
of openness. The number of programs determined to have medium and low levels
were 14 and 2, respectively. Though this analysis is based on a limited data set, it can
be inferred that tying MOSA implementation to the acquisition policy has a positive
effect on the degree of openness in system development.
Boudreau (2007) executed a case study on the use of MOSA on the U.S. Navy's
Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion program. The program is described as evolutionary
acquisition's "poster child" due to the cost and schedule performance achieved through
the extensive use of commercial components despite a highly dynamic product
baseline. This approach is made possible through the development of federated
systems with a modular architecture. A vital activity for this approach is the
identification and control of key interfaces to partition volatile components from the
rest of the system. This control mechanism allows the modification or replacement of
system modules without greatly impacting the other system components. This
approach requires the program manager to be both technically savvy and highly
involved in the systems development process. Additionally, vendors must align their
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business models with the Government's requirements of minimal proprietary data and
extensive cooperation among competitors. The payoffs for the Governments
implementation of this process are decreased software sustainment and logistics costs
leading to a lower overall life-cycle cost.
Kerr (2007) identified two primary mechanisms for enabling technology insertion into
existing systems. The first is planning for insertion by identifying components to be
upgraded based on projected benefit to the total ownership cost of the system.
Planning includes the selection of an optimal replacement strategy such as attrition or
recall. The second is designing for insertion through the use of a modular open
systems approach including the employment of interface standards, modularity, and
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components where possible. While the amount of
published information regarding MOSA is growing, additional investigation into the
implementation of this evolving development philosophy is necessary, especially with
regard to the interaction of these requirements with other tenets of the evolutionary
acquisition approach. Sherman and Rhoads (2010) assert that use of open architectures
during system design provide reduced cycle times for both the initial development
phase and subsequent generations. They state that the use of standardized or
commercial-off-the-shelf components is a particularly factor in the potential reduction
of defense system acquisition cycle times.
2.6 Literature Gap
A disconnect exists in the literature between DoD-level strategy from the business
viewpoint and the implementation of the new program requirements. Further, what
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research that has been done focuses on the DoD at the enterprise level. While research
is conducted by Government academic institutions and federally funded research and
development centers, the topic can benefit greatly from the diversity of thought,
methods, and perspectives offered by multiple university research programs working
in parallel (Gansler and Lucyshyn, 2005). This research is made necessary by
increased pressure on the federal discretionary spending budget (of which the DoD is
a part); increased scope, complexity, and technical requirement advancement of
developed systems; changing landscape of defense operations and environment; the
decrease in competent prime contractors due to mergers and acquisitions; the
increased "jointness" required of systems under development which increases the
number of stakeholders for each development program.
A research gap exists with regard to DoD acquisition policy impacts and effective
implementation of these reforms at the program level. While there is significant
research available that examines the challenges facing defense acquisition programs,
the vast majority of the literature approaches the problem from the viewpoint of the
Government. There is little publicly available research that focuses on the perspective
of defense contractors due to the fact that the primary sponsor of this research in this
area, the U.S. Government, is understandably most concerned with the DoD's
operation within the federal guidelines and budget. Also, most industry-sponsored
research is not disseminated outside of the limits of the commissioning corporation for
competitive reasons. Furthermore, not enough time has passed since the December
2008 revision of the Defense Acquisition Management System and the passage of the
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Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 for a responsive body of research to
accumulate or for programs executed under these new guidelines to be adequately
studied. Both government and industry must implement the strategic reforms
mandated by Congress and the DoD at the program level in order to know whether the
new acquisition regulations and strategies will achieve their desired effects. Table
2.6-1 summarizes the identified gap in the existing body of knowledge as determined
through the review of relevant literature.
Table 2.6-1: Literature Gap Summary
Literature Deficiency

Cause

Research Gap

Program-Level Research

 Focus on enterprise level;
 R&D Research is focused on
private sector

Current research does not
connect DoD program-level
issues

Defense Acquisition
Research Base Focus

 Need for increase in academic
research;
 Most published research
conducted by Government;
 Industry research base
unavailable to public

Perspective is exclusively
focused on DoD impacts

Recent Changes to Process

 Recent modifications to DoD
5000.002 modifications;
 WSARA-2009;
 Uncertainty to program-level
reactions

Impact of recent changes have
not been fully explored

The changes enacted to the DoD Acquisition process in response to these challenges
are too recent for a significant number of studies to be completed. In order to
understand whether the changes are having the desired effect of decreasing risk and
thus improving performance in acquisition programs, programs that are operating
under the new guidelines must be examined. Such investigations may also indicate if
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some of these changes should be reexamined due to emergent problems or if other
steps are necessary to address issues not affected by the process modifications.
New program requirements regarding the execution of early Systems Engineering
activity, the employment of mature technologies, and the use of a Modular Open
Systems Approach are intended to increase requirements and design knowledge,
decrease technology implementation risk, and decrease integration risk, respectively.
This research study seeks to measure the impact of these process changes as
implemented on multiple programs executed under the revised acquisition framework
and identify the correlation with identified knowledge and risk factors. The focus is
placed on determining whether the implementation of Evolutionary Acquisition has
the desired effect of increasing the amount and quality of knowledge available to
decision makers, lowering program risk, and increasing the likelihood of successful
program outcomes.
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology employed to address the previously stated
problem and research question. This methodology is used to examine the validity of
the constructs identified in the conceptual model and the hypothesized relationships
among them.
3.2 High-Level Research Methodology
The research methodology described in this section is developed to bound the scope of
the research, identify the key variables and their relationships, and ultimately test the
hypotheses. This process is depicted in Figure 3.2-1.

Figure 3.2-1: Research Methodology
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The first step is to identify the focus of the research, leading to the initial problem
statement and research questions. The second step is to establish the limits of the
research to set the bounds of the scope of inquiry. Thirdly, a focused literature review
is developed that identifies the knowledge gaps that are addressed by the research. The
fourth step is to identify the constructs relating to the problem space and their
hypothesized relationships to each other based on the surveyed body of knowledge.
After conceptualization of the problem and solution spaces is complete, the fifth step
involves the designation of operationalized measures to evaluate the impact and
interaction of the identified constructs. A research methodology is designed in the
sixth step to develop and assess the measures resulting in the development of research
instruments. These instruments are used to collect data during the seventh step. This
data is analyzed in the eighth step with the goal of producing conclusions with regard
to the constructs and hypothesis, which are documented and reported during the ninth
and final step. Conclusions are developed and the conceptual model and hypotheses
are revised. Recommendations for future research are documented during this step.
The results of the first three steps in the research plan are documented in Chapters I
and II. This chapter focuses on the conceptualization, operationalization, and design of
the research.
3.3 Research Conceptualization
Conceptualization is the process of developing constructs to represent aspects of the
problem and its environment. Constructs are intangible factors within the case context
that are of interest to the research question. The research question, along with a review
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of the relevant literature, guides the development of constructs that are to be measured
during the course of the study. The hypotheses being tested or developed by the
research relates to the existence of dynamics among the constructs. In theory-building
research studies it is helpful to establish a priori constructs to provide a starting point
for inquiry. Establishing constructs based on the literature early in the study allows for
the measurement of constructs during all phases of data collection (Eisenhardt, 1989).
If the constructs are significant, multiple data sources will provide convergent
evidence (Yin, 2009). Constructs are refined throughout the study based on data
collection and analysis.
“Overdescription” of elements and the environments related to critical processes is a
potential issue with systems engineering research. To counter this issue, constructs
representing new phenomena are often best explained with a focus on a small set of
essential factors (Friedman and Sage, 2003). In order to provide a basis to manage the
complexity of the problem domain, the related literature is studied to identify the
technical concepts critical to the defense acquisition process and their interaction
leading to the development of the conceptual model depicted in Figure 3.3-1.

Figure 3.3-1: Conceptual Model
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The logic model presented in section 2.4 serves as the foundation for the conceptual
model. This model represents the process of complex systems acquisition in which the
implementation of an Evolutionary Acquisition Approach places increased
requirements related to Early Systems Engineering, Maturity Verification, and a
Modular Open Systems Approach on acquisition programs. These factors, as
described in the literature review, influence the levels of Development Knowledge,
Implementation Knowledge, and Integration and Sustainment Knowledge on the
program. The reviewed literature suggests that the levels of program knowledge have
a positive impact on the technical, cost, and schedule performance of a program.
Multiple unidentified factors undoubtedly are also impacted by the process change and
in turn affect the program's levels of knowledge and risk, but they are not addressed
directly by the research design and are considered as part of the program
environment. The constructs identified in the conceptual model are described in detail
as part of the literature review presented in Chapter II. Description of the constructs as
they pertain to the research design and the measures used to evaluate them are
contained in the section on Research Operationalization.
3.4 Research Operationalization
Operationalization is the process of translating the abstract concepts into measurable
indicators and variables. As constructs cannot be measured directly, operational
measures must be developed to allow for determination of their prevalence, impacts,
and dynamics. These operational measures are analyzed to test existing theories or
support the development of new theory. Operational measures derived from constructs
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provide the logical links between data and propositions that are critical for valid
research (Yin, 2009). The research model is developed as an extension of the
conceptual model during this process to map the operational measures to the
constructs that they represent and illustrate the hypothesized relationships among the
constructs. The research model is depicted in Figure 3.4-1.

Figure 3.4-1: Research Model

The research model also divides the constructs and operationalized measures into
dependent and independent variables with regard to the hypotheses. Each of the
independent constructs relates to an aspect of system development that is purported to
improve acquisition outcomes by increasing the knowledge and reducing uncertainty
with regard to some aspect of the program. Each of the dependent constructs
represents a type and level of programmatic knowledge that is critical to the effective
development and fielding of a system solution. The hypothesized nature of the
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relationships among the constructs is included in the research model as represented by
H1, H2, and H3. All three of these hypotheses assert a positive correlation between the
independent and dependent constructs. As knowledge is proportional to program
success (GAO, 2008), the hypotheses posit that the proper implementation of the
independent constructs lead to improvement in program knowledge and risk positions
and ultimately to improved program outcomes.
To test the existence of the hypothesized relationships among the variables, each
construct is assessed through two operationalized measures. These research elements
are described in the subsequent sections, grouped by the relevant hypothesis. In each
section, the hypothesis is stated, followed by a description of each construct and the
operational measures that are used to evaluate the prevalence of the constructs. The
hypotheses, constructs, and measures described in the subsequent sections are used to
develop research instruments that are employed to gather data related to the identified
constructs. That data is then used to test the identified hypotheses.
3.4.1 Hypothesis 1 (H1)
The first hypothesis proposes that a positive relationship exists between the execution
of systems engineering activities early in the product lifecycle and knowledge
necessary for the successful development of complex systems. This hypothesis is
stated as follows:
H1: Execution of systems engineering activities prior to full implementation
commitment increases development knowledge.
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This hypothesis is assessed by measuring the relationship between the independent
“Early Systems Engineering” construct and the dependent “Development Knowledge”
construct.
3.4.1.1 Measurement of the “Early Systems Engineering” Construct
For the purposes of this research, Early Systems Engineering is defined as activities
that occur during the Technology Development phase that seek to develop
requirements, establish a baseline for a preliminary solution, and lead to the
satisfaction of technical requirements within cost and schedule constraints. Although
the importance of systems engineering activities prior to the Technology Development
phase has been established (National Research Council, 2009), the decision process is
almost entirely Government-driven. Industry is not substantially involved with the
system solution to provide insight into the impact of decisions at the implementation
level until after award of Technology Development contracts as depicted in Figure
2.4-2. The involvement of contractors is crucial to developing an understanding of the
cost, schedule, technologies, and risk involved in the implementation of the
Government’s requirements and delivery of the system solution to the warfighter. This
construct is an independent variable within this research.
In order to measure the presence of this construct on a program, focus is placed on the
Systems Engineering Technical Reviews held during the Technology Development
phase. System Engineering Technical Reviews are major events on programs that
include multiple stakeholders including the contractor, acquiring program office,
operational users, system support personnel, and technical experts. They include a
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summary of the system development activity status and serve as the decision point for
the establishment of baselines. Generally they are hosted by the contractor and
facilitated by off-program Government representatives. The contractor provides the
majority of the material to be assessed by stakeholders and experts. Artifacts of these
reviews include agenda, review presentation material from the Government and
contractor, and review minutes. Table 3.4-1 describes the systems engineering reviews
prescribed by the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2011) during technology
development.
Table 3.4-1: Systems Engineering Reviews During Technology Development
Review
Name

Review Objectives

Associated
Baseline

System
Requirements
Review

Ensure that the system can proceed into initial development with
acceptable risk and that all requirements derived from warfighter
requirements are defined, testable, and consistent with cost, schedule,
risk, technology readiness, and other system constraints.

Requirements
Baseline

System
Functional
Review

Ensure that the system has a reasonable expectation of satisfying
warfighter requirements within the currently allocated budget and
schedule and that Integrated Product Teams are prepared to start
preliminary design.

Functional
Baseline

Preliminary
Design
Review

Ensure that the system under review has a reasonable expectation of
being judged operationally effective and suitable and that the
hardware, software, human/support systems and underlying
architectures are capable of satisfying the requirements within the
currently allocated budget and schedule.

Allocated
Baseline

Both the manner in which the reviews are executed and the effectiveness of those
reviews is assessed to determine the prominence of the construct.
3.4.1.1.1 “Review Execution” Measure
This measure is used to assess the number, type, nature, and goals of reviews held
during the Technology Development phase of the program. It assesses the focus of the
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review on the appropriate baselines, as opposed to implementation concerns, as well
as the degree to which program budget and schedule are impacted by design choices.
There may be variation among service branches in review execution due to the fact
that the procedures used to govern the reviews are often managed by individual
services or subcomponents (e.g., NAVAIRINST 4355.19D), however the procedures
are commonly based on the process outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook
(DAU, 2011).
3.4.1.1.2 “Review Effectiveness” Measure
The goals of these reviews are to identify risk, align cost and schedule with technical
requirements, and establish valid requirements and design baselines (DAU, 2011). The
effectiveness of these reviews is assessed based on evidence that these goals have
been met. This includes examination of whether significant risks have been identified
during reviews and whether the reviews concluded that the system as specified is
implementable within cost and schedule constraints. Additionally, as part of this
measure, it is determined if stakeholders and subject matter experts from appropriate
disciplines participated in the reviews which is critical to ensuring that all relevant
perspectives have been addressed (DAU, 2011).
3.4.1.2 Measurement of the “Development Knowledge” Construct
“Development Knowledge” is the level of understanding present among the program
regarding the requirements of the system and the design of the solution necessary to
meet those requirements. If the system requirements are not sufficiently defined and
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understood to support development of a technically compliant product within cost and
schedule projections, the program is placed at significant risk. The potential impacts
of insufficient development knowledge are delays to test activities, delays in
production, increased development costs, and decreased technical performance due to
trade-offs made to ensure operational timeline goals are met. If the cost and schedule
requirements of the program are not achievable, then it is unreasonable to expect those
requirements to be met. When the risks are realized during execution due to a lack of
development knowledge the actual costs of the program become evident, which leads
to rebaselining of cost and schedule estimates. Repeated rebaselining is a hallmark of
troubled and failing programs (Kwak and Smith, 2009).
The measurement of the “Development Knowledge” construct focuses on the
development and management of the requirements set and the success of the program
in the Technology Development phase to refine the system requirements and establish
an executable allocated baseline. Development knowledge is the degree to which the
system requirements, operational environment, and required capabilities are
understood by the program and reflected in the system design.
3.4.1.2.1 “Requirements Stability” Measure
Requirements Stability is a measure of the amount and nature of change to the
requirements set during system development. Changes in requirements during system
implementation are a leading cause of cost and schedule overruns as demonstrated on
multiple failed programs (GAO, 2011a; GAO, 2006). Costello and Liu (2005) present
the requirements quality of volatility (i.e. lack of stability) and suggest the use of such
63

metrics early in the development life cycle and continuing through system-level test
and evaluation. Stability of requirements is also identified as a leading indicator of the
success of systems engineering on a program by Roedler, Rhodes, Schimmoller, and
Jones (2010). This subfactor measures program characteristics that indicate future
requirements changes may occur during the Engineering & Manufacturing
Development phase including optional capabilities and requirements that include “tobe-determined” (TBD) parameters.
3.4.1.2.2 “Requirements Validation” Measure
Validation of a requirement set, as defined by Bahill and Dean (2009), is the process
of determining that the requirements set is complete and consistent; supports the
development of an implementable architecture; and can be translated into a real-world
system that can be fabricated and tested. Requirements validation indicates the level of
understanding of the requirements set and impacts of those requirements on the
development and fielding of a system. The validation of the requirement set is also
identified as a leading indicator of systems engineering success (Roedler, Rhodes,
Schimmoller, and Jones, 2010). A system based on a validated requirements set
presents much less development risk than one based on requirements that have not
been adequately examined for feasibility of implementation. Discovery that
requirements are invalid during implementation leads to sacrificing of system
technical performance or delays and cost overruns as new technology is inserted into
the system. This subfactor is assessed through examination of the completeness and
consistency of the requirements set, the degree to which appropriate verification
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criteria have been established, and evidence of a documented system architecture that
is achievable within cost and schedule constraints.
3.4.2 Hypothesis 2 (H2)
The second hypothesis proposes that a positive relationship exists between the product
maturity verification activities and the successful implementation of complex systems.
This hypothesis is stated as follows:
H2: Verification of product maturity prior to system detailed design increases
implementation knowledge.
The validity of this hypothesis is assessed by measuring the relationship between the
independent “Maturity Verification” construct and the dependent “Implementation
Knowledge” construct.
3.4.2.1 Measurement of the “Maturity Verification” Construct
The “Maturity Verification” construct represents activities conducted during the
Technology Development phase to determine the readiness of the proposed system
with regard to both performance in relevant operational environments and factors
related to system producibility. This scope includes the competitive prototyping scope
and technology and manufacturing readiness assessments required to be included in
programs prior to full funding. (WSARA, 2009). Measurement of this construct
includes evaluation of both the requirements on system prototypes and the means by
which the maturity of the proposed system is assessed.
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3.4.2.1.1 “Prototype Requirements” Measure
One of the primary purposes of the Technology Development phase is the
demonstration of critical technologies using system prototypes (DOD 5000.02, 2008).
The Department of the Air Force (2008, pg 1) defines prototyping as follows:
“The process of assembling representative hardware and software into a
configuration that can demonstrate and validate both operation and functionality of
key elements of the proposed product or system".
It is critical from an implementation standpoint that key elements and functionality are
included in the prototype. This measure assesses the technical requirements of the
prototype to determine the degree to which it is representative of the proposed system.
The relevant properties include physical characteristics, system performance, specified
environments, and production process requirements.
3.4.2.1.2 “Maturity Assessment” Measure
The manner in which the product is assessed is critical to developing a proper
understanding of system maturity, as evidenced by the requirement for prototypes to
be demonstrated in relevant environments (DOD 5000.02, 2008). This measure
examines the degree to which maturity assessments include test and evaluation of
prototypes in relevant environments and examination of the components in the
proposed system to determine maturity with regard to predictability of performance
and production capability. The level of adherence to the formal Technology Readiness
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Assessment (TRA Deskbook, 2009) and Manufacturing Readiness Level Assessment
(MRL Assessment Deskbook, 2011) processes are also investigated.
3.4.2.2 Measurement of the “Implementation Knowledge” Construct
Implementation knowledge is the degree to which the required tools, processes, and
technologies for manufacturing and verifying a system that meets requirements is
understood and reflected in the program plan. The GAO recommends that a predetermined level of maturity be demonstrated before integration of a technology into
product development programs. In order to reduce risk, the DoD wishes to match
mission needs to mature technologies that are well understood. Appropriate
technologies are those that can be predictably implemented to enable the satisfaction
of cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements (DoD FY2011 Budget,
2010). To be useful to the warfighter, a technology must be integrated into a system
that can be produced in sufficient quantities in an affordable manner. Therefore, the
concept of manufacturing readiness is also important to a successful acquisition. The
level of Implementation Knowledge acquired by the program is assessed through the
operational measures of Technology Readiness and Manufacturing Readiness.
3.4.2.2.1 “Technology Readiness” Measure
Technology readiness is a measure of the demonstrated maturity of a technology for a
given application in a relevant environment (Technology Readiness Assessment
Deskbook, 2009). Use of mature technology in system designs is a recommended best
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practice that aids in the avoidance of program cost and schedule overruns (GAO,
2011b).
The primary metric for assessing the maturity of technology used in DoD and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) acquisition programs is the
Technology Readiness Level (TRL). TRL is measured on an integer scale of 1 to 9
with higher numbers denoting a higher level of proven maturity. Levels of
demonstrated readiness range from the observation of basic concepts to prototype
validation to demonstration of a system during successful mission operations
(Mankins, 1995).
This subfactor assesses whether the system’s critical technologies have achieved the
requisite maturity of TRL 6, which is the minimum recommended level of technology
maturity for progression into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase
(WSARA, 2009). This level of maturity is evidenced by whether its technologies have
been demonstrated in an operationally relevant environment through prototyping
activities or as part of another system. This subfactor is measured by identifying
whether critical technologies have been used in previous systems and whether those
technologies have been demonstrated in operationally relevant environments to reduce
first-time events prior to system deployment.
3.4.2.2.2 “Manufacturing Readiness” Measure
Manufacturing Readiness is a scale used to support assessment of a technology,
component, manufacturing process, weapon system, or subsystem to determine
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manufacturing maturity and risk (MRL Deskbook, 2011). Once a system is verified to
meet requirements and approved for deployment, it must be consistently manufactured
at a sufficient rate to meet operational needs and at a predictable cost to support valid
budget estimates. It is preferred that production processes be understood and defined
early in programs because a lack of manufacturing knowledge is associated with
production cost and schedule overruns (GAO, 2009). This measure is assessed by
identifying the degree to which the program has achieved the appropriate
Manufacturing Readiness Level by sufficiently defining production plans and
demonstrating processes.
3.4.3 Hypothesis 3 (H3)
The third hypothesis proposes that a relationship exists between the use of an open
approach and the ability to integrate the system with internal and external components
and platforms to obtain an operational capability. This approach is also theorized to
facilitate sustainment and growth of capability over the system lifecycle. This
hypothesis is stated as follows:
H3: Application of a Modular Open Systems Approach during development increases
integration & sustainment knowledge.
The validity of this hypothesis is assessed by measuring the relationship between the
independent “Modular Open Systems Approach” construct and the dependent
“Integration and Sustainment Knowledge” construct.
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3.4.3.1 Measurement of the “Modular Open Systems Approach” Construct
MOSA is an integrated business and technical strategy for systems development and
maintenance that employs a modular design and defines key interfaces using widely
supported, consensus-based standards (OSJTF, 2004). This construct is evaluated by
examining the open-systems requirements levied by the program and the nature of
assessments conducted to determine compliance with a Modular Open Systems
Approach.
3.4.3.1.1 “Open-Systems Requirements” Measure
Open-system requirements are mandatory qualities of a program or system that relate
to the use of previously available components and non-proprietary interface
implementation. These qualities encourage participation of third parties (e.g., entities
other than the vendor and the Government) in system development and sustainment
(Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Alstyne, 2008). This subfactor is assessed by identifying
the amount and nature of open systems requirements levied on the program, including
prohibitions against the use of proprietary components and data (MOSA PART,
2004).
3.4.3.1.2 “Openness Assessments” Measure
Due to the qualitative nature of open-system requirements, assessments are necessary
to ensure conformance to a Modular Open Systems Approach (OSJTF, 2004). This
subfactor measures the number and type of assessments performed to evaluate the
application of standards, identification of relevant components available in the market,
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volatility of system components, and the establishment of business cases for the
degree to which the system should implement open design concepts.
3.4.3.2 Measurement of the “Integration and Sustainment Knowledge” Construct
Once systems are designed and produced, they must be integrated with other systems
and sustained in the long term in order to be useful to the warfighter. System
Integration and Sustainment Knowledge is the degree to which the required tools,
processes, and technologies for connecting the system to external systems and
platforms and the resources necessary to maintain those capabilities over the system
life-cycle are understood by the program.
Most costs of a system occur during operation and sustainment phase, however these
costs are determined through choices made during system development (Blanchard
and Fabrycky, 2005). Therefore, it is critical that the development programs account
for future change of the required system capabilities and environments. This construct
is assessed through the assessment of the inclusion of previously developed and
proven components in the proposed system design and the degree to which the
implementation details of critical interfaces are disclosed to interested parties.
3.4.3.2.1 “Non-Developmental Items” Measure
Non-developmental items (NDI) are components of a system that have been obtained
from a commercial source or have been reused from prior programs. The use of NDI
significantly reduces program uncertainty because the performance characteristics and
behavior of the components have been previously verified. Use of NDI reduces both
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the scope of development work and the uncertainty that the component is compliant to
specifications (Steves, 1997). This subfactor is assessed by examining the use of nondevelopmental hardware and software components in the system design.
3.4.3.2.2 “Interface Disclosure” Measure
Interface disclosure is a tenet of MOSA that seeks to ensure that interfaces are
implemented in such a way as to support integration with other systems and system
capability growth (OSJTF, 2004). This measure is evaluated by determining the
degree to which the system interface implementation definitions are available to
interested parties, comply with published standards, and support future capability
growth and component replacement (MOSA PART, 2004).
3.4.4 Additional Barriers and Enablers
For each of the dependent constructs, there exist a set of currently unknown barriers
and enablers to the successful implementation of an Evolutionary Acquisition
approach. While these factors are not part of the primary line of questioning, the
research design includes elements that attempt to identify them.
3.5 Research Design
The complexity of defense systems and time lines associated with their development
discourage the application of experimental methods by limiting the researcher’s ability
to isolate variables and control the project environment. Research into systems and
processes with a high level of complexity limit the use of control cases, the isolation
of variables, and the ability to apply standardized methodology (Valerdi and Davidz,
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2009). Verification of product maturity and MOSA as components of a
comprehensive systems-engineering approach share similar issues with regard to the
development of effective research designs. As the concepts are difficult to objectively
quantify, individual perception of their meaning, applicability, and implementation are
the most valid measures available for these qualities.
Qualitative methods are applicable to problems dealing with human systems,
particularly for studies exploring organizational effects because people are dynamic,
individualistic, and capable of misalignment (Avison, et al, 1999). Therefore,
qualitative research methods are appropriate for application to the study of the defense
acquisition process to collect evidence regarding theory and application of principles.
Because the objects of the study are humans rather than inanimate objects, it is critical
to capture the subject’s frame of reference when collecting data. Therefore, the
research plan is implemented to measure the constructs using a qualitative, mixedmethods multiple-case-study methodology based on Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009)
to investigate the impact of the acquisition process changes at the program level. The
case studies are augmented by survey methods that collect data from a larger variety
of programs. The integrated research methodology is depicted in Figure 3.5-1.
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Figure 3.5-1: Integrated Research Methodology

This integrated framework includes two distinct stages with case studies followed by
surveys. The goal of this methodology is to achieve both depth and breadth to the data
and findings within available resources. When studying new areas or phenomena,
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that periods of data collection and analysis overlap so that
adjustments to data collection efforts for improved effectiveness. This
recommendation supports the use of multiple data collection stages in the research
design wherein later data collection activities (i.e. surveys) are influenced by the data
collected in the earlier stage (i.e. interviews). The use of multiple sources of
information also allows for triangulation of information to increase the validity of the
results (Yin, 2009).
3.5.1 Case Study Approach
The first stage consists of case studies of programs executed under the new acquisition
process guidelines. Case studies provide an advanced understanding of the subjects
under investigation because their findings are grounded in reality and captured in
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empirical data (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Case studies should be used when the research
question addresses the “how’s” and “why’s” of the topic of interest; the researcher is
not able to conduct controlled experiments; the goal of the research is to explore
current events and outcomes; and the context of the research is application-oriented as
opposed to theoretical. The case study methodology is specifically cited as appropriate
approach for investigating the outcomes and drivers for government programs (Yin,
2009). The case study methodology has been successfully applied to systems
engineering and management aspects of defense acquisition projects (Friedman and
Sage, 2003).
In this research design, two cases of defense acquisition programs executed under the
new process are examined at multiple levels through review of program
documentation and interviews of several members of each program team. This stage
provides a significant level of depth to the research as it examines each case
individually from multiple perspectives using multiple data sources. Relevant program
documentation is reviewed to examine the prominence of the constructs and determine
the prevalence of the hypothesized relationships. The document reviews are completed
prior to the interviews to ensure that the researcher has a thorough understanding of
the context of each case. Interviews are then conducted to assess hypotheses and gain
a deeper understanding of the case elements than is possible with review of static
documents.
Interviews allow for targeted focus on specific topics and provide causal inferences by
subjects (Yin, 2009). Niazi, Wilson, and Zowghi (2005) raised the concern that
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previous “Critical Success Factor” research has been dominated by multiple-choice
questionnaire survey methodology. The restriction of response options may lead to
bias due to the limitation of responses to those factors that have been already
identified in the literature or which the researchers find to be important. Therefore, the
use of interviews that allow the subjects to identify the crucial elements that shape the
programs' knowledge and risk position is appropriate for this application. The primary
purpose of the interviews is to develop a framework to facilitate understanding of the
organizational interactions (Cunningham, 1993) and to support development of the
survey research instruments.
Individual case analyses are performed to determine both the prominence of the
constructs and the relationships among them. Cross-case analysis is also performed to
identify patterns and differences between the two cases with regard to the factors
identified in the single-case analyses. The study of multiple programs provides a small
but significant amount of breadth to the research by limiting the effect of idiosyncratic
elements of either case on the theory to be developed.
The research design incorporates a feedback loop wherein the results of the case
studies are compared to the research model and hypotheses to determine whether they
should be revised. This approach is flexible and allows for what Eisenhardt (1998)
defines as “controlled opportunism” which is especially important when the goal of
the research is the establishment of theory through the exploration of new topics or
phenomena. If necessary, the survey instrument is also modified as a result of
discoveries that occur during case analysis.
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3.5.2 Survey Approach
The second stage consists of a questionnaire-based survey of a population selected
from a pool of participants in Evolutionary Acquisition programs as well as subjectmatter experts in relevant fields. The survey is structured such that the questions
identify the prevalence of the constructs on the programs and the impacts of the
independent constructs on the program’s execution and subsequent risk position.
In contrast to case studies, survey research seeks to identify the prevalence of
constructs within a larger cross-section of the population. The use of surveys to gather
more information regarding topics and issues discovered during interviews is
suggested by Cunningham (1993). The larger sample size allows for generalization of
concepts across groups (Babbie, 1990), providing substantial breadth to the study by
incorporating a wider variety of viewpoints based on diverse experiences. The use of a
survey instrument adds a set of quantitative data collected from a broad population to
the narrow, but rich set of empirical data collected during the case study portion. The
quantitative data obtained from the survey is used to statistically test the hypotheses.
3.5.3 Case Studies and Surveys as Complementary Methods
When dealing with complex, dynamic situations, qualitative and quantitative methods
applied in conjunction often provide the most effective insight into the problem under
review (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Interviews and surveys, in particular, are complementary
instruments, providing breadth and depth, respectively (Elm, 2008; Flyvbjerg, 2006),
while the document reviews provide objective context of the cases being studied.
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Analysis of qualitative data is difficult and complex, requiring a solid understanding
of the data’s context and social setting (Marshall and Rossman, 1989). Case study
methods provide deep understanding of the nuanced and dynamic environment of the
programs, allowing for the identification of factors that might not be captured by a
questionnaire instrument (Woodside and Wilson, 2003), whereas surveys are useful
for discovering the prevalence of factors and determining their effect on a large
number of situations in a relatively short period of time (Yin, 2009).
Previous case studies of multiple concurrent development projects using interview and
survey data have been successfully completed, yielding insight into organizational
processes. For example, Purser, Pasmore, Tenkasi (1992) utilized multiple data
collection methods including 55 structured interviews and a survey of 130
practitioners focused on two projects executed by the same organization. Similarly,
the research methodology presented here includes the gathering of data from multiple
programs within a common organization using interviews and surveys. Based on the
resulting research design, data collection and analysis procedures are developed and
pre-tested.
3.5.4 Pilot Study Approach
Piloting of a research study incorporates the middle components of a Deming cycle
(i.e., “Plan, Do, Check, Act”) to improve the outcome of the main study by testing the
methods prior to full implementation. Pilot studies can be particularly effective for the
refinement of data collection plans and lines of questioning (Yin, 2009). Research
instruments, hypotheses, and analysis techniques may be improved or replaced based
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on the outcome of these activities. Pilot study activities provide an opportunity for the
researcher to practice the data collection and analysis skills necessary for the effective
execution of studies. They also allow for third-party review of results to identify
improvements to the data collection and analysis process prior to the initiation of the
data collection phase of the study (Marshall and Rossman, 1989).
The execution of full pilot case studies is not feasible in the context of this research
due to the small number of relevant cases available. However, in order to take
advantage of the benefits of the piloting process, the interview and survey instruments
are tested prior to full implementation. As the nature of documentation is static and
allows for repeated analysis, reviews of these artifacts are not piloted. The focus of
pilot activity for this research is refinement of the research and data analysis
techniques. The survey instrument employed by this research is examined by
academic experts prior to survey execution.
The data from these pilot activities is processed according to the research plan to
ensure that the data obtained can be analyzed using the proposed techniques. The
analysis encompasses all steps of the processing from data verification through
hypothesis testing. The examination of pilot data serves to ensure that the data from
the surveys is compatible with the procedures and tools used to process it. The results
from this analysis are reviewed with colleagues and the respondents to assess the
validity of the results obtained. The purpose of this piloting process is to assess
whether the mechanics of the process are correctly specified. The results of any
analysis during the piloting activity are not used to validate constructs or hypotheses.
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If found to be advantageous, the interview format, survey instrument, or data analysis
process may be modified to ensure that subject responses are able to be properly
transformed from raw data to usable results. The output of the pilot activities are
captured in the research database, but are not included in the published results.
3.5.5 Quality of Research Methodology
The quality of the research is crucial due to the fact that research that lacks validity
provides questionable results that are more likely to be improperly applied in the field
(Valerdi and Davidz, 2009). In furtherance of demonstrating the quality of the
research methodology, the following tests of construct validity, internal validity,
external validity, and reliability identified by Yin (2009) are used. Additionally,
potential sources of bias are identified and addressed
3.5.5.1 Construct Validity
Construct validity is the degree to which the concepts identified by the research
actually exist and correct operational metrics are used to assess the effects of
identified concepts and the hypothesized relationships among them. Construct validity
in Systems Engineering research is especially challenging due to the lack of consistent
definition of systems engineering terms and practices across organizations (Valerdi
and Davidz, 2009). Therefore, conducting studies on different projects executed
within a commercial organization provides for increased construct validity due to the
common context for the concepts measured by the research instruments. Additionally,
the use of a two-phase data collection strategy that incorporates a feed-back loop and
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review of the instruments by third parties allows for the verification that the constructs
identified are being properly measured. The results of theory-building research
methods based on real-world situations such as case studies have a high likelihood of
empirical validity because the construct and theory development process is so closely
intertwined with the data collection efforts (Eisenhardt, 1989). As the constructs
measured by the survey instrument are derived from the case study results, the
research has a high level of construct validity. To demonstrate the construct validity of
the research design, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is performed on the survey
data. CFA provides analysis of the internal structure of operationalized measures and
the constructs to identify the degree of correspondence between them (Pedhazur and
Schmelkin, 1991).
3.5.5.2 Internal Validity
Internal validity relies on the establishment of causal relationships among the
constructs. Internal validity is bolstered through the development of logic models to
better understand and communicate relationships (Yin, 2009). The use of the logic
model presented in Section 2.4 as the basis for the construct model and hypothesized
relationships improves the internal validity of the research design. The in-depth study
of multiple cases and the survey covering a larger number of programs allows for
pattern matching and triangulation (Yin, 2009), also known as Convergent Validity
(Valerdi and Davidz, 2009). Triangulation also increases the internal validity of the
research when multiple lines of questioning and methods (e.g., interviews and
document reviews) for gathering data within each case study yield similar results. The
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existence of convergence increases the likelihood that the observed effects are real and
not an artifact of the data collection instruments or methods. The use of cross-case
analysis as well as the collection of data from respondents with varying perspectives
and responsibility levels within each case increases the likelihood of triangulation
when the constructs under investigation are supportable by the data (Yin, 2009).
3.5.5.3 External Validity
External validity is a measure of the applicability of the study results to the defined
domain (Yin, 2009). A high level of external validity is critical for successful
application of the theory developed to other programs. If the generalizability of the
results is low, implementation of suggestions forwarded by this research could
conceivably hinder rather than improve the knowledge and risk position of a program
(Valerdi and Davidz, 2009).
A challenge to the external validity of the research is posed by the number of
programs to be included in the first phase of the study. The small number of cases
available is due to the fact that the few programs that have been executed under the
new DoD acquisition process have reached a point where results are evident. While
there is relatively small number of active programs currently being executed under
this new process, the external validity is likely to improve over time as older programs
end and new programs incorporate the elements of Evolutionary Acquisition as
specified by DoD regulations. The fact that the programs under review represent
emerging phenomena that will become more prevalent in the future qualifies these
cases as “revelatory”, and therefore important for investigation (Yin, 2009).
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Although a large population is usually preferred to increase the likelihood that the
research is generalizable, small-sample case studies are acceptable for theory building
as long as depth is acquired (Eisenhardt, 1989). The review of program documentation
and interviews with multiple participants per program provide the requisite depth. To
account for the relatively small sample size, the constructs under study in this research
have a strong grounding in the literature on defense acquisition and product
development. The external validity of research is improved when variables are based
on literature reviews because the literature incorporates results from a large number of
diverse scenarios (Gable, 1994).
As the primary goal of this effort is to build theory to be tested by future research, the
results may be tested across a greater number and variety of programs as part of future
research when more data becomes available. The future extension of the study is
supported by a documented research protocol contained in the Data Collection and
Analysis section. The documentation facilitates reliable replication of the research in
other contexts and supports other studies to verify the results. Additionally, the use of
surveys administered to practitioners to determine the prevalence and impacts of the
identified constructs in other contexts adds significant breadth to make results more
generalizable.
Another specific challenge to the chosen research methodology and the programs
selected is that it does not seek to draw responses from a diverse set of cases. The
programs studied are selected purposively rather than randomly, which is preferable
for research oriented to developing theory and identifying constructs (Eisenhardt,
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1989). The selection of cases that incorporate the newly modified acquisition
principles is highly relevant to future acquisition programs and improves the external
validity of the research inside of an important emerging context.
On the surface, the limitation of scope to DoD programs may make the theories and
constructs generated difficult to extend to other areas. Even though acquisition
programs conducted by NASA, Homeland Security (including Coast Guard), other
federal agencies, or private firms are not directly included in the study, those domains
share many characteristics with defense acquisitions. Future studies may be executed
based on the documented methodology to investigate the prevalence and impact of the
identified factors in those specific domains.
Due to the opportunity for access to interview subjects and detailed programmatic
data, the case studies are limited to contractor organizations that execute programs.
The fact that both programs drew data from contractors and involved similar levels of
complexity serve to reduce the number of factors involved in the evaluation, but
potentially reduces the external validity of the results. The concentration of studies on
a single organization is not unprecedented. Previous studies in related areas have been
conducted with phases of data collection focused on a single organization. The
Corning Systems Engineering Directorate (2009) measured the effectiveness of
systems engineering techniques using a literature review and interviews with 19
systems engineers and project managers at Corning, Inc. Kludze (2003) conducted a
study of systems engineering effectiveness by interviewing a population limited to
NASA program personnel. Purser, Pasmore, and Ramkrishnan (1992) conducted case
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studies of two concurrent product development projects within a single division of a
company. The Purser and Kludze case studies were also complemented with
questionnaires administered to a larger population to increase the generalizability of
the results. These examples bolster the view that the challenges to generalizability,
while significant, do not invalidate the value of the research.
3.5.5.4 Reliability
The term "reliability" in this context refers to the repeatability of results using the
identified protocol. Reliability is principally enhanced through development of a
database and rigorous documentation of the study execution (Yin, 2009). A threat to
the reliability of the research is that a single individual was responsible for collection
and analysis of all research data. The use of a single researcher could not be avoided
due to the resources available to support the research. This fact is mitigated by the
existence of field notes taken during the investigation and the rigorous methodology
applied during data collection. Well-defined case study protocols significantly
increase the reliability of the research by reducing variation in execution (Yin, 2009).
Though the data presented is masked, protection of the confidentiality of the data is
not identified as a major impediment to the research, as the researcher has knowledge
of the identities of the respondents. The reproducibility could be questioned, however
if another researcher wishes to follow up on the conducted research proper assurance
of information non-disclosure could be the major impediment. The fact that the
interviewees perceptions and experiences color the responses may also be a challenge
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to reliability, but the open nature of the questions reduce the effect of interviewer bias
(Cunningham, 1993).
When using a questionnaire to gather quantitative data, it is important to test the
results to assure that the instrument is reliable. The reliability of the questionnaire is
critical to the overall validity of the findings as well as the ability to extend the
research in future work to encompass adjacent topics or populations. Unfortunately, as
the reliability of a measurement is dependent on the population being measured, the
reliability of the questionnaire cannot be determined prior to employment (Pedhazur
and Schmelkin, 1991).
To quantitatively assess the reliability of the survey instrument, the results of
questions grouped by associated operationalized measures and Cronbach’s Alpha is
calculated for each group. If reliability scores are low for a particular item, then it is
considered for removal as an appropriate measure of the construct. At that time, it is
decided if the question is invalid, if it is closely related to another construct, or if it
measures a factor that is likely to vary independently of the other questions while still
representing the construct.
3.5.5.5 Potential Sources of Bias
All research is susceptible to bias, therefore, it is critical to recognize and account for
it during the research planning stage and acknowledge it in research reports (Leedy,
1989). The following sources of bias have been identified and action has been taken to
decrease the influence of these sources as described below.
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Due to available resources, one individual is responsible for collection and analysis of
all data. Yin (2009) identifies researcher preconceptions as a significant source of bias
in case study research. To address this source of bias, a rigorous process is
documented and followed during collection and analysis of the data. The overlap of
data collection and analysis that results from the two-stage process provides the
opportunity to revise the constructs of the research if they are not supported by the
data. Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that the closeness of the researcher to the data when
using case study methods actually reduces bias in the results. A research database is
maintained so that others can examine the evidence and preliminary findings are
discussed with colleagues to gather multiple points of view.
The methods used to extract the data are a potential source of bias because the
respondents may be influenced by the way that questions are asked. Connotations of
terms may influence the respondent to try to give the “correct” answer. Additionally, it
should not be assumed that everyone has the same understanding of context-specific
terms. Interviewees are likely to answer the questions in response to the meaning that
any ambiguous terms have to them (Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991). To ensure clarity
of purpose, interviews are conducted using open-ended questions that avoid the use of
jargon and ambiguous phrasing. The terms used in the survey questions are based on
Government sources that are not program-specific. Both the interview and surveys
questions are reviewed by third parties to ensure that all terms used are clear and do
not imply positive or negative connotations. The interview process and the survey
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instrument are piloted to further identify questions that may influence the respondent’s
answers.
Data collected from interviews is particularly susceptible to the effects of memory and
retrospective reasoning (Woodside and Wilson, 2003). An effective strategy to
account for bias in interview data is the collection the use of multiple subjects to
provide diverse perspectives because it is unlikely that their individual biases
converge (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Self-presentation, that is the tendency of
interview respondents to make a particular impression (Pedhazur and Schmelkin,
1991), may be a significant in the interview phase. Collecting data from program
documentation and Government assessments provides independent verification of the
risk position of each program.
The affect of sample selection may also be significant due to the small number of
cases being studied and the theoretical sampling approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) used to
increase the relevance of the data to the research question. The programs to be studied
are revelatory cases for the new process; therefore there are few cases available. The
focus of the case studies on an organization with a consistent, well-established culture
is driven by the researcher’s opportunity access to a large amount of rich data. The
researcher has an extensive understanding of the organizational culture and the impact
of cultural effects is included in the set of rival explanations considered. The use of a
questionnaire instrument to test the findings of the cases studies provides for testing of
the hypotheses on a larger sample population.
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3.6 Data Collection and Analysis Process
The purpose of the data collection and analysis phase is to gather information
regarding the specified constructs and measures that is used to determine the validity
of the constructs and their hypothesized relationships. This phase of research includes
the selection of cases, the development of the research instruments, and the collection
and analysis of the individual data sets. The documentation reviews, interviews, and
surveys are used as data-gathering tools to obtain diverse perspectives on the problems
facing defense acquisition programs. Table 3.6-1 identifies the subjects addressed and
the objectives sought through use of each type of research instrument.
Table 3.6-1: Overview of Data Collection Methods
Data Collection
Method

Data Source

Objective

Program
Documentation
Review

Program requirements, review
material, and program plans

Determine program context and execution
effectiveness

Interviews

Twenty practitioners involved
in two Evolutionary
Acquisition programs

Develop insight into impacts of process changes
on program execution and identify new barriers
and enablers to effective execution

Surveys

Thirty practitioners involved in
Evolutionary Acquisition
programs

Measure the prevalence and impact of identified
constructs and test relationships among them

This section describes how the data is collected, analyzed, and documented during the
research process.
3.6.1 Case Selection Process
The case-selection process identifies “what” is to be studied. Factors that affect case
selection include access to sources of information, data collection methods being used,
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applicability to the research question, and type of data sought. Selection of the cases to
be studied requires determining the unit or units of analysis to define the boundaries of
a case in the context of the study, be it an individual, a project, a company, or even an
entire country (Yin, 2009). This research defines a case as the Technology
Development phase of a Major Defense Acquisition Program.
This research employs purposive sampling to ensure that valid cases are studied,
increasing the probability that the results yield data useful to the specific problem.
When employing a case-study methodology to develop theory, it is preferable to select
cases that are germane to the theory domain rather than employing random sampling.
Purposive selection of cases can also serve to control for variation of unmeasured
factors in the case (Eisenhardt, 1989).
To ensure selection of appropriate cases, the objectives of the study are enumerated
along with the resultant constraints on the available cases. These constraints are
identified and mitigation measures are implemented within the research plan to lessen
their impact. The objectives, constraints, and mitigation related to case selection are
presented in Table 3.6-2.
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Table 3.6-2: Case Selection Objectives, Constraints, and Mitigation
Objective

Constraint

Mitigation

Study impacts of DoD
5000.02 changes on projects
at or after Milestone B

Defense programs initiated
between 2008 and 2010

 Literature review to establish
validity of constructs;
 Significant depth of inquiry

Control for Program
Complexity

Limited to Major Defense
Acquisition Programs

 Multiple hypotheses linked to
individual construct
relationships

Complete Study within Time
& Resources

Maximum of two cases;
Excludes very-large-scale
and multi-national programs

 Identify future work;
 Use survey to check external
validity

Access Sufficient Data Detail

Protection of proprietary and
competition-sensitive data
Issues

 Store sensitive data on
organization’s computers;
 Mask and Aggregate Published
Data

3.6.2 Program Documentation Review Process
Program documentation is reviewed to obtain evidence that demonstrates the presence
and level of emphasis placed on the identified constructs during planning and
execution of the Technology Development phase of the program. Organizational
information, such as that contained in program documentation, is useful for
developing the context of the case (Cunningham, 1993). The benefits of using
program documentation as a source of information for case studies are that they are
stable, unobtrusive, and allow for examination of longer time spans which facilitates
establishment of the case's history (Yin, 2009).
3.6.2.1 Documentation Selection
Program documentation artifacts are chosen for the review based on their applicability
to the research constructs within each program and their availability for both cases.
The documents selected for review are identified in Table 3.6-3.
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Table 3.6-3: Documents Reviewed for Case Studies
Document

Source

Description

Information Sought

Contractor

Documents contractor's
process and planned activities
for technical effort of contract.

 Review execution and focus
 Open systems approach
 Prototype and system development
process
 Requirements management approach

Statement of
Work (SOW)

Government

Defines Scope of work for
contract to include reviews,
assessments, and test activities.

System
Specifications

Specifies performance
Government
requirements and design
& Contractor
solution

 Technology and manufacturing scope
and challenges
 Technologies and solutions applied to
program
 Maturity of requirement baselines

Preliminary
Design Review
(PDR) Material

Snapshot of program and
system development progress
Government
prior to Milestone B.
& Contractor
Addresses cost and schedule,
and technical factors.






Systems
Engineering
Management
Plan (SEMP)

Programmatic requirements for:
 Systems engineering execution
 Prototype development
 MOSA implementation

MOSA Implementation
Prototype results
Review focus and content
Risk assessments

Additionally, these documents are relatively consistent in format and required content
and provide multiple perspectives of the programs. After selection of the documents,
they are obtained from each program and stored in a secure on-site research database.
3.6.2.2 Documentation Analysis Process
Each document is initially reviewed individually to provide an understanding of the
structure and overall themes. Using the document review analysis instrument (see
Appendix A), each construct is rated using a scale that is adapted from the
Government-developed MOSA Program Assessment and Rating Tool (MOSA PART,
2004). The scale is applied to four questions for each measure as to the extent that it is
present on the program. The four-point rating scheme is described in Table 3.6-4.
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Table 3.6-4: Document Rating Scale Adapted for Documentation Reviews
Extent Present

Description

1 – None

No evidence that the subject has been adequately addressed

2 – Little

Minimal evidence that subject has been adequately addressed

3 – Moderate

Significant evidence that subject has been adequately addressed

4 – Large

Very high level of evidence that subject has been adequately addressed

In addition to the rating of construct applicability to the program, the document review
provides general insight into the execution of the program and allows for the tailoring
of interview questions to align with program-specific terms.
3.6.3 Interview Process
Semi-structured interviews with practitioners involved in defense acquisition
programs executed under the new guidelines are conducted to identify characteristics
of evolutionary acquisition implementation on the selected programs. The interview
questions, particularly the terms used to describe the constructs, are shaped by the
context provided by the literature review and the examination of program
documentation. These questions focus on the relationships among the constructs
identified in the research model.
3.6.3.1 Interview Question Development
Interview questions are developed to measure the constructs as well as to gather
demographic data about the interview subjects. These questions are developed in part
based on the review of case documentation to align them with the organizational
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situation and properly reflect the context of the organization. The questions included
in the survey instrument are presented in Table 3.6-5.
Table 3.6-5: Interview Questions for Case Study Participants
#

Question

Construct

1

How would you characterize your role
on the TD program?

Demographic

2

How long have you been working in
the field of national defense and what
roles have you performed?

Demographic

3

How did the new TD/EMD structure
affect the planning and execution of
the program?

General

4

How did the scope of the TD program
impact the knowledge and risk
position of the Government with
regard to completing the acquisition of
this system on-time and within
budget?

General

Assess the opinion of the respondent
as to whether the new structure as
implemented on the program is
beneficial to the Government.

5

How did completion of systems
engineering reviews (e.g., PDR)
during the TD phase impact the risk
position of the program for EMD and
later phases?

H1

Assess the perceived impact of early
systems engineering activities on the
risk level of completing the program.

6

How did prototype development and
testing during the TD phase impact the
risk position of the program for EMD
and later phases?

H2

Assess the perceived impact of
prototype development and
demonstration activities on the
maturity of the proposed system
solution.

7

How did the execution of Modular
Open Systems scope during the TD
phase impact the risk position of the
program for EMD and later phases?

H3

Assess the perceived impact of open
systems requirements and assessment
activities on the system sustainment
and upgrade risk level of the program.

8

9

What additional actions could the
Government have taken during the TD
phase to improve the risk position of
the program for EMD and later
phases?
What additional actions could the
Government have taken during the TD
phase to improve the risk position of
the program for EMD and later
phases?

Objective
Determine perspective of interview
subject. Provides context for
responses.
Determine experience base from
which conclusions and assessment are
drawn.
Assess positive or negative
impressions of the affect of the
process modifications. May identify
bias regarding the new paradigm and
barriers to effective implementation.

Barriers /
Enablers

Identify Government-controlled
enablers and barriers to
implementation of the new process.

Barriers /
Enablers

Identify contractor-controlled barriers
and enablers to implementation of the
new process.
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The first two items are demographic questions posed to establish background,
experience base, and potential biases of the interview subject. The third and forth
questions are posed to the subject to assess their opinion regarding barriers and
enablers to the success of the new process. Questions 5, 6, and 7 pertain to the impact
of each of the independent constructs on the results of the Technology Development
program. The purpose of the three independent-construct questions is to evaluate the
validity of the dependent constructs and the hypothesized relationships. The final two
questions are asked regarding the overall impact of the transition to a two-phase
program structure to gather general impressions regarding the acquisition process
changes that may affect the responses to other questions. Significant themes across
responses to the final two questions are used to develop new survey questions to
measure the impact of these barriers and enablers on a larger sample of programs.
The interview contains many "discovery" characteristics which allow the interviewee
to describe concepts and experiences through responses to generalized, open-ended
questions. Discovery interviews are particularly useful during the beginning stages of
studies and are helpful in the development of valid research instruments (Cunningham
1993). They also allow for deeper understanding than highly structured questions and
present opportunities to probe the subject using follow-up questions.
While it is more difficult to analyze the responses to open-ended questions than
closed-ended inquiries, this approach may decrease the effect of bias due to question
phrasing. They also significantly improve the researcher’s understanding of the
response context (Cunningham, 1993). As it is critical to recognize the respondent’s
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reference frame when executing empirical research, this reference is important
because it allows for the examination of motives and methods that are internal to the
organization, not just assigning cause-and-effect relationships based on external
factors (Valerdi and Davidz, 2009). In addition, the depth of understanding gained by
the researcher through the review of program documentation related to the constructs
prior to the interviews is expected to facilitate analysis of the data.
3.6.3.2 Interview Population Selection Process
The target subjects of the interviews are practitioners in the field of military system
development that have significant experience on one of the programs selected as a
case study. Involvement of practitioners in the research process is critical because
members of organizations are most capable of defining their problems and potential
solutions (Cunningham, 1993). A diverse set of program roles is identified for
inclusion in the study including program managers, technical managers, logisticians,
and systems, software, and hardware engineers. The roles of intended interview
subjects and their anticipated perspectives are identified in Figure 3.6-1.
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Figure 3.6-1: Interview Subjects and Associated Perspectives

Candidates for inclusion in the interview population are identified during the
document review. Sources of information regarding the appropriate interview
population include document signatory pages, review presentations, and organization
charts.
3.6.3.3 Pilot Interview Execution
Pilot interviews are executed primarily to ensure that the meanings of the questions
are clear, the inquiries elicit the correct type of information, and the interviews can be
executed in an appropriate amount of time. This pilot activity consists of interviewing
subjects in positions similar to potential subjects, but who are not required candidates
for inclusion in the main study due to their level of involvement in the cases under
review. In order to increase the effectiveness of the interview pretest, the pilot
interviews are conducted in the same manner and in the same setting as the later data
97

collection stage. Feedback is solicited from the subject after the event with regard to
the interview pace, context, and question phrasing. If necessary, the interview
questions and process are modified as a result of issues found during the pilot
interviews. If the interview process or questions are not significantly modified after
the pilot interview, the data collected is included in the research sample.
3.6.3.4 Interview Administration Process
The top-level questions are written out before the interview stage begins. The phrasing
of the questions are carefully developed and documented to ensure that the questions
are capable of eliciting the proper information from the respondent. The questions are
to be posed to the interviewee exactly as written. This consistency decreases bias that
may be caused by variations in the question phrasing that introduces measurement
variation (Babbie, 1990).
The interviews are conducted one-on-one with individuals. The goal is to conduct all
interviews in person to take advantage of the tone and body-language information that
can be obtained by observing the subject (Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991), though
some interviews may be performed by telephone if necessary. The interview
administration process is depicted in Figure 3.6-2.
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Figure 3.6-2: Interview Administration Process

Each potential subject is contacted by phone or in person and asked to participate in
the study. If the subject agrees, the interview is scheduled. The day before the
interview, a reminder of the time and location is sent to the subject. Each interview
begins with a statement by the interviewer to explain the purpose of the interview to
frame the context of the discussion. The interview questions are then posed to the
subject and responses are recorded. If answers to any particular question are
insufficient, probing questions are asked to clarify the response. As audio recordings
are not allowed at the facility where interviews are conducted, notes from interviews
are documented on specially prepared interview data collection sheets. A study of
Systems Engineering effectiveness conducted at the Corning Corporation that
included interviews also used no recording devices in favor of handwritten notes
(Corning Systems Engineering Directorate, 2009).
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During the interview, care is taken to ensure that the notes record the responses reflect
the answers as they are given. Additionally, marginal comments are recorded with
regard to the interviewee’s tone and body language. After conclusion of each
interview, the researcher records initial impressions of the responses. These responses
are recorded separately from the subject responses.
Raw data from interviews is converted from the hand-written notes into an electronic
format via typing or scanning and stored on computer systems internal to the
organization where data is collected to limit the risk that proprietary data is revealed to
unauthorized persons. The notes are then provided to the subject for comment and
updated if necessary. The output of the interview process is retained in an online data
storage site to permit access from multiple locations.
3.6.3.5 Interview Data Analysis Process
The data collected through the interview process is analyzed to gain further insight
into the cases and the validity of the constructs and hypotheses. The demographic
questions are used to obtain background information for the subject and context for
the information received from the other questions. This data is also employed to
qualitatively identify any relationship between the subject’s background and
perspective on the processes. The responses to the general questions regarding the
changes to the acquisition process are used to identify program-level implications of
the changes and are analyzed to determine if there is an impact to the models and
hypotheses. The data from the general questions is also used to determine if a bias
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exists against the process changes that may color the responses to the remaining
question.
For the questions relating to the hypotheses, the individual interview responses are
coded for the presence of the relevant dependent construct as well as the polarity of
the hypothesized relationship. Constructs and themes among responses that are not
related to the identified constructs are analyzed with particular attention paid to
similar phrasing among responses. Responses to the two questions relating to potential
improvements that could be made by the Government and contractors during
execution of programs are examined to determine if any additional barriers and
enablers to a successful acquisition exist and should be studied by future research.
After all of the interviews have been conducted for a case, notes among interview
events are compared with the intent of identifying the prevalence of the constructs and
the hypothesized relationships within the case. If new themes emerge through the
interview process, they are added to list of potential constructs for assessment. Once
the interview stage of each case study is complete and the final list of themes and
trends is identified, the data from each interview is examined for the presence of
dissenting or contradictory evidence. Yin (1989) identifies the addressing of rival
theories as critical to the validity of research findings, therefore responses to the
interview questions are analyzed to identify preliminary conclusions that are used to
revise the conceptual model, research model, hypotheses, and survey instrument if
necessary. It is critical to identify contradictory trends in data as they may serve to
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identify challenges to the resulting hypotheses that may need to be explored during
theory testing (Marshall and Rossman, 1989).
Upon completion of the interview data analysis, descriptive statistics are generated
with regard to demographics and correlated responses. A percentage of responses that
corroborate the dependent constructs and hypotheses are presented along with
significant rival explanations present in the data. Themes within the barriers and
enablers identified by the subjects are also analyzed and described. Significant quotes
are included in the report to increase the understanding of the data. This data is
combined with the document review results to support case-level analysis.
3.6.4 Single and Cross-Case Analysis Process
Both single and cross-case analyses are performed to assess the presence and impacts
of the constructs on the programs under review. The process for analysis of the case
study data is depicted in Figure 3.6-3.

Figure 3.6-3: Single and Cross-Case Analysis Process
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At the conclusion of the interview phase for each case, documentation is again
reviewed as necessary to corroborate interview responses and investigate responses
that seem contradictory with other information. Factual responses to interview
questions should be corroborated with information from other sources, such as case
documents, whereas opinions need not be supported by other sources (Yin, 2009). The
document review results are then compared with the interview responses to determine
if they converge. These results provide insight into the internal and construct validity
of the research. A description of the characteristics of each case is constructed wherein
the general level of agreement between the sources is noted and particular areas of
convergence or divergence are analyzed and described.
After both case studies are complete, cross-case analysis is conducted by comparing
the profiles. They are examined with regard to their agreement on the validity of the
constructs and hypotheses and the identification of new themes. The degree of
convergence between the two cases provides strong evidence as to the validity of the
constructs and hypotheses. If necessary, the conceptual model, hypotheses, and survey
instrument are modified based on this analysis.
3.6.5 Survey Process
After conclusion of the case studies, a survey is administered in order to obtain data
from a wider range of programs. The data gathered is used to determine the
generalizability of the case study findings and statistically evaluated to test the
hypotheses. Self-reporting instruments, such as written surveys, are a common and
effective tool for gathering data on organizational and process studies because they
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support a large number of samples and can be analyzed quantitatively (Cunningham,
1993). The development of the survey instrument and administration process was
executed using the following sequential steps:
1. Review relevant examples of survey studies
2. Select the population to be surveyed
3. Develop the survey instrument
4. Pilot the survey and incorporate findings
5. Administer the survey
6. Analyze the survey responses
7. Test hypotheses
These steps were adopted based on the relevant examples identified during the
literature review (Elm, 2008; Kludze, 2003).
3.6.5.1 Review of Relevant Survey Examples
Two example survey studies in the area of Systems Engineering were analyzed to aid
in development of the survey for this research. The survey instruments, target
populations, and analysis techniques were examined to determine the desirable
characteristics of the research methods and processes. Additionally, the results of the
surveys and issues identified during the development and execution of them were
analyzed to determine lessons learned that could be incorporated into this research.
A cooperative study (Elm, et al, 2008) between the Software Engineering Institute and
the National Defense Industry Association sought to identify the association between
the systems engineering practices and project performance using multiple choice,
forced-Likert-scale, and free-response questions. The study used a questionnaire to
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determine the amount of systems engineering content of a program by measuring the
creation and use of systems-engineering-related work products. The questionnaire
employed quantitative financial and technical measures to assess project performance.
A study by Kludze (2003) included a survey to determine the value of systems
engineering on complex projects. The intended survey population was systems
engineers and project managers at NASA as well as members of the International
Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE).
3.6.5.2 Survey Population Selection
A knowledgeable target population with relevant experience on programs executed
under the new acquisition process is identified to provide insight into the constructs
and hypotheses from a wider perspective. The survey questions are primarily related
to the perception of impacts, therefore a knowledgeable population is vital to the
validity of the survey. Programs identified during the case selection process that are
not included in the case study phase are incorporated into the survey phase along with
the previously studied programs. The roles of the respondents align with those
interviewed during the case study and include program managers, technical managers,
logisticians, and systems, software, and hardware engineers.
3.6.5.3 Survey Instrument Development
The survey instrument is designed to obtain relevant information regarding the
respondent’s background, program experience, and opinions regarding the dependent
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and independent variables as identified in the Research Model. The inputs and
objectives used to determine the survey questions are depicted in Figure 3.6-4.

Figure 3.6-4: Drivers and Results of the Survey Development Process

The survey contains a page that includes description of the study, disclosure of
relevant information, and documentation of consent as required. Data is collected on
the background of the respondents, their overall opinion of the impact of the new
acquisition process structure, and the characteristics of the program that is being
assessed. The survey contains questions about the relevant program to determine if the
respondent is qualified to answer the survey. It also requests data from the respondents
regarding their professional experience and details of the program including years
experience, place of employment, and role within the program. This data is used to
determine if both the respondent and program are within the desired population.
Substantive questions relating to the measures identified in the research model are
posed to assess the prevalence of the constructs and their relationships. The survey
instrument includes four questions to assess each of the measures related to the
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constructs. The substantive survey items are structured as 4-point, Likert-type
questions. Likert-type questions are used because the questions relate to the presence
and impact of the constructs as perceived by the respondent. The respondent is asked
to characterize the extent to which the statement given applies to the program
according to the following scale: “None”, “Little”, “Moderate”, and “Large”. The
description for the scale is contained in Table 3.6-6.
Table 3.6-6: Rating Scale for Survey Items
Extent Present

Description

1 – None

No inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program

2 – Little

Minimal or nominal inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program

3 – Moderate

Significant inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program

4 – Large

Extensive inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program

The scale is based on Government sources and is similar to the scale used during the
document reviews. Additionally, two free-response questions are included to gather
suggestions of tactics that may be employed in the future to improve acquisition
outcomes. Responses to these questions are used to support the development of
suggestions for future research. A paper version of the survey instrument is contained
in Appendix D. The data collection model that associates questions with measures and
hypotheses is presented in

107

Figure 3.6-5: Survey Data Collection Model

3.6.5.4 Pilot Survey Execution
Piloting of questionnaires is particularly important when the research design calls for a
single round of data collection. The pilot survey allows for modification of the
instrument prior to implementation based on the identification of missing or unclear
questions (Babbie, 1990). In order to ensure that the survey can be self-administered
by the respondent and completed within the allotted time, the questionnaire instrument
is reviewed by knowledgeable personnel who are not required for inclusion in the full
study sample. Use of these perspectives allows for effective testing of the data
collection techniques without contaminating the relatively small pool of available
subjects. Feedback is solicited from the reviews to obtain their opinions regarding
question clarity, survey organization, and other characteristics of the instrument. The
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piloting activity identifies problematic questions and verifies the mechanics of the
survey process.
3.6.5.5 Survey Administration Protocol
This research uses web-based survey data collection methods. As this mode of
delivery provides convenience to the respondent, use of the internet to execute the
survey is expected to provide an increased response rate over paper surveys.
Additionally, the time it takes to complete the survey can have an impact on the
response rate. The researchers in the Elm (2008) study expressed that if the response
took more than an hour, response rate would decline; therefore the target amount of
time for the completion of this survey is less than one hour.
A survey response request is sent to each potential respondent and is accompanied by
a cover letter that assures the respondent that the data collected would be used only for
the survey and would not be attributed to individuals. In order to increase the response
rate, the administration process employs methods to electronically contact nonresponsive participants periodically to encourage completion of the survey.
3.6.5.6 Survey Data Analysis
A multi-stage process is required to process, analyze, and manage the survey data.
This process includes response verification, question reliability evaluation, descriptive
statistics generation, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and hypothesis testing. The
overall survey data analysis process is depicted in Figure 3.6-6.
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Figure 3.6-6: Survey Data Analysis Process

After collection of the data, it is transferred to a spreadsheet to facilitate analysis with
the R statistical software package (R Core Development Team, 2011). The survey
responses that do not contain sufficient information or are completed by respondents
that are not part of the targeted population are removed from the data set. A response
is considered invalid and discarded if it meets one of the following criteria:


Missing critical demographic or program information



More than one non-response for questions related to an operational measure



Characteristics of program do not qualify it for inclusion in the study

The discarded responses are stored in the research database to provide assurance that
the sample is not shaped to influence the results.
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To quantitatively assess the reliability of the instrument, a statistical test of reliability,
Cronbach’s Alpha, is applied to the data obtained from the questionnaire. For this type
of research, which relies primarily on the opinion and perception of the subjects, the
results of questions grouped by associated measure and Cronbach’s Alpha is
calculated for each variable. If reliability scores are low for a particular question, then
it is considered for removal as an appropriate measure of the construct. At that time, it
is decided if the question is invalid, or if it is closely related to another construct.
Descriptive statistics are generated from the valid response set to include demographic
profiles, program descriptions, and response distributions for each question. As part of
the descriptive statistic development, the responses to the questions related to the
dependent constructs are analyzed to determine if programs are implementing the new
processes as specified in accordance with the regulations and applicable guidelines.
In order to verify the validity of the constructs in the theoretical conceptual model,
CFA is performed on the survey data. CFA examines the construct validity of the
research by estimating the correlation of measures related to the factors with the
correlations observed in the sample population. By using maximum likelihood
techniques, estimation is performed for the population as a whole and not solely for
the sample (Thompson, 2004). If the response sample is large enough to account for
the all twenty four questions (N ~ 60), then CFA is performed on the collective set of
independent variables to ensure that the data collected supports them and the same
process is executed for the dependent variables. If the sample size is too small to
provide sufficient degrees of freedom to estimate the variability due to each question
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and associated errors, then confirmatory factor analysis is performed on each construct
individually.
As part of the confirmatory factor analysis, multiple fit statistics are used to evaluate
the fit of the model to the collected data. If the analysis does not confirm the presence
of the constructs and the sample size is sufficient, then exploratory factor analysis is
performed to identify the constructs that are present in the data. If necessary, these
constructs are included in an updated conceptual model and hypotheses to be
presented in Chapter V. If the analysis is successful, then the survey data is used to
support hypothesis testing.
A critical output of the confirmatory factor analysis process is the set of factor scores
that are used during hypothesis testing. These scores are derived for each construct
from the responses provided to the survey data. To prepare the survey data for testing,
the responses to the substantive questions that are mapped to each construct are
reduced to yield a factor loading. The Structural Equation Model package for R is
used to perform confirmatory factor analysis and determine the loading for each
factor. This loading matrix is multiplied by the response set to yield the data used in
hypothesis testing.
3.6.5.7 Hypothesis Testing
The three hypotheses are tested using statistical analysis of the responses to the
substantive survey questions (i.e. the questions related to the constructs). As the data
collected using Likert-type questions is non-parametric and ordinal in nature,
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Kendall’s tau test (Kendall, 1938) is used to assess the hypotheses with regard to the
research data. The tau test calculates the rank correlation between two sets of data.
Tau is calculated using Equation 3.6-1.
Equation 3.6-1: Kendall's tau

Tau is expressed as a number between -1 and 1. A negative value indicates negative
correlation and a positive value indicates a positive correlation between the two
variables. The absolute value of tau indicates the strength of the association between
the two factors. The levels of association for each tau value range as designated for
this study are presented in Table 3.6-7.
Table 3.6-7: Thresholds for Correlation Evaluation
tau Value Range

Strength of Association

tau > 0.35

Very Strong

0.35 > tau > 0.3

Strong

0.3 > tau > 0.25

Moderate

0.25 > tau > 0.2

Weak

tau < 0.2

Insignificant

3.7 Conclusion and Recommendation Development
For research to have value to anyone other than the researcher, the results must be
communicated to others in a way that properly conveys the implications of the
findings. The documented conclusions contain a summary of the hypothesis testing as
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well as recommendations for effective implementation of the revised acquisition
process on future programs. Suggestions for expansion of research to increase
generalizability are provided along with an updated research model and hypotheses to
support future research. Additionally, anecdotal evidence from the interview data and
review of program documentation is presented to suggest future research topics and
identify lessons learned from the execution of the programs.
The conclusion and recommendation section includes a determination as to whether
the individual hypotheses are supported by the survey data collected. In the case that a
hypothesis is not supported, a rationale is presented for the discrepancy between the
relationship suggested by the literature and the survey data. If necessary, the
conceptual model and hypotheses are updated and presented with explanation. Finally,
suggestions for future work based on barriers and enablers discovered as well as
potential extensions of the research design to new populations are documented in the
conclusion and recommendation section in Chapter V. The conclusions and
recommendations are based primarily on the data analysis results, which are presented
in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the case study and survey findings. Results of survey data
verification, reliability, and confirmatory factor analysis are also included to
demonstrate the validity of the research design and the data obtained. Finally, the
results of nonparametric rank-correlation hypotheses testing are provided to determine
whether the collected data supported the theories under development.
4.2 Program Selection
A candidate pool of programs was designated with the goal of selecting viable cases
for in-depth analysis of the research constructs and their relationships. Programs were
initially identified and assessed for the applicability and availability of data. The
results of the case evaluation process are presented in Table 4.2-1.
Table 4.2-1: Assessment of Candidate Programs
Program
Designation

TD Start
Date

Life-cycle
Phase

Interview
Availability

Study Inclusion

Program A

2009

Milestone B

High

Case A and Survey

Program B

2008

Milestone B

High

Case B and Survey

Program C

2008

Milestone B

Medium

Survey

Program D

2010

Milestone B

Low

Survey

Program E

2010

TD Execution

Low

Program F

2010

TD Execution

Low

Survey
Declined to
Participate
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The programs are identified using codenames to protect the anonymity of the
participants and to avoid the exposure of potentially sensitive information. The
identified life-cycle phase for each case indicates the status of the program at the start
of case selection. All programs were invited to participate in the survey stage of the
study and only one declined. Programs A and B were chosen as the subjects of indepth case studies primarily because they were at the proper phase for inclusion in the
study and provided a high level of availability to the researcher. Additionally,
Programs A and B were intended to produce disparate products for different branches
of the armed services, therefore they differ enough to provide acceptable validity for
any identified convergence.
4.3 Study Pilot Activity Results
A pilot interview was conducted with a member of the engineering staff assigned to
Case A. This individual was a systems engineer responsible for the development of
interface specifications for the product. As the individual was not a lead member of
the team, piloting of the interview did not contaminate or reduce the pool of potential
interview subjects. The pilot interview identified minor improvements to the phrasing
of interview questions that improved the subject’s understanding of the question
context. No questions were deleted nor were the intent of any of the questions
modified. The original questions, updated questions, and reasons for change are
described in Table 4.3-1.
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Table 4.3-1: Modifications to Interview Questions
Question
#

Original Question

Updated Question

Reason

2

How long have you been
working in the field of
national defense?

How long have you been working
in the field of national defense
and what roles have you
performed?

Allows for better
understanding of subject
background.

5

How did completion of
systems engineering
reviews (e.g., PDR) prior
to full development
commitment impact
program risk?

How did completion of systems
engineering reviews (e.g., PDR)
during the TD phase impact the
risk position of the program for
EMD and later phases?

Provides more specific
context for question. Pilot
interview response to
original question was in
terms of TD risk and
performance.

6

How did prototype
development and testing
impact the risk position
of the program?

How did prototype development
and testing during the TD phase
impact the risk position of the
program for EMD and later
phases?

Clarifies the intent of the
question to ensure that
impact provided is with
regard to the EMD phase,
not the TD phase.

7

How did the Modular
Open Systems scope
impact the risk position
of the program risk?

How did the execution of
Modular Open Systems scope
during the TD phase impact the
risk position of the program for
EMD and later phases?

Clarifies the intent of the
question to ensure that
impact provided is with
regard to the EMD phase,
not the TD phase.

8

How could the
Government have
improved the risk
position of the program?

What additional actions could the
Government have taken during
the TD phase to improve the risk
position of the program for EMD
and later phases?

Clarifies the intent of the
question to ensure that
impact provided is with
regard to the EMD phase,
not the TD phase.

9

How could the
Government have
improved the risk
position of the program?

What additional actions could the
Government have taken during
the TD phase to improve the risk
position of the program for EMD
and later phases?

Clarifies the intent of the
question to ensure that
impact provided is with
regard to the EMD phase,
not the TD phase.

These changes are intended to improve the subject’s understanding of the data sought
by the question. In all but one case, the clarification attempts to ensure that the
information provided relates to action that occurred during the Technology
Development phase and the effect on the Engineering & Manufacturing Development
phase and subsequent program stages. After the pilot interview was completed, the
data was processed in accordance with the procedure described in Chapter III. No
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modifications to the data processing procedures were made as a result of the pilot
interview. Due to the changes made to the interview questions, data from the pilot
interview was not included in the research sample for Case A.
The survey instrument was provided to multiple individuals in the academic and
industry community prior to the beginning of the survey period to determine the
quality of the instrument and support evaluation of the data analysis procedures. All of
these individuals are knowledgeable about systems engineering and the defense
acquisition process and none were used in the survey population. The piloting process
activity identified no major changes to the instrument or survey analysis procedure,
but did identify minor changes to the survey instructions and background
explanations. Piloting the instrument also provided useful information regarding the
time required to complete the survey.
4.4 Case Study Results
Case studies were performed on two programs executed under the new process. The
studies were executed individually and followed by cross-case analysis to determine
the level of convergence between the programs regarding validity of the constructs,
hypotheses, and previously unidentified enablers and barriers.
4.4.1 Case Study A
The Technology Development phase of Program A was established in 2009 with the
objectives of developing a system design resulting in a Preliminary Design Review
and testing of a prototype system containing all critical technology elements in a
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relevant environment. Two vendors were selected to participate in this phase and
complete the tasks in parallel. At the end of the Technology Development phase, a
single contractor was selected to complete the system design and qualification under
an Engineering & Manufacturing Development contract. This case study examined
one of the vendors involved in the Technology Development phase for Program A.
4.4.1.1 Case A Document Review Results
The program was rated for each subfactor based on evidence contained in the
documentation that addressed the questions posed in the Documentation Analysis
Sheet. The program was assessed with 48 questions to identify the degree to which the
operational measures were present on the program according to the scale presented in
Table 4.4-1. Details about the development of the scale are provided in section 3.6.2.2.
Table 4.4-1: Document Rating Scale Adapted for Documentation Reviews.
Extent Present

Description

1 – None

No evidence that the subject has been adequately addressed

2 – Little

Minimal evidence that subject has been adequately addressed

3 – Moderate

Significant evidence that subject has been adequately addressed

4 – Large

Very high level of evidence that subject has been adequately addressed

The rating for each operationalized measure was calculated by averaging the ratings
for each of the questions associated with that measure. The results for individual
questions are contained in Appendix A. The ratings at the level of operationalized
measures are provided in Table 4.4-2.
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Table 4.4-2: Case A Document Review Results
Construct

Early Systems
Engineering

Operationalized
Measure

Rating
(1-4)

Review
Execution

2.750

Review
Effectiveness

2.250

Requirements
Stability

1.750

Requirements
Validation

2.250

Prototype
Requirements

2.000

Maturity
Assessment

3.250

Technology
Readiness

3.250

Manufacturing
Readiness

4.000

Open-Systems
Requirements

3.250

Openness
Assessments

3.750

NonDevelopmental
Items

3.500

Disclosed
Interfaces

3.750

Development
Knowledge

Maturity
Verification

Implementation
Knowledge

Modular Open
Systems
Approach

Integration and
Sustainment
Knowledge

Analysis
Appropriate reviews held with focus on requirements.
Certification of system for advancement not sufficiently
tied to overall budget, schedule, or risks.
Reviews well-attended, but did not identify new risks,
address open requirements, or establish cost and
schedule baselines prior to Milestone B.
Major changes to functional and performance
requirements between phases threaten to invalidate
architecture and technology assessment. Requirements
likely to change after in EMD to address open issues.
Requirement set not complete or consistent due to open
requirement issues. Budget and schedule impacts not
assessed. Architecture validated via modeling and
prototype, but may not support new requirements.
Prototype requirements focus on functionality and
performance. No size, weight, power, or manufacturing
requirements and these aspects are not addressed by
prototype demonstration scenarios.
Prototype testing assessed critical technologies, but
equally focused on previously proven applications.
Prototype requirements formally verified by contractor
with Government involvement. Multiple technology and
manufacturing maturity assessments conducted.
Technology demonstrated during prototype testing and
high-fidelity modeling and simulation. Critical
technology previously used for related purpose. High
level of design reuse and COTS components.
Sourcing for all system components identified.
Prototype manufactured on pilot production lines with
significant design reuse and incorporation of
commercial components.
Program requires use of a modular open systems
approach, discourages use of proprietary interfaces, and
leveraging of commercial hardware and software,
however many MOSA-related requirements are
ambiguous and unverifiable.
Extensive use of Government standard tools for formal
evaluation of MOSA progress as well as meeting, plans,
and analysis documents related to openness of system.
Commercial processing resources and software used
where feasible, including open-source software
elements. Application-specific components re-used
from other programs and proven systems.
Extensive use of widely used commercial and open
standard interfaces coupled with partitioning of
potentially volatile components from the rest of the
system.
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While reviews were held on Program A as required, they did not sufficiently identify
new risks or close existing ones. Additionally, requirements issues were left open
within the established technical baselines. This negatively affected the quality of the
baselines which suggests that the appropriate level of Development Knowledge was
not obtained by the program. This condition is exacerbated by the fact that the
Government implemented significant system requirements changes after the
conclusion of the Preliminary Design Review. The lack of requirement issue closure
introduced substantial risk with regard to technical, cost, and schedule factors because
the changes were not incorporated into the technical baselines and the effects are on
the design, cost and producibility of the system were unknown.
The prototype requirements levied by the Government focused on performance factors
necessary to demonstrate the maturity of the technologies used and the ability of the
system architecture to support the desired capabilities without regard to the form
factor or producibility. Using the prototypes and previously developed systems as a
basis, multiple technology and manufacturing readiness assessments were performed
jointly by the contractor and the Government. These evaluations led to the conclusion
on the program that the system as proposed had the requisite maturity of both
technology application and manufacturing processes.
Case A contained a significant amount of MOSA-related scope including technical
requirements, and statement of work tasks such as generation of planning documents,
execution of assessments using Government-developed tools, and performance of
market surveys to identify potential subcomponent vendors. The resulting system
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incorporated a high percentage of non-developmental hardware and software
components including open-source operating environments for software applications
and commercial processing resources. The design also leveraged commercial or open
standards in every interface that was not required to integrate with legacy external
systems. The application of this design philosophy provided for multiple sources of
supply for system components and facilitates upgrade and sustainment throughout the
system lifecycle.
4.4.1.2 Case A Interview Results
The interviews for Case A were conducted after completion of the document reviews.
The documents for Case A did not indicate that the nature or wording of the questions
in the interview should be changed due to ambiguity or uncommon usage. A total of
10 interviews were conducted for Case A with a population consisting of two program
managers, two technical managers, three systems engineers, one software engineer,
one hardware engineer, and one logistics/reliability engineer. The population covered
all of the desired areas of expertise and the respondent pool had an average of
approximately 27 years of experience in defense and aerospace, which is more than
sufficient to consider them to be authoritative with regard to system development
programs.
The overall opinions of the program participants with regard to the revised acquisition
process was mixed but skewed towards the negative. While it was acknowledged that
the process had the potential to provide the Government with increased insight into the
system under development, significant issues with regard to communication between
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the Government and the contractor, simultaneous development of a design and a
prototype, an unfunded gap between the Technology Development and Engineering &
Manufacturing Development phase, and lack of information regarding Technology
Development scope and objectives were noted by the interview subjects.
There was heavy focus in every interview on the prototype development, even in
answers to questions that did not reference the prototype. This indicates that the
program itself was heavily focused on the prototype during planning and execution of
the Technology Development phase. Competitive effects were also prevalent
throughout the interviews for Case A and appeared to have a significant impact on the
behavior and strategy of both the contractor and the Government teams.
Elements of the dependent constructs were largely cited in response to questions
regarding the effects of the independent constructs. This supports the validity of the
dependent constructs and relationships between the constructs for this case. Overall,
the data collected displays a high degree of convergence both within the interview
data set and with the document reviews regarding both the general impressions of the
program structure and content, the identified research constructs, and barriers to
program success.
4.4.1.2.1 Early Systems Engineering and Development Knowledge
A slight majority (six out of ten) of the subjects interviewed stated that the execution
of System Engineering Reviews prior to Milestone B and the Engineering &
Manufacturing Development phase source selection reduced the overall risk level for
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the program. The reviews were seen as a good method for providing insight to the
Government; however, they were ineffective at establishing stable baselines. This
finding regarding the execution and effectiveness of System Engineering Reviews for
Case A aligns with the documentation analysis assessment regarding Early Systems
Engineering and Development Knowledge.
The instability of requirements is largely seen as an effect of the lack of
communication on the part of the Government and the inability to make requirements
changes during the Technology Development phase due to competitive factors. One
systems engineer stated that “we could not negotiate adjustments in requirements, so
the requirements needed adjustments after PDR.” The adjustments to which this
individual referred were significant changes to the technical requirements made by the
Government between the end of the Technology Development phase and Milestone B
outside of the baselining and review process. These requirement changes added
functionality and increased the complexity of the system. This potentially invalidated
the baselines established during the Technology Development phase and drove a
requirement in the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase to repeat a
major review in order to reestablish the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed
solution when including the modified requirements.
The need to continue system-level requirements development after Milestone B
indicates an ineffectiveness of the required System Engineering Reviews to establish
the necessary levels of Development Knowledge. In this case, the lack of requirement
completeness at the Preliminary Design Review was caused by a failure to identify all
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stakeholder requirements prior to or during the Technology Development phase.
Discovery of these new requirements during the Technology Development phase
drove changes to the system-level specification after the Preliminary Design Review
because the Government was reluctant to make changes to the system-level
specification during the Technology Development phase for reasons related to the
procurement schedule and competition for the Engineering & Manufacturing
Development phase.
4.4.1.2.2 Maturity Verification and Implementation Knowledge
The development and test of prototypes during the Technology Development phase
was predominately cited in interviews for this case as an effective activity for the
improvement of System Implementation Knowledge and reduction of risk early in the
program. The referenced benefits of the company’s prototyping strategy included both
the knowledge gained with regard to the integration of the system components and, to
a lesser extent, the maturity of the manufacturing environment and processes.
However, the evaluation of critical technology elements, which is the driving
requirement for execution of prototype scope in the Technology Development phase,
was not mentioned in any of the interviews for Case A.
It should be noted that the contractor developed a prototype that far exceeded the
Government requirements and was highly representative of the intended production
system configuration. The implementation and test of a high-fidelity prototype was an
effort to reduce production and performance risk for the Engineering & Manufacturing
Development phase and was intended to improve the company’s competitive position.
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The level of fidelity was not driven by the requirements of the prototype specification
as evidenced by repeated references to the comparatively low level of maturity with
regard to form factor and functionality displayed by the competing contractor’s
prototype offering. This finding aligns with the document review finding that the
system design had a high level of maturity despite the moderate level of prototype
requirements levied by the Government.
4.4.1.2.3 Modular Open Systems Approach and Integration & Sustainment Knowledge
Elements related to the construct of Integration and Sustainment Knowledge were
identified through the interview process to be valid for this case. The assessments of
system and program openness as part of the independent construct of a Modular Open
Systems Approach, though required by the statement of work and presented at system
engineering reviews, were not mentioned by any of the interview subjects. The
documentation review resulted in a high level of both MOSA application and
Integration & Sustainment Knowledge for Case A, which is supported by multiple
interview responses.
The inclusion of MOSA-related system requirements was cited by multiple interview
subjects as having a positive effect on the life-cycle cost and sustainment risk of the
system by increasing the sources of supply for system components and allowing for
increased competition, thus reducing the cost and effort required to upgrade or replace
system components throughout the lifecycle. Despite the ambiguity of the
requirements, the contractor embraced MOSA and worked to understand the concepts
and incorporate them into the system design.
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As with other requirements on the program, there was a lack of effective
communication regarding Government expectations for the open-systems
requirements. The primary issue identified by the interview subjects with regard to
MOSA was the ambiguity of the requirements language and the lack of associated
objective verification criteria. The resulting opinions were of increased risk with
regard to development of the system due to the potential for issues to arise during
verification because the requirements were not well defined. Despite the performance
of openness assessments, significant questions remained as to, in the words of a
systems engineer, “How modular? How open was the architecture?”
4.4.1.2.4 Barriers to Success of Program A
Multiple factors not included in the Conceptual Model were identified during the
interviews for Case A as having significant impacts on the execution of the program
and the resulting risk position at the end of the Technology Development phase. The
most-cited barrier to success of the Technology Development phase for Case A was a
lack of communication with the Government. The predominant complaint was that the
Government did not communicate openly with the contractor, however it was also
suggested that the contractor might not have been as open as it could have been
regarding potential issues due to the pending competition for the next program phase.
The reason most often provided for the Government’s unwillingness to provide
information was the pending competition and the fear of the losing contractor
protesting the award of the Engineering & Manufacturing Development contract. This
caused the Government to withhold information from the contractor regarding critical
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program questions as fundamental as identification of the Government’s evaluation
criteria for successful prototype testing. In the words of a member of the program
management team: “We came into TD with an idea of how we would be evaluated and
the Government would neither confirm nor deny whether we were correct.”
Perhaps the most critical impact of this lack of communication was the inability to
modify system requirements during the Technology Development phase. Multiple
interview subjects noted that there were errors in the Government’s top-level
specification and that many requirements were ambiguous and unverifiable. Even
though the Government team acknowledged these deficiencies, very few changes to
the system-level performance specifications were approved during the Technology
Development phase. Instead, the requirements set was addressed by both contractors
during the systems engineering process and modified at the end of the Technology
Development phase by the Government. The Government’s unwillingness to negotiate
requirements changes during the Technology Development phase caused significant
issues with regard to the contractor’s ability to trade system requirements in order to
reduce risk. The inflexibility of the contractual requirements set paired with the lack
of feedback from the Government in response to contractor interpretations of
requirements limited the capability for the program to develop a best-value solution.
The significant modifications to system requirements made unilaterally by the
Government after the Preliminary Design Review added risk to the program by
reducing the validity of development knowledge gained during the Technology
Development phase.
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Competitive factors hindered the ability of the program to resolve issues during the
Technology Development phase; however competition was also cited by multiple
subjects as having a beneficial impact to the Government. In this case, the contractor
focused more intently on the cost and schedule performance of the Technology
Development phase than is normal for a cost-type contract. The contractor is also
incentivized to invest in the program prior to contract award, particularly with regard
to prototype hardware, and focus on the direct comparisons that the Government can
perform based cost and schedule performance during the Technology Development
phase and on the performance of the prototypes. The potential downside is that
because the Technology Development phase is seen as an audition to demonstrate
business performance for the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase. In
one interview it was stated that the contractor didn’t perform additional risk reduction
activities because adding more resources during the Technology Development phase
might be detrimental during the competition for the next phase.
The prototype developed by the contractor was highly production-representative and
sought to incorporate many of the features of the final system configuration that were
not required per the Government’s prototype requirements specification. The
development of the prototype in this manner limited the amount of resources
available to be spent on the production system design. The development and testing of
the prototype concurrently with the development of the production system design put
stress on the contractor’s team. The Government’s evaluation of the prototype was
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believed by the contractor to be a significant factor in the Engineering &
Manufacturing Development source selection process.
The resulting emphasis placed on the prototype impeded the development of the
production system design and many decisions were deferred until they could be
resolved in a non-competitive environment during the Engineering & Manufacturing
Development phase. A contributing factor to the level of effort necessary to develop
the prototype that was cited in the interviews is the misalignment between company
procedures and the Government’s revised acquisition process which increased the
time spent on the prototype.
Staffing of the Government team was seen as a barrier to success by some of the
interview population. The Government team did not have the manpower to manage
multiple contractors and was unable to appropriately provide experts in relevant areas
to both teams. Additionally, the teams were charged with evaluating the contractors’
proposals for the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase, further
increasing the workload of the Government team.
The existence of a gap between the end of the phases was not sufficiently addressed
by the program prior to its occurrence and jeopardized the progress made by the
program team. Though not prevalent in the interviews with the technical personnel,
the issue of the gap between the phases was cited as a serious issue by a member of
the program management team. The gap added risk to the program by disrupting
continuity between the phases and required additional Government and contractor
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funding to maintain the contractor team between phases. This funding was necessary
to ensure that the contractor team would be available at the beginning of the next
contract in order to reduce the schedule risk for the remainder of the program.
4.4.1.3 Summary of Case Study A
A summary of the case study results for Program A is presented in Table 4.4-3.
Table 4.4-3: Case Study A Results Summary
Case Study Topic

Case A Results

Overall Impact of TD Phase

Slightly negative overall

Early Systems Engineering

• Improved system knowledge
• Requirements unstable after PDR

Maturity Verification

• Increased design maturity
• Prototype driven by competition

Modular Open Systems Approach
(MOSA)

• High level of MOSA emphasis;
• Significant openness in design

Barriers to Program Success

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Lack of communication
Competitive environment
Inflexible requirements
Requirements changes after PDR
Excessive focus on prototype
Gap between program phases
Misaligned Government and Contractor
processes

The end result of Program A’s Technology Development phase was a significant
increase in Implementation and Integration & Sustainment Knowledge over the levels
present at contract award. Levels of risk for the program outcome are elevated by
misalignment between the Government and contractor teams. The misalignment
stemmed primarily from the inhibition of communication due to the competitive
environment. The lack of information flow caused confusion about the role and
importance of the prototype and prevented the teams from establishing complete and
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stable technical baselines. These results were compared with the results from Case
Study B to determine if convergence between the programs was present.
4.4.2 Case Study B
The Technology Development phase of Case B was established with the objective of
developing a system design, holding a Preliminary Design Review, and demonstrating
a prototype containing all critical technology elements in a relevant environment. Two
vendors were selected to participate in and execute the Technology Development
phase in parallel. In addition to the Government-funded prototype activity, both
contractors committed significant internal resources to demonstrate the maturity of
their solutions. The program included a nominal amount of MOSA scope. At the end
of the Technology Development phase, a single contractor was to be selected to
complete the system design and qualification under an Engineering & Manufacturing
Development contract. This case study examined one of the two vendors that
participated in the Technology Development phase for Program B.
4.4.2.1 Case B Document Review Results
The program was rated for each subfactor based on evidence contained in the
documentation that addressed the questions posed in the Documentation Analysis
Sheet. The results for individual questions are contained in Appendix B. The rating for
each operationalized measure was calculated by averaging the ratings for each of the
questions associated with that measure. The average ratings at the operationalized
measure level are provided in Table 4.4-4.
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Table 4.4-4: Case B Document Review Results
Construct

Early Systems
Engineering

Operationalized
Measure

Rating
(1-4)

Review
Execution

2.750

Review
Effectiveness

3.500

Requirements
Stability

3.250

Requirements
Validation

3.000

Prototype
Requirements

1.750

Maturity
Assessment

3.250

Technology
Readiness

3.500

Manufacturing
Readiness

4.000

Open-Systems
Requirements

3.000

Openness
Assessments

1.000

NonDevelopmental
Items

3.250

Disclosed
Interfaces

1.750

Development
Knowledge

Maturity
Verification

Implementation
Knowledge

Modular Open
Systems
Approach

Integration and
Sustainment
Knowledge

Analysis
Reviews held at system and subsystem levels and
focused on requirements. Program budget and schedule
not adequately addressed
Extensive involvement of stakeholders and SME's.
Risks not identified during reviews. Requirements
issues and resolution paths addressed.
No unresolved Government requirements at the end of
the TD. A few contractor requirements were TBD, but
closure plans in place. Design-driving requirements and
functionality reduced between PDR and Milestone B.
Program lacks necessary budget/schedule information to
ensure that system compatible with constraints.
Requirements set complete and verification in place.
Architecture validated via modeling, simulation, and a
highly representative prototype.
Direct prototype requirements not identified, however
size, weight, power, and performance driven by
demonstration requirements. No manufacturing
requirements identified by the Government.
Critical technology central to system core functionality.
Verification tests and demonstrations ensure prototype
meets requirements. Technology and manufacturing
assessments conducted.
Technologies integrated into prototype that is highly
representative of final system configuration and
successfully demonstrated in relevant environments and
operational scenarios.
Sources for all components identified. Prototype
manufactured on representative production lines.
Extensive component reuse from previous programs.
MOSA and use of open standards for growth interfaces
required, but requirements are vague and no details or
products for requirement verification are present.
No formal evaluation tools, business case analyses, or
market surveys of open systems to provide
understanding of potential issues, commercial sources,
growth capabilities, or obsolescence risks.
System solution uses commercial processing resources
and software operating environments. Significant reuse
of hardware and software components from other
programs.
Openness of external communication and form factors
are limited by legacy interfaces. Internal interfaces use
few standards and have little growth capacity.
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System engineering reviews were held at multiple levels with extensive involvement
of stakeholders and domain experts. The reviews sufficiently focused on requirements
issues and adequately linked design features to driving requirements. The result was a
complete, consistent requirements set. There was a significant requirement change
between the Preliminary Design Review and Milestone B which reduced the
operational capability of the system. This change did not invalidate the knowledge
position of the program with regard to development, but may have changed the
risk/reward ratio of the selected technology and architecture.
While direct technical specifications for the prototype were not provided by the
Government as part of the Program B requirements, operationally relevant scenarios
under which the prototype would be tested were identified in the Technology
Development statement of work. These scenarios identified the environments and
capabilities which were to be demonstrated in the Technology Development phase.
These scenarios drove many of the characteristics of the delivered prototype, but
requirements as to the production environment for the prototypes were not imposed.
Demonstration of the critical technologies proposed for use in the system was the
focus of the prototype tests, which had the desired effect of establishing Technology
Readiness Levels of 6 or higher for the critical technology elements. Additionally,
integration procedures and suppliers for the system were exercised and evaluated
during prototype development leading to sufficiently high Manufacturing Readiness
Levels to support the finalization of the production environment and procedures
during the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase.
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The Government specification and statement of work contained requirements for the
use of MOSA on the program, but it did not specify assessments to be completed or
verification criteria for MOSA-related requirements. Despite the lack of focus on how
MOSA requirements would be verified, and because of the history associated with the
design, the system incorporated a significant number of non-developmental hardware
and software items. The growth capability of external system interfaces was limited by
requirements to integrate with legacy components and platforms. Internal interfaces
were largely based on commercial or open standards, but the protocols selected did
not provide significant bandwidth growth capacity for future capability extension.
4.4.2.2 Case B Interview Results
The interviews for Case B were conducted after completion of the document review.
The documents did not indicate that the nature or wording of the questions in the
interview should be changed due to ambiguity or uncommon usage. A total of 10
interviews with individuals assigned to Program B were conducted with a population
consisting of two program managers, two technical managers, three systems
engineers, one hardware engineer, and one logistics/reliability engineer. The
population covered all of the desired areas of expertise and the respondent pool had an
average of approximately 26 years of experience in defense and aerospace, which is
sufficient to consider them to be authorities on system development programs.
The overall response of the program participants to the revised acquisition process
was both positive and negative. Of those that were opposed to the changes opinions
seemed to be very strong as exemplified by statements such as “Overall, TD was a
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colossal waste of time and money.” While the incorporation of design and test scope
to reduce risk and the inclusion of competition were cited as elements that improved
the general risk position of the program, issues with regard to communication,
requirements management, and the alignment of scope with schedule were cited as
negative aspects.
4.4.2.2.1 Early Systems Engineering and Development Knowledge
The majority of the interview subjects expressed the opinion that execution of System
Engineering Reviews during the Technology Development phase decreased risk and
multiple subjects directly referenced the increased level of knowledge available to
support the Government’s selection of a single contractor due to the scope of the
Technology Development phase. This data suggests a positive relationship between
execution of Systems Engineering Reviews prior to Milestone B and the level of
Development Knowledge available to support a procurement decision. This finding is
consistent with the results of the document review that high ratings for both Early
Systems Engineering and Development Knowledge.
The Government did not consistently identify new risks at the reviews or provide
sufficient feedback regarding the design because of restrictions on the Government’s
team with regard to communication. While there was little to no change in the
requirements specification during the Technology Development phase, the
requirements set had some stability issues between the Preliminary Design Review
and the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase. The Government removed
a driving system capability to ensure a level competition for the Engineering &
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Manufacturing Development phase. While this reduction in capability did not directly
introduce technical risk into the program, it drove the solutions developed during
Technology Development to use more complex technology than was necessary to
provide the newly defined base capabilities. There is a potential for additional risk in
the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase if the design were changed to
use less advanced technology, but reviews were not held to assess the new design.
4.4.2.2.2 Maturity Verification and Implementation Knowledge
The consensus of the team members for Program B was that development and test of
prototypes during the Technology Development phase improved the maturity of the
design and reduced the risk to further development and implementation. Only two of
the ten interviewed team members mentioned technology readiness or selection in any
of their answers, though some did refer to elements of manufacturing readiness such
as production process definition and identification of suppliers for system
components. This finding agrees with the document review of a high level of Product
Maturity coupled with a moderate level of prototype requirements.
The contractor team developed and tested a prototype that was highly representative
of the intended production design. There were still significant differences between the
prototype and the intended production design, which was a source of frustration
among the technical team members due to the fact that there was “dead-end
engineering that does not help the next phase” which was seen as a waste of resources.
However, most interview subjects stated that the testing of the system during the
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Technology Development phase identified design changes that would be implemented
during Engineering & Manufacturing Development to correct errors and reduced risk.
4.4.2.2.3 Modular Open Systems Approach and Integration & Sustainment Knowledge
Inclusion of Government-mandated MOSA-related scope such as requirements and
assessments was seen to have only a minimal impact on the design of the system. It
was repeatedly acknowledged in interviews that use of MOSA principles facilitates
upgrades to and sustainment of the system throughout the lifecycle. However, the
Government’s requirements in this area were poorly defined and not emphasized
during the program. A software engineer stated that “there was no pressure on this
requirement from the Government.”
Despite the Government’s indifference, the system incorporated significant levels of
modularity and design reuse due to a legacy program and the company’s standard
procedures for system development. In one interview, it was stated that “we were
driven by best practices, not the Government requirements.” This assessment aligns
with the document review findings of a high level of Non-Developmental Item use
coupled with a low level of interface disclosure and robustness.
4.4.2.2.4 Barriers to the Success of Program B
Open communication between the Government and the contractor was impaired on
program due to competitive factors. An engineer from Case B said the “there was
mostly one-way communication [from the contractor to the Government] despite the
fact that there were two Government teams, one for each contractor and no cross138

pollination between the Government teams.” Members of both the technical and
program management teams attributed the root cause of the lack of communication to
the Government’s fear of a protest by the vendor that is not awarded the Engineering
& Manufacturing Development contract. These issues inhibited the “free flow of
information” in the words of one of the technical managers and prevented the
Government and contractor from working as a team.
Another effect of the competitive environment that was identified through the
interviews was the inability of the contractor to change system-level requirements
during the Technology Development phase. As a result, trade-offs among capability,
reliability, environments, physical attributes, and cost of the system were unable to be
made. After the Preliminary Design Review, however, the Government removed
significant requirements from the system level specification, which was seen by
program personnel as an effort to ensure a competition between technically equivalent
offerings for the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase.
Multiple respondents stated that there was not enough time in the Technology
Development phase to properly develop both a prototype for test and a system design
to support production in parallel. The contractor tested a prototype that was intended
to be representative of the tactical system, which increased the complexity and
required development of multiple components on a short timeline. As a result of this
hardware focus, the depth of analysis regarding requirements, software, and
algorithms as part of the tactical system design process was less than is normal for
development efforts of this size. According to a member of the engineering team,
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“problems resulted from a near-term view that may affect the program into EMD”
because of this focus on the technology-demonstration hardware and software.
Multiple interview subjects identified the gap between the Technology Development
and Engineering & Manufacturing Development phases as a risk to the completion of
the program due to issues with maintaining technical teams. One technical manager
stated that “the delay between TD and EMD causes a loss of organizational inertia.”
The same individual also said that “initial operating capability may be delayed
because you step back in the learning curve and open up supplier issues.” Both of
these factors are sources of significant schedule risk to the program because of the
aggressive timelines of the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase.
4.4.2.3 Summary of Case Study B
A summary of the case study results for Program B is presented in Table 4.4-5.
Table 4.4-5: Case Study B Results Summary
Case Study Topic

Case B Results

Overall Impact of TD Phase

Mixed with strongly negative opinions

Early Systems Engineering

• Improved system & requirements knowledge
• Requirements unstable after PDR

Maturity Verification

• Increased design maturity
• Not driven by Government requirements

Modular Open Systems Approach
(MOSA)

• Low level of MOSA emphasis
• Openness driven by design practices

Barriers to Program Success

•
•
•
•
•

Lack of open communication
Requirements inflexibility
Modification of requirements after PDR
Excessive focus on prototype
Gap between program phases
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The end result of Program B’s Technology Development phase was a significant
increase in both Development and Implementation Knowledge over that available at
contract award. The ultimate success of the program is at risk, however, due to the
inability of the Government and contractor teams to communicate and work together
to stabilize requirement baselines for the eventual production system and the gap
between program phases.
4.4.3 Cross-Case Analysis Results
The results of the two case studies were compared to determine areas of convergence
and divergence in approach and outcomes. The results of the document reviews,
findings from the individual case interviews, and data from the cross-case expert
interviews are analyzed to determine the degree to which the results of the case studies
support the hypotheses and to identify convergent evidence of barriers to success.
4.4.3.1 Document Review Comparison
The ratings for the factors derived from the document reviews were compared to
determine if the hypothesized correlation among the constructs was supported by this
small data set. The hypothesized relationships were defined as follows:
H1: Execution of systems engineering activities prior to full implementation
commitment increases development knowledge.
H2: Verification of product maturity prior to system detailed design increases
implementation knowledge.
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H3: Application of a Modular Open Systems Approach during development increases
integration & sustainment knowledge.
The hypotheses assert that a positive relationship exists between the independent and
dependent variables. If the hypotheses are supported, a high level of the independent
constructs would be associated with a high level of the dependent constructs. If the
constructs display negative relationships when comparing the two cases, or there is no
discernible difference, the data would not indicate support for the hypotheses. A
graphical representation of the document review results comparison across the two
cases with regard to the hypotheses is presented in Figure 4.4-1.

Document Review Ratings for Dependent
Constructs

4
H2-B

H2-A

3.5

H3-A
H1-B

3
2.5
H3-B
2
H1-A
1.5
1
1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

Document Review Ratings for Independent Constructs

Figure 4.4-1: Comparison of Document Review Results

For Hypotheses 1 and 3, the case with the higher rating for the independent construct
(Case B and A, respectively) also had the higher rating for the dependent construct.

142

This relationship indicates support for the first and third hypotheses. For Hypothesis 2,
both cases are similarly rated with regard to the independent and dependent construct,
leading to a finding that the validity of Hypothesis 2 is not discernible from
comparison of the document review results. The very high levels of the
Implementation Knowledge ratings are explained by the Government’s strategy of
providing flexibility to the contractor by only specifying key aspects of the prototype
coupled with the contractor’s strategy of developing prototype units that are
representative of the system’s intended production configuration. This analysis is
qualitative in nature and based on a minimal data set, however it suggests that there is
not enough evidence to reject any of the hypotheses based on the document reviews.
4.4.3.2 Interviews with Cross-Case Experts
In addition to interviews with dedicated program personnel, two off-program technical
experts that had insight into both cases were interviewed to obtain an independent
perspective of the program outcomes. These experts have a combined 72 years of
experience in the defense and aerospace industry. They were charged with the review
of both programs before and during the Technology Development phases.
The experts concurred that systems engineering activities executed earlier in the
program increases the knowledge available to support decisions and estimates.
Similarly to the individuals interviewed for the case studies, the experts’ responses
were heavily centered on the prototype portion of the Technology Development phase
and noted that the testing of the prototypes significantly improved the maturity of the
design and identifies improvement to be made in later phases. Unlike the majority of
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the case study interviews, one of the experts tied advancement of technology readiness
levels to the execution of the prototype testing. Both experts identified MOSA as an
enabler for upgrade and sustainment of the system in the long term and agreed with
the individual case results that the driver of open systems characteristics on one of the
programs was the company’s procedures rather than Government requirements.
One of the experts noted a severe misalignment between contractor internal
procedures and the Government’s revised acquisition process. The difficulty in
executing system design and prototype test efforts in parallel was stated by both
experts. They also identified the lack of open communication from Government to the
contractor to be a significant source of risk for programs. The inability to make tradeoffs related to requirements was also cited by both individuals as a problem for the
development of the system. One of the experts pointed out that the requirements for
different competitors are not allowed to diverge because it makes Government’s
evaluation of the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase proposals more
difficult. This restriction on flexibility limits the contractor’s ability to be creative and
provide a best-value offering with regard to cost and capability.
4.4.3.3 Systemic Barriers to Program Success
The interviews contained questions that solicited the impact of the process
modifications as well as actions that could have been taken by the Government and
contractor to improve the program’s risk position at Milestone B. From responses to
these questions, barriers to the successful implementation of the acquisition process
were identified that were common between the two programs. From the commonality
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it is inferred that the potential root causes of the barriers are systemic effects of the
process itself rather than an artifacts of program execution.
Both cases displayed a clear lack of open communication between the contractor and
the Government due to the competitive environment and the possibility of a protest
after award of the Engineering & Manufacturing Development contract. This impacted
the alignment of purpose, the identification of risks, and the understanding of
requirements between the contractor and Government teams.
In both cases, the Government would not allow flexibility of requirements during the
Technology Development phase. This prevented the contractor from resolving
conflicts in the specification and trading less critical requirements for improved
capability, higher producibility, and reduced procurement and lifecycle cost.
Requirements were changed by the Government outside of the systems engineering
process after the Preliminary Design Review via new specifications delivered with the
Engineering & Manufacturing Development Requests for Proposals. In neither case
were these requirements changes or their effects on the existing design formally
reviewed with the contractor. These changes negatively impacted the value of the
Development Knowledge gained from the Technology Development phase and
increased the risk of completing the development of the system on time and budget.
Additionally, the gap that existed for both programs between Technology
Development and Engineering & Manufacturing Development phases impeded the
team’s momentum and endangered the contractor’s ability to maintain the execution
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team. Due to lack of Government funding, the contractor was forced to disperse some
team members to other efforts. The result was that the team would have to reform at
the beginning of the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase and new
personnel might need to be brought on to fill the roles of those that are no longer
available to the program which impacts learning curve.
In general, focus on prototype at the expense of the system design and Engineering &
Manufacturing Development program was a factor on both cases as well. Given the
relatively small level of funding for Technology Development programs due to the
limited scope and the focus on cost and schedule performance, less resources were
available for depth of analysis of the production system. The desire on the part of the
contractor to make the prototype representative of a production system forced key
design and architectural decisions to be made too early without sufficient supporting
analysis or understanding of requirements. The desire for similarity between the
prototype and production systems drives architecture and technology selection
decisions too early if prototype is considered baseline for system and significantly
increases the complexity and effort required to develop a non-tactical system.
Additionally, the prototype focus causes some work to be deferred until the
Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase that should have been addressed
earlier in the program.
Misalignment between the Government’s new acquisition process and the contractor’s
standard development process was cited in the interviews for Case Study A and one of
the cross-case expert interviews as an obstacle that had to be overcome by the
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program. This misalignment made it difficult for the contractor team to develop a
prototype and production design in parallel due to the amount of analysis and work
products required for the release of the prototype.
4.4.4 Case Study Results Summary
Hypotheses 1 and 3 were supported by the comparison of the case study results.
Support for Hypothesis 2 was undetermined due to the high levels of Implementation
Knowledge displayed by both cases. Additionally, all of the independent and
dependent constructs were validated and the following barriers were identified by the
case study phase:


Lack of open communication between the Government and contractor



Requirements mismanagement during the Technology Development phase



Focus on the prototype at expense of production system design



Gap between Government funding of TD and EMD program phases



Misalignment of Government and Contractor development processes

A summary of the individual case study results and identification of patterns resulting
from cross-case analysis is presented in Table 4.4-6.
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Table 4.4-6: Cross-Case Analysis Results Summary
Case Study
Topic

Case A Results

Overall
Impact of
TD Phase

Case B Results

• Improved system
knowledge
• Requirements unstable
after PDR

Maturity
Verification

• Increased design maturity
• Prototype driven by
competition

Modular
Open
Systems
Approach
(MOSA)

• High level of MOSA
emphasis;
• Significant openness in
design

•
•
•

•
•
•
•
Barriers to
Program
Success

Lack of communication
Competitive environment
Inflexible requirements
Requirements changes
after PDR
• Excessive focus on
prototype
• Gap between program
phases
• Misaligned Government
and Contractor processes

Participants are unsure of
new process, but
negative opinions are
strongly so.
Improved system &
Reviews Improved
requirements
Development
knowledge
Knowledge, but
Requirements unstable baselines not stable
after PDR
Increased design
Very high
maturity
Implementation
Not driven by
Knowledge resulting
Government
from competition
requirements
Integration &
Low level of MOSA
Sustainment Knowledge
emphasis
depends on Government
Openness driven by
emphasis
design practices

Mixed with strongly
negative opinions

Slightly negative overall

Early
Systems
Engineering

Cross-Case
Findings

•

•
•

• Lack of open
communication
• Requirements
inflexibility
• Modification of
requirements after PDR
• Excessive focus on
prototype
• Gap between program
phases

• Lack of Communication
• Requirements
Mismanagement
• Prototype Focus
• Program Gaps
• Misaligned Processes

In response to the findings of the case studies, the research model was revised to
incorporate the newly discovered barriers. The independent construct, dependent
constructs, operationalized measures, and hypotheses were unchanged. The revised
research model is depicted in Figure 4.4-2.
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Figure 4.4-2: Revised Research Model as a Result of the Case Study Findings

The survey instrument incorporated the case study findings to improve measurement
of the identified enablers and barriers on a larger set of programs.
4.5 Impacts of Case Study Results on Survey
No modifications to the survey questions regarding the constructs and hypothesized
relationships were made as a result of the case study findings; however additional
questions regarding the specific barriers that were present on the programs were added
to the questionnaire. Items regarding these factors were added to the general
impressions section of the questionnaire to sequester them from the questions used to
test the hypotheses. These questions are provided in Table 4.5-1.
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Table 4.5-1: Survey Questions to Assess Barriers on Programs
Question

Associated
Barrier

62. To what degree was effective communication from the Government to the
contractor adversely affected by the competitive environment during the
Technology Development program phase?

Lack of Open
Communication

63. To what degree was effective communication from the contractor to the
Government adversely affected by the competitive environment during the
Technology Development program phase?

Lack of Open
Communication

64. To what degree did the development and test of a prototype system during
the Technology Development phase of the program adversely affect the focus
on the design to be presented at the Preliminary Design Review?

Focus on
Prototype

65. To what degree was the prototype developed and tested during the
Technology Development phase of the program representative of the intended
production system design?

Focus on
Prototype

66. To what degree were the internal company processes aligned with the
Government’s current acquisition process?

Process
Misalignment

67. To what degree were proposed changes to the Government’s system
specification incorporated during the Technology Development phase of the
program?

Requirements
Mismanagement

68. To what degree did the gap between the end of the TD phase and the
beginning of the EMD phase add risk to the program?

Program Gap

For each question, response options are identical to the substantive items used to
assess the hypotheses (i.e., “None”, “Little”, “Moderate”, or “Large”). Both programs
exhibited the characteristic of significant changes to the system-level requirements by
the Government between the Preliminary Design Review and Milestone B, however
the addition of a new question to the survey instrument is not necessary because this
topic is already addressed by a question related to the “Requirements Stability”
measure. To assess whether the perceived purpose of prototype development and
testing as implemented on the programs under investigation aligns with the
Government’s primary goal of identifying immature technology in proposed systems
prior Milestone B, the following question was added to the Respondent and Program
Background section of the questionnaire:
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What was the primary purpose of the prototype development and test efforts on the program?
o
o
o
o
o

Evaluation of the maturity of critical technologies
Evaluation of system performance to support EMD proposal evaluation
Evaluation of manufacturing capabilities
Evaluation of integrated production representative components
There was no prototyping during the TD phase

The answers to these newly added questions are used to determine if the barriers had a
significant impact on programs being surveyed. For barriers that were prevalent on the
surveyed program population, suggestions are provided in Chapter V to enable future
programs to overcome similar obstacles to success.
4.6 Survey Analysis Results
The survey was deployed to 97 contractor personnel in roles that mirrored those of the
case study interviewees. Each respondent was involved in one of five recent Major
Defense Acquisition Programs that were executed at multiple contractor sites. Each of
the military services (i.e., Air Force, Army, and Navy) were represented by at least
one program. As the programs were all subject to the revised acquisition process, each
included a Technology Development phase with a Preliminary Design Review,
competitive prototyping among multiple contractors, and some level of MOSA scope.
Examination of organizational charts provided by program management
representatives identified potential respondents. Each of the organizational charts was
the version presented at the programs’ Preliminary Design Review. The survey was
open for three months for Programs A, B, and C. The survey for programs C and D
was open for two months due to delays in acquiring the organizational charts.
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4.6.1 Survey Data Validation
Before analysis of the survey results with regard to the constructs, hypotheses, and
barriers, the results were validated to ensure that the data collected was complete,
from acceptable sources, reliable, and fit the proposed research model.
4.6.1.1 Response Verification Results
Four survey responses were discarded and not included in the analyzed sample. Three
were from Program A and one was from Program B. One of these responses indicated
that the data provided pertained to a program other than the one being profiled. All
other discarded responses were only partially completed.
4.6.1.2 Descriptive Statistics
Statistics about the survey data were generated to provide insight into the sampled
population. The goal was to ensure that programs participated, that the respondents
had sufficient experience, and that an appropriate mix of roles was represented by the
participants. Table 4.6-1 presents the response characteristics for the survey sample.
Table 4.6-1: Response Characteristics for the Survey Sample
Program

Invitations

A
B
C
D
E

24
16
16
19
22
97

TOTAL

Valid
Responses

Response
Rate

Proportion of
Total Sample

11
6
5
2
10

46%
38%
31%
11%
45%
35%

32%
18%
15%
5%
29%

34

100%

The low response rate was possibly due to concerns over providing potentially
sensitive information. This rationale is supported by the decision of a candidate
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program (Program F) to withdraw from the study for reasons related to the
competition for an Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase contract.
Additionally, since the companies involved in the research did not provide financial
support to the survey, time taken to respond was not compensated. Though the
response rate for Program D was particularly low, the shortened survey period did not
appear to be the cause as the Program E survey was open for the same period of time.
Small sample sizes were anticipated as this study was uncompensated academic
research being performed in an industrial setting. A low number of total survey
invitations were distributed due to the small number of programs available. The
anticipation of small sample sizes was part of the rationale for selection of multimethod research process that drew data from several sources. The goal of obtaining a
sample that consisted of individuals that held lead positions on the programs, of which
there is a small number, further limited the number of responses.
4.6.1.2.1 Roles of Participants
The pursuit of input from program leaders influenced the roles represented in the
survey sample and limited the number of candidates eligible for study participation.
Figure 4.6-1 presents proportions of the respondent roles in the survey sample.
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Roles of Respondents on Surveyed Programs

Logistics and
Sustainment
Engineer
9%
Hardware
Engineer
9%

Program
Manager
18%

Technical
Manager
20%

Systems
Engineer
35%

Software
Engineer
9%

Figure 4.6-1: Distribution of Program Roles within the Respondent Population

The organizational charts indicated that the primary holders of leadership roles on the
programs were concentrated in the roles of Program Manager, Technical Manager,
and Systems Engineer. Since the objective of the research was to examine the highlevel program impacts of the new acquisition process and environment, the
predominance of these roles in the sample population for this study is valid, as the
individuals likely had perspectives and responsibilities that spanned the program.
4.6.1.2.2 Experience Levels of Respondents
Previous experience is another important factor to the validity of the population
sample. Because there was no control group and no absolute measure of program
knowledge and risk, the study relied on comparison with past program execution. To
assess the level of experience, the survey contained a question to determine how many
years of experience that the respondents had in the area of national defense. The
results from the question are presented in Figure 4.6-2. The figure shows the high,
low, and average number of years of experience for respondents on each program.
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Respondent Experience by Program (Years)
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Figure 4.6-2: Respondent Experience Statistics for Program Survey Samples

The level of experience contained within the survey sample was sufficient to have
confidence that the respondents are capable of comparing the execution of the
surveyed programs with past efforts. The very high level of experience of the sampled
population is not surprising as the survey targeted senior roles on programs.
4.6.1.3 Reliability Analysis Results
Cronbach’s alpha test was applied to the survey questionnaire responses to determine
the reliability of the instrument with regard to assessment of the operationalized
measures. An online calculator built on the R statistics language was used to perform
the analysis (Wessa, 2012). The threshold for inclusion of a measure in the study was
an alpha value of 0.6. While this minimum rating is considered less than optimal, it is
acknowledged that this is exploratory research and that the instruments may require
refinement after applications to more data sets. The results of the analysis are
presented in Table 4.6-2.
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Table 4.6-2: Cronbach’s  Analysis Results for the Survey Instrument
Construct
Early Systems Engineering
Developmental Knowledge
Maturity Verification
Implementation Knowledge
Modular Open Systems Approach
Integration and Sustainment Knowledge

Operationalized Measure
Review Execution
Review Effectiveness
Requirement Stability
Requirement Validation
Prototype Requirements
Maturity Assessments
Technology Readiness
Manufacturing Readiness
Open System Requirements
Openness Assessments
Non-developmental Items
Disclosed Interfaces

Excluded Cronbach
Items

0.64
14
0.73
0.62
0.77
0.62
0.61
0.71
0.85
44
0.61
0.62
53
0.62
0.80

The reliability analysis indicates a mixed level of quality for the survey instrument
with regard to this data sample. The questions relating to Technology Readiness,
Manufacturing Readiness, and Disclosed Interfaces display a high level of reliability
without the removal of questions. The adaptation of these questions from existing
Government assessment instruments likely contributed to their high level of reliability.
The questions that assessed Requirements Validation were adapted from Bahill and
Dean (2009) and were also rated as more reliable than those for most of the other
measures.
In order to increase the reliability of the data set gathered from this sample, three
questions were excluded from the confirmatory factor analysis and hypothesis testing.
The questions that were removed were Question #1 for the Review Effectiveness
measure, Question #3 for the Open System Requirements Measure, and Question #4
for the Non-Developmental Items measure. Removal of the first noted question
greatly improved the reliability of the measurement, while removal of the other two
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questions merely made the measurement acceptable. Details regarding the removed
questions and potential causes for their negative impact on reliability are described in
Table 4.6-3.
Table 4.6-3: Questions Removed from Survey Analysis with Rationale
Construct

Operationalized
Measure

Early Systems
Engineering

Review
Effectiveness

Modular Open
Systems
Approach

Open System
Requirements

Integration and
Sustainment
Knowledge

Nondevelopmental
Items

Removed Question Text

Reliability Rationale

14. Systems Engineering Review
identified and documented risks
to be addressed during system
development.

Risk documentation is
also accomplished in
separate dedicated
meetings.
Use of NDI and COTS
driven by system
44. The system is required to
environmental
employ non-developmental items
considerations. Specific
and/or commercial off-the-shelf
requirement may not have
components for non-applicationbeen levied or may have
specific functions.”
been included
independently of MOSA.
Reuse depends on other
53. The system design
product lines that company
incorporates reuse of hardware
offers more than
component designs developed
requirement of each
on previous programs.
program.

After the identified questions were removed from the sample the fit of the construct
model to the data was evaluated using Confirmatory Factor Analysis.
4.6.1.4 Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results
Confirmatory Factor Analysis was initially performed on the survey responses at the
construct level to determine the presence of the latent variables in the data set. Due to
the small sample size, each construct was analyzed independently.
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4.6.1.4.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Initial Model
The model was constructed using the R statistics language and analyzed using the
Structural Equation Model package. Figure 4.6-3 contains the initial model relating
the observed variables to the latent constructs.

Figure 4.6-3: CFA Model at Construct Level

Five fit statistics were used to assess the model: Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), BentlerBonett Index or Normed Fit Index (BB NFI), Bentler Comparative Fit Index (CFI),
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR).
Table 4.6-4 contains the results of fit analysis at the construct level.
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Table 4.6-4: CFA Fit Statistics for the Research Constructs
Measure of Fit
(Threshold)
Early Systems
Engineering
Developmental
Knowledge
Maturity
Verification
Implementation
Knowledge
Modular Open Systems
Approach
Integration and
Sustainment Knowledge

GFI
(> 0.90)

BB NFI
(> 0.90)

Bentler CFI
(> 0.90)

TLI
(> 0.90)

SRMR
(< 0.08)

0.815

0.623

0.741

0.612

0.123

0.757

0.595

0.731

0.623

0.135

0.843

0.608

0.927

0.898

0.105

0.726

0.648

0.748

0.647

0.154

0.803

0.641

0.728

0.592

0.122

0.754

0.603

0.701

0.551

0.134

The confirmatory factor analysis results showed that the constructs as identified in the
Conceptual Model were not well represented in the sample. With the exception of the
Bentler Comparative Fit Index for the Maturity Verification construct, all fit measures
for all of the constructs were below the acceptability thresholds. This result indicated
that the model required significant revision.
4.6.1.4.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Revised Model
To assess whether the lack of fit was a function of the defined operationalized
measures or their groupings, a new model was developed to separate the observed
variables from each other. In this new model each operational measure was mapped to
the questions that measured them directly. Additionally, the model contained
interactions among the independent and dependent variables. The revised model is
presented in Figure 4.6-4.
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Figure 4.6-4: CFA Model at Operationalized Measure Level

The fit of the collected survey data to the model at the operationalized measure level
was assessed using Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Statistics describing the fit for
individual questions resulting from the analysis at the operationalized measure level
were calculated and compared to thresholds. Statistics could not be calculated for the
Review Effectiveness, Open-Systems Requirements, and Non-Developmental Items
measures because their correlation matrices do not contain enough elements. Removal
of questions from the model as a result of reliability analysis caused this lack of matrix
size. Because these measures were deemed to be reliable by the Cronbach’s alpha test,
they remained in the model. However, conclusions related to relationship assessment
for these measures carry a caveat that the validity of these factor measures were not
completely understood. The fit statistics are presented in Table 4.6-5.
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Table 4.6-5: CFA Fit Statistics for the Operationalized Measures
Measure of Fit
(Threshold)

GFI
(> 0.95)

BB NFI
(> 0.90)

Bentler CFI
(> 0.90)

TLI
(> 0.90)

SRMR
(< 0.08)

Review Execution

0.992

0.978

1.000

1.263

0.034

Review Effectiveness

1*

-

-

-

-

Requirements Stability

0.940

0.824

0.880

0.641

0.100

Requirements Validation

0.985

0.975

1.000

1.135

0.037

Prototype Requirements

0.997

0.988

1.000

1.593

0.022

Maturity Assessments

0.954

0.810

0.893

0.680

0.075

Technology Readiness

0.989

0.976

1.000

1.169

0.032

Manufacturing Readiness

0.989

0.990

1.000

1.056

0.021

Open-Systems Requirements

1*

-

-

-

-

Openness Assessments

0.991

0.988

1.000

1.114

0.028

Non-Developmental Items

1*

-

-

-

-

Interface Disclosure

0.974

0.961

1.000

1.032

0.040

The statistics indicated that the lower level model provided a substantial improvement
over the fit of the original conceptual model. The calculated fit statistics were at or
very near thresholds with two exceptions. The Requirements Stability and Maturity
Assessment operationalized measures were well below threshold for the Tucker-Lewis
index. This perceived deficiency was likely a result of the low number of degrees of
freedom present in the model. The other fit statistics were near thresholds for the
Requirements Stability and Maturity Assessment operationalized measures, therefore
these measures remained in the model.
4.6.2 Evaluation of Relationships among Variables
The confirmatory factor analysis resulted in an assessment of the contribution of each
question to the variability in the sample. The contributions of each question to the
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factor score were represented by the loadings for the questions. The loadings for the
questions are presented in Table 4.6-6.
Table 4.6-6: Confirmatory Factor Analysis Loadings for the Survey Questions

Review Execution

Q1
Loading
0.613

Q2
Loading
1.005

Q3
Loading
0.270

Q4
Loading
0.394

Review Effectiveness

0

0.695

0.787

0.627

Requirements Stability

1.154

0.245

0.383

0.490

Requirements Validation

0.486

0.736

0.567

0.926

Prototype Requirements

0.347

0.997

0.490

0.333

Maturity Assessments

0.422

0.781

0.457

0.513

Technology Readiness

0.823

0.269

0.749

0.641

Manufacturing Readiness

0.511

0.883

0.840

0.922

Open-Systems Requirements

0.648

0.689

0

0.429

Openness Assessments

0.502

0.659

1.034

0.665

Non-Developmental Items

0.087

2.980

0.194

0

Disclosed Interfaces

0.538

0.643

0.857

0.840

Operationalized Measure

Cells that contain “0” indicate questions that were removed from the data set as a
result of reliability analysis. The scores were included as the weighting coefficients in
a weighted average that represents the value of the variables for each respondent.
Because relationships were tested using pair-wise comparisons of ranks within each
measure, the comparative magnitude of the loadings across measures does not
influence the outcome of the correlations analysis.
The relationships among the independent and dependent constructs were evaluated by
applying Kendall’s tau rank correlation test to the survey results to determine the
levels of correlation between the independent factors and the dependent factors.
Association thresholds of tau values ranges for this study are presented in Table 3.6-7.
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Table 4.6-7: Thresholds for Correlation Evaluation
tau Value Range

Strength of Association

tau > 0.35

Very Strong

0.35 > tau > 0.3

Strong

0.3 > tau > 0.25

Moderate

0.25 > tau > 0.2

Weak

tau < 0.2

Insignificant

In addition to the questions that assessed the operationalized measures, direct
questions were asked of the respondents with regard to program elements and their
impact on program risk levels. The results from these questions are presented with the
hypotheses to compare the perceived level of knowledge and risk improvement
resulting from the respective program elements with the observed data.
4.6.2.1 Early Systems Engineering and Development Knowledge (H1)
The results of the quantitative relationship evaluation indicated that the evidence
supported H1.The tau rank correlation results for the operationalized measures
associated with H1 are presented in Table 4.6-8.
Table 4.6-8: Tau Rank Correlation Matrix for Hypothesis 1
Review
Execution

Review
Effectiveness

Requirements
Stability

0.242

0.375

Requirements
Validation

0.356

0.435

The associations between Review Effectiveness and both Requirements Stability and
Validation were very strong. Additionally, a very strong positive relationship was
observed between Review Execution and Requirements Validation. Though the tau
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value for the relationship between Review Execution and Requirements Stability was
not greater than 0.3, a value of 0.242 indicated a weak correlation. These findings
suggested that completion of the reviews prior to the Preliminary Design Review had
the intended effect of increasing program knowledge prior to Milestone B.
The respondents were asked a direct question regarding the magnitude of the positive
impact on program risk resulting from the execution of a Preliminary Design Review
prior to approving implementation of the system design. The direct question regarding
completion of a Preliminary Design Review prior to Milestone B supported the
assessment of H1 is illustrated by the graph in Figure 4.6-5. In all of the graphs
presented in this chapter, each program accounts for 20% of the response, regardless
of the number of responses from each case. The options presented to the respondents
were on a scale similar to the items related to the operationalized measures. The
responses to these questions as presented are normalized on a per-case basis to ensure
that Programs A and E did not skew the results and that Program D was adequately
represented. The normalization caused each program to represent one fifth of the total
sample.
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Figure 4.6-5. Impact of PDR prior to Implementation Approval on Program Risk

Almost all respondents across the programs expressed that holding a Preliminary
Design Review prior to funding system implementation improved the risk position of
the program to some degree, though they disagreed as to the magnitude of the benefit.
The majority (68%) of the overall sample expressed that there was at least a moderate
improvement in program risk due to holding a Preliminary Design Review prior to
Milestone B. A majority of each of the program samples except for Program E
concurred with the assessment that the Preliminary Design Review reduced risk at
least moderately.
4.6.2.2 Maturity Verification and Implementation Risk (H2)
The results of the hypothesis testing did not fully support H2. The correlation results
for the operationalized measures associated with H2 are presented in Table 4.6-9.
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Table 4.6-9: Tau Rank Correlation Matrix for Hypothesis 2
Prototype
Requirements

Maturity
Assessments

Technology Readiness

0.262

0.264

Manufacturing Readiness

0.395

0.288

The tau score of 0.395 between Prototype Requirements and Manufacturing Readiness
indicated a very strong association, but the other correlations did not exceed the
threshold of 0.3. However, the tau values among the independent and dependent
variables were all above 0.25, which indicated a moderate positive correlation
between the respective variables.
The respondents were asked a direct question regarding the magnitude of the positive
impact on program risk resulting from the development and test of a system prototype
during the Technology Development phase. The response to the direct question
regarding the prototype’s impact on program risk is presented in Figure 4.6-6.
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Figure 4.6-6. Improvement of Program Risk Due to Prototype
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Over 70% of the sample expressed that the prototype had a “Moderate” or “Large”
positive impact on program risk levels. Only Program B expressed that the impact of
the prototype development and test during the Technology Development phase was
less than positive, and the majority of that case still indicated that there was a
“Moderate” or “Large” improvement. Interestingly, no member of Program B
answered that there was “Little” positive impact of the prototype, indicating that there
is a split opinion as to the value of prototyping on that program.
The results of this question were not consistent with the lack of support for H2 during
relationship evaluation. Two potential explanations are offered for this misalignment.
First, the respondents may not understand the extent or nature of the impact of
prototyping on program risk levels. Alternately, the reduced risk on the program might
have manifested in variables other than Technology and Manufacturing Readiness as
measured. The second explanation is supported by the strong correlation between the
Maturity Verification construct and the measure of Requirements Validation.
The case studies found that the characteristics of the prototypes on Programs A and B
were driven more by competition than by Government-levied requirements, which
might have been true of the other programs as well. If competition was the primary
factor in prototype development, the independent Prototype Requirements measure
would not necessarily be strongly correlated with the dependent measures of
Manufacturing and Technology Readiness. In fact, no independent measure was
strongly correlated with Technology Readiness; however the Review Execution,
Prototype Requirements, and Maturity Assessment independent variables displayed
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moderately positive correlations. This pattern suggests that both Maturity Verification
and Early Systems Engineering positively influenced Technology Readiness, but
neither ensured technology maturity of the solution in isolation.
4.6.2.3 MOSA and Integration & Sustainment Risk (H3)
The results of the hypothesis testing supported H3. The tau rank correlation results for
the operationalized measures associated with H3 are presented in Table 4.6-10.
Table 4.6-10: Tau Rank Correlation Matrix for Hypothesis 3
Open-Systems
Requirements

Openness
Assessments

Non-Developmental Items

0.084

0.418

Disclosed Interfaces

0.333

0.442

The tau values for the correlations between Openness Assessments and both NonDevelopmental Items and Disclosed Interfaces indicated that there was a very strong
correlation among these variables. There was also a strong association between Open
Systems Requirements and Disclosed Interfaces. This finding suggested that assessing
programs’ use of Non-Developmental Items and Disclosed Interfaces positively
influenced the inclusion of these elements in the product design. However the
correlation between Open Systems Requirements and the use of Non-Developmental
Items was negligible. The explanation for this lack of correlation may be that the use
of Non-Developmental Items such as commercial off-the-shelf components and
components used on other programs had more to do with the availability of such items
than Government requirements. Data was collected using a question to directly gauge
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the respondents’ impression of the impact of MOSA on program risk. Figure 4.10-3
contains the normalized results from this question.

Risk Improvement Due to MOSA
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Figure 4.6-7. Improvement in Program Risk as a Results of MOSA Scope

The figure shows that all respondents perceived some level of improvement from the
application of MOSA and that a slight majority (57%) described the improvement as
“Moderate” or “Large”. This finding further supports the validity of H3. A potential
explanation for the dearth of “Large” or “None” responses is that because the effects
of MOSA on the programs are not necessarily immediately evident, the measurement
of this construct was more prone to Central Tendency Bias.
4.6.2.4 Additional Relationships
In addition to the hypothesized relationships, correlation analysis revealed
unanticipated relationships between other factors in the data. The correlation matrix
for the factors is presented in Table 4.6-11.
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Table 4.6-11: Tau Rank Correlation Matrix for the Operationalized Measures

Requirements
Stability
Requirements
Validation
Technology
Readiness
Manufacturing
Readiness
NonDevelopmental
Items
Disclosed
Interfaces

Review
Execution

Review
Effectiveness

Prototype
Requirements

Maturity
Assessments

Open-Systems
Requirements

Openness
Assessments

0.242

0.375

0.269

0.19

-0.272

0.046

0.356

0.435

0.606

0.471

0.196

0.384

0.262

0.217

0.262

0.264

0.018

0.135

0.317

0.188

0.395

0.288

0.064

0.495

0.102

-0.016

0.225

0.099

0.084

0.418

0.361

0.011

0.123

0.158

0.333

0.442

Shaded cells in the table signify the relationships that were hypothesized prior to data
collection. Bold type indicates strong correlations ( > 0.3) in respondent ranking
related to the independent and dependent variables. The potential relationships with
strong correlation were examined to determine the validity of the research hypotheses
and to understand possible causes and implications for unanticipated relationships.
The dependent Requirements Validation measure was significantly correlated with
both of the measures of the independent Maturity Verification construct. The
Prototype Requirements operationalized measure, with a correlation value of 0.606,
was more strongly correlated with Requirements Validation than either of the systems
engineering review measures. The connection between these aspects is logical given
that the value of prototypes development and evaluation include validation of the
system design and refinement of requirements (Drezner and Huang, 2010).
The relationship between Maturity Assessments and Requirements Validation is less
clear. The use and nature of assessments was observed to impact validation to a much
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greater degree than Technology or Manufacturing Readiness. Examination of the
correlations on a question-by-question basis identified the driving factors for the
relationship at a deeper level. Firstly, the completion of technology readiness
assessments requires documentation of the system architecture which increases the
score for the Requirements Validation measure. Secondly, formal verification of
prototype requirements with Government involvement during the Technology
Demonstration phase establishes an initial set of verification criteria for some systemlevel requirements. If these criteria were deemed as inappropriate after the prototype
testing, they would be more likely to be changed than verification requirements that
had yet to be validated. Finally, execution of Maturity Assessment activities,
especially with regard to high-risk areas and critical technologies likely gave the team
confidence that the program could be completed on budget and schedule.
Examination of the correlation between Openness Assessments and Requirements
Validation identified that programs with a documented system architecture and with
established verification criteria for system-level requirements were much more likely
to have performed market surveys. No further explanation was found in the data for
this correlation. The relationship between Disclosure of Interfaces and Review
Execution was also examined and found to have no logical rationale for the correlation
at the individual question level.
The observed relationship between Openness Assessments and Manufacturing
readiness is likely a second-order effect. Openness Assessments were also strongly
correlated with the use of Non-Developmental Items. Because Non-Developmental
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Items, including both commercial products and components used on other programs
have already been produced, they have an inherently higher level of maturity and it is
logical that processes equipment for producing them would be better understood. One
might expect a commensurate increase in the Technology Readiness measure with use
of Non-Developmental Items, but the questions related to Technology Readiness focus
only on unproven technology elements. The Manufacturing Readiness questions
addressed the system as a whole to include lower-risk components such as processor
cards and physical structures.
4.6.3 Potential Barriers to Program Success
The survey instrument included direct questions to evaluate the prevalence of the
potential barriers to successful program execution identified during the case study
phase. All charts containing response data presented within this section are normalized
such that each program constitutes twenty percent of the sample, regardless of the
number of responses from each program.
4.6.3.1 Communication in a Competitive Environment
Lack of communication between Government and contractor personnel was indicated
to be a major issue during the case studies of Programs A and B. To assess the impact
to the additional programs, two questions were asked of respondents regarding
communication on programs executed under the new acquisition process. Figure
4.11-1 presents normalized response data for the first question regarding Governmentto-contractor communication.
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Adverse Effect of Competitive Environment on
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Figure 4.6-8. Adverse Effect of Competition on Government-to-Contractor Communication.

Almost all respondents expressed that there was some level of adverse effect with over
75% of the sample and the majority of each program characterizing the impact as
“Moderate” or “Large”. These results suggest that the new program structure
negatively impacted communication from the Government to the contractor.
Figure 4.6-9 contains the normalized response data for the second question regarding
the level of adverse effect that the competitive environment had on communication
from the contractor to the Government.
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Figure 4.6-9. Adverse Effect of Competition on Contractor-to-Government Communication.

The results of the direct question suggested that the new program structure also
negatively impacted communication from the contractor to the Government, though to
a smaller degree. The majority of Case E expressed that the effect on contractor-toGovernment communication was “Little” to “None”.
4.6.3.2 Requirements Mismanagement during the TD Phase
The case studies indicated that requirements were inflexible during the Technology
Development phase, but changed significantly after the Preliminary Design Review.
As one of the goals of the Technology Development phase is to refine requirements by
incorporating contractor inputs, a question was asked of the respondents regarding
Government acceptance of changes to the system requirements that were proposed by
the contractor. The response data for that question is presented in Figure 4.6-10.
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Figure 4.6-10. Acceptance of Contractor-proposed Requirements Changes during Technology
Development Phase.

The majority of the samples from Programs A, B, and D expressed that there was little
to no acceptance of contractor-proposed specification changes during the Technology
Development phase. A small majority of the overall sample also shared this view. A
question was also asked related to the stability of requirements after the establishment
of the allocated baseline upon completion of the Preliminary Design Review. Figure
4.6-11 presents the results from this question.
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Figure 4.6-11. Requirements Stability after PDR.
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The majority of each program agreed that the system-level requirements were
significantly changed after the execution of the Preliminary Design Review, but
before the beginning of the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase. The
combination of these results suggests that the finding of the case studies related to the
mismanagement of requirements is systemic and not isolated to Programs A and B.
4.6.3.3 Excessive Focus on Prototypes
The case study interviews signaled a disproportionate focus on the prototyping activity
compared to the refinement of requirements and development of the preliminary
design. In response to this finding of the case studies, multiple items were included in
the survey instrument regarding the prototyping activity on the programs. The first
question sought to determine the purpose of the prototypes on each program as
perceived by the contractor personnel. The unmodified response data for this question
is presented in Table 4.6-12.
Table 4.6-12. Perceived Purpose of Prototype
Program
A
B
C
D
E
TOTAL

Evaluation of the
Evaluation of system
Evaluation of integrated
maturity of critical
performance to support the
production-representative
technologies
EMD source selection evaluation
components
1
8
2
3
3
4
1
1
9
1
18
12
3

The responses indicated that there was significant confusion on Programs A and B
regarding the purpose of the prototype. If the goals of prototyping scope on each
program were clearly communicated, each case should have provided consistent

176

responses to the question. In both cases, a significant number of respondents signified
that the purpose of the prototype was primarily to support source selection. This
finding is corroborated by the case study interviews wherein it was indicated by a
significant number of subjects that prototype performance was a major factor in the
competition for the next phase.
Another question intended to gather information regarding prototype focus on the
programs asked the respondent to rate the degree to which the prototype represented
the production design under development throughout the Technology Development
phase. Figure 4.6-12 provides the normalized response data for this question.
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Figure 4.6-12. Degree that the Prototypes Represent Intended Production Design.

The programs overwhelmingly stated that the prototypes were at least moderately
representative of the intended production design in each case, with 60% of the sample
characterizing the degree of representativeness as “Large.” This finding indicated that
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a significant amount of focus was placed on the design, manufacture, and
demonstration of the prototype systems during the Technology Development phase.
A third question asked the respondent to characterize the degree to which the
development and test of a prototype adversely affected the focus of the program team
on the system design to be presented at the Preliminary Design Review. Figure 4.6-13
contains the normalized response data for the question.
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Figure 4.6-13. Degree of Adverse Effect Due to Prototype Focus.

A significant majority (73%) of the population expressed that the prototype interfered
with execution of the system design, however 59% of the sample stated that there was
little to no adverse effect. All of the programs except for D split responses over
multiple categories, indicating that there was not a strong consensus within the
programs. Programs C and E felt little to no adverse effect from the prototype scope,
both of which displayed a firm understanding of the prototype purpose. Program D is
difficult to characterize based on the small sample size, but it appears that the
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prototype scope had a moderate negative effect on the program. The responses from
Programs A and B were more varied. This variance might be related to the lack of
cohesion among the program teams regarding the purpose of the prototypes. In
contrast to the evidence from the case study interviews, the majority of Program A
stated that the negative effect was “Little” or “None”. A previous question found that
almost all of the respondents for Program A felt that the primary purpose of the
Technology Development phase was to support the source selection for the next phase
through prototyping. The combination of these data points suggests that Program A
did not assess that prototyping had a negative impact because it was thought to be the
most important aspect of that phase.
4.6.3.4 Gaps between Program Phases
The case study interviews indicated that significant risk to Engineering and
Manufacturing Development was introduced by splitting the program into two distinct
segments. In response, a question was included in the survey to determine the amount
of risk introduced to the program by the transition between program phases. Figure
4.6-14 contains the normalized data resulting from this question.
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Figure 4.6-14. Program Risk Due to Transition between Program Phases

Almost all respondents (98%) asserted that there was some level of additional risk due
to the transition and 66% of the normalized sample stated that there was at least a
“Moderate” negative effect. The data from this question confirmed that disruption of
the program due to the transition to a new contract after the execution of the
Preliminary Design Review was experienced by programs other than those included in
the case study phase.
4.6.3.5 Contractor / Government Process Alignment
The case-study interviews with cross-case experts in Systems Engineering identified a
potential misalignment between contractor and Government system development
processes. To assess this potential barrier, a question was included in the survey to
determine the degree to which the processes of the organizations are aligned. Figure
4.6-15 presents the results of this question.

180

Contractor/Government Process Alignment
60%
50%
E

40%

D

30%

C
B

20%

A

10%
0%
None

Little

Mod

Large

Figure 4.6-15. Government and Contractor Development Processes Alignment

The results of the question indicate that there was not a large degree of misalignment
between the Government and contractor processes on these programs. While there
were responses from Programs A and C that the respective processes are not
synchronized, over 80% of the population stated that the processes are aligned to at
least a moderate degree, indicated that the programs were not severely impacted by
any misalignment.
4.6.4 General Impressions of TD/EMD Program Structure
To provide context for assessment of individual program elements, a question was
posed to determine the overall perceived effect of the TD/EMD program structure.
The results of the overall TD/EMD effectiveness question are presented in Figure
4.6-16.
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Figure 4.6-16: Overall Program Risk Improvement due to TD/EMD Structure

A strong majority of the surveyed population expressed that the new structure
provided a moderate (40%) or large (42%) degree of risk improvement for their
programs. This result provided perspective when examining the impact of each
program element and barriers to program success introduced by the new process.
Though the remainder of the survey data indicated that multiple factors contribute to
risk in both positive and negative ways, the overall opinion among contractor
participants was that the changes benefited these programs to a substantial degree.
4.6.5 Survey Results Summary
H1 and H3 were supported by at strong correlations among the related independent and
dependent variables. H2 was moderately supported. The proposed barriers to success
were all supported by the survey results with the exception of Process Misalignment.
A summary of the survey findings are presented in Table 4.6-13.
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Table 4.6-13. Summary of Survey Findings
Measured Factor

Survey Result

Early Systems
Engineering

 Strongly correlated with Development Knowledge
 Perceived to have positive impact on risk

Maturity Verification

 Very strongly correlated to Requirements Validation
 Moderately correlated to Implementation Knowledge

Modular Open
Systems Approach

 Strong correlation with Integration & Sustainment
Knowledge
 Indirectly improved Manufacturing Readiness

Lack of
Communication

 Government-to-Contractor communication significantly
reduced by competitive environment
 Contractor-to-Government communication also affected

Prototype Focus

 Purpose of prototype not clear on all programs
 All prototypes highly representative of final design
 Majority of sample cited some adverse effect

Requirements
Mismanagement

 Requirements not refined with contractor
 Requirements not stable between PDR and next phase

Program Gap

 Significant risk added by gaps in program
 Some impact felt by all programs

Process Misaligned

 Processes not significantly misaligned
 Results relatively consistent across all programs

4.7 Results and Analysis Summary
This chapter presented data from case studies and surveys. It communicated the results
of hypothesis testing, examined potential barriers to program success, and identified
potential relationships among elements of the acquisition process. Chapter V contains
an integrated summary of the findings from multiple research methods and
conclusions regarding the proposed enablers and barriers. Chapter V also explores the
implications of the study results and provides recommendations for Government and
industry to improve program outcomes and suggestions for expansion of this research.
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter provides conclusions based on the research findings and updates to the
previously identified constructs and hypotheses based on the study results. This
chapter also presents recommended applications of the research and suggestions for
future work to expand the research and explore newly identified aspects of the
problem.
5.2 Integrated Summary of Findings
Table 5.2-1 presents an integrated summary of the findings from the case studies and
the survey data. The table compares the output of the document analyses, interviews,
and the qualitative survey questions. The marks in the table cells are interpreted as
follows:


Checkmark (): The data source supports the hypothesis or barrier



Ex-out (): The data source does not support the hypothesis or barrier



Question Mark (?): The data source’s support for the hypothesis or barrier is
undetermined



Dash (-): The data source did not address the hypothesis or barrier

The assessment of each of the survey findings represents an analysis of whether the
related qualitative question responses were predominately “None”/”Little” or
“Moderate”/”Large”.
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Table 5.2-1. Integrated Findings of the Research Study
Method

Hypothesized Enablers

Interviews

Surveys
Conclusions

Recommendations

A

B

A

B

Experts

A

B

C

D

E

Enabler: Early Systems
Engineering





















Enabler: Maturity
Verification

?

?









?





Accept as enabler for
 • Development Knowledge
• Implementation Knowledge

Enabler: MOSA





















Accept as enabler for
Integration & Sustainment
Knowledge

Emphasize MOSA on programs and
establish verification criteria.

Barrier: Lack of
Communication

-

-

















Accept as barrier to
Development Knowledge

Implement processes for effective
communication at program start.

Barrier: Prototype
Focus

-

-

















Accept as barrier to
Development Knowledge

 Align effort to technology risk.
 Limit use of performance test results
in source selection decisions.

Barrier: Requirements
Mismanagement

-

-

















Accept as barrier to
Development Knowledge

 Refine requirements during
Technology Development
 Maintain stable baselines after PDR

Barrier: Program Gap

-

-

















Accept as barrier to
Program Schedule

Identify value-added scope to sustain
teams during transition

Barrier: Process
Misalignment

-

-

















Reject as barrier

Drop barrier from future studies.

Theory

Potential Barriers

Documents
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Accept as enabler for
Development Knowledge

Maintain requirement for
reviews prior to Milestone B.
 Focus prototype on technology and
requirements validation.
 Establish prototype purpose early.

The case studies were unable to determine the impact of the Maturity Verification
efforts because the prototypes developed during the Technology Development phase
were driven by competitive factors rather than Government requirements. The
responses to the qualitative question regarding the impact of prototyping on Program
B were sufficiently diffuse as to preclude determination of the effect of Maturity
Verification as an enabler on that program.
Program A was determined to have been impacted adversely by prototype focus
despite the lack of responses to the direct question in the “Moderate” or “Large”
categories, because most of the respondents misunderstood or were improperly
informed of the purpose of the prototyping scope in the Technology Demonstration
phase.
While the interviews for Program A suggested a negative impact due to Process
Misalignment, the primary source of information that supported the existence of that
potential barrier was the cross-case experts. Misalignment of the Government and
contractors was not identified as a significant impediment to program success by any
other sources, including the survey responses from Program A.
The alignment of the survey data from Programs A and B with the case study data
indicate that the instruments were properly developed to find convergent evidence
among sources. Though there is natural variation among the programs with regard to
the concepts under investigation, Program E appears to diverge from the remainder of
the program set. This difference could be a result of the nature of the system under
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development, the Government program team, the culture of the business unit, or a
combination of these factors which were not included in the research scope.
The primary data supporting the decision to reject or not reject the research
hypotheses were measured correlations among the associated measures. A summary of
the quantitative hypothesis testing results is presented in Table 5.2-2.
Table 5.2-2. Correlations among Operationalized Measures Related to Hypotheses

Hypothesis

Strong
Correlations
( > 0.30)

Moderate
Correlations
(0.30 >  > 0.25)

Weak
Correlations
(0.25 >  > 0.20)

Insignificant
Correlations
( < 0.20)

H1

3

0

1

0

H2

1

3

0

0

H3

3

0

0

1

H1 and H3 were each supported by three strong positive correlations among the
associated operationalized measures. H2 was only supported by a single strong
correlation between variables related to the hypothesis (Prototype Requirements and
Manufacturing Readiness), however the remaining three correlations were all
moderately positive. Only one correlation (Open Systems Requirements and NonDevelopmental Items) was found to be insignificant. The following sections present
the conclusions and recommendations resulting from these findings.
5.3 Conclusions
This section presents the research conclusions regarding the three hypotheses and the
five potential barriers to program success identified by the case studies.
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5.3.1 Conclusions Regarding Hypotheses
The hypotheses were evaluated based primarily on the levels of correlations among
the associated operationalized measures. A majority of the correlations had to be
strongly positive to be considered as sufficiently supporting the hypothesis as tested.
5.3.1.1 Hypothesis 1 (Supported)
The hypothesis that application of Early Systems Engineering would improve the
levels of Development Knowledge on defense acquisition programs was supported by
the study evidence. This decision was derived from the case study results and the fact
that three out of the four correlations among the independent and dependent variables
were strongly positive. Additionally, the remaining correlation (Review Execution and
Requirements Stability) was found to be weakly positive. These relationships indicate
that execution of systems engineering reviews prior to Milestone B reduces the risk to
the program during implementation of the system design. This conclusion is supported
by the qualitative assessment of program personnel that holding a Preliminary Design
Review during the Technology Development phase improved the risk position of the
program at Milestone B.
5.3.1.2 Hypothesis 2 (Not Sufficiently Supported)
The hypothesis that verification of design maturity through prototyping and maturity
assessments would improve Implementation Knowledge regarding the system design
was not supported by sufficient evidence. This conclusion was a result of the
ambiguity of the case study results with regard to this relationship and because only
188

one of the potential correlations among the associated independent and dependent
operationalized measures (Prototype Requirements and Manufacturing Readiness) was
found to be strongly positive. However, the three other relationships among the
variable were found to be moderately positive, suggesting that there was likely a
similar relationship among the constructs that could be determined by a modified
research process. Despite the insufficient level of support for H2, Maturity Verification
is accepted as an enabler to program success. The conclusion that there is a valid
relationship between Maturity Verification and risk to the implementation of the
design is supported by the qualitative assessment of program respondents that
prototyping provided a “Moderate” to “Large” improvement in the level of risk after
Milestone B.
5.3.1.3 Hypothesis 3 (Supported)
The hypothesis that implementation of a Modular Open Systems Approach would
improve the levels of Integration and Sustainment Knowledge on defense acquisition
programs was supported by the case studies and three out of the four correlations
among the independent and dependent variables were strongly positive. These
relationships indicated that levying requirements related to component reuse,
application of interface standards, and assessments of system openness prior to
Milestone B reduced the risk to the program during integration of the system and
improves long-term supportability. This conclusion was marginally supported by the
qualitative assessment of program personnel that Modular Open Systems Approach
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scope executed during the Technology Development phase resulted in “Little” to
“Moderate” improvement in the risk position of the program at Milestone B.
5.3.2 Conclusions Regarding Barriers to Success
This section provides conclusions regarding the validity of the potential barriers to
program success identified during the case study interviews. The conclusions of this
section are solely based on the results of the multi-program survey.
5.3.2.1 Government / Contractor Communication
The data shows that the free flow of information between the Government and
contractor organizations during the Technology Development phase was inhibited by
execution of the programs in competitive environments. The Government appeared to
be more prone to withholding information than vendors, but as the survey sample
included only contractor personnel, that could be a result of population bias.
This finding confirms that the Government limited communication due to competitive
factors, but did not provide specific facets of the competition that inhibited the flow of
information or specific types of information that were withheld. Interviews conducted
during the case studies indicated that the prevalence of a concern among Government
personnel that a protest of the eventual Engineering and Manufacturing Development
phase contract would result from directing the contractors’ work or inadvertent release
of sensitive information. This explanation for the lack of communication from the
Government was echoed in the free-response question data for Programs A and B. A
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member of Program B provided the following suggestion for how the Government
could have improved the outcome of the Technology Development phase:
“Better communication - they seemed worried more about being the one to cause a
protest then to work toward a common solution. Definitely did not treat contractor as
a team player.”
The avoidance of protests was not cited, however, as C, D, or E. The lack of
corroboration from the programs not included in the case studies may indicate that
concern about protests was isolated to programs A and B, or that it was more
pronounced on Programs A and B than other issues.
The case-study interviews also indicated that contractor-to-Government
communication might be inhibited by a desire to limit negative information presented
to the Government that might have impacted the later competition for the Engineering
& Manufacturing Development phase. Although attempts to limit the exposure of
negative information were the simplest explanation, no data were found in the survey
free-response items to determine the specific cause of this lack of communication.
5.3.2.2 Requirements Mismanagement
The case studies and surveys both supported the confirmation of requirements
mismanagement as a barrier to successful program execution. The majority of the
programs experienced reluctance on the part of the Government to modify
requirements during the Technology Development phase, followed by significant
changes to the requirements after the establishment of the system allocated baseline at
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the Preliminary Design Review. This sequence of events significantly reduced the
level of Development Knowledge gained in the Technology Development phase by
introducing requirements that were not fully understood by the contractor nor
incorporated into the system baseline. Therefore, the impacts of these requirements
could not be known until the requirement changes are traced to the system element
definitions and the designs are updated.
There are two potential rationales for the resistance to contract changes during the
Technology Demonstration phase. First, the competitive environment obstructed both
open communication and contract actions due to the duplication of work and the
desire to avoid the appearance of favoritism. These barriers are compounded by the
fact that changes to requirements during a contract will often trigger an increase in
cost commensurate with the size of the changes. The Government avoided these costs
by introducing changes as part of a competitive Request for Proposals that would
provide maximum incentive for the contractors to absorb the cost of the changes into
their bids for the next phase.
The second rationale is that the Government initially produced a high-quality
specification that was well traced to operational capabilities and that there was no
need for significant changes to the allocated baseline. If this explanation is correct, it
would be expected that the stability of the system-level requirements set would
continue after the end of the Technology Development phase. However, significant
changes did occur after establishment of the allocated system baseline and prior to the
beginning of the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase.
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This result, coupled with the lack of accepted contractor-proposed changes during the
Technology Development phase suggested that the specifications required significant
refinement, but the Government did not make the necessary changes until the
competition for the next phase began. The Government’s behavior on these programs
aligned with the results of the case studies that prompted inclusion of these questions.
In addition, the observed correlation between Review Execution and Requirements
Stability was significantly lower than the relationships among the other variables
related to H1. This indicated that execution of the reviews during the Technology
Development phase did not have the intended positive impact, likely because the
Government was permitted to significantly modify the requirements set as part of the
competition for the next program phase.
5.3.2.3 Prototype Focus
The case studies and survey results indicated that there was excessive focus placed on
system prototypes during the execution of most of the programs. This confirms the
existence of this barrier to success of acquisition programs introduced by the new
process. Misplaced focus can impede program success because limited resources spent
on the prototype are not available for maturing the intended production design. This
situation is compounded when the program views the execution of prototyping
activities to support selection of the contractor for the next phase. As securing
contracts for production of the system is the primary objective of the contractor, the
prototype becomes the top priority of the program at the expense of the design of the
system that will eventually be fielded.
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On both of the case study programs, success in prototype testing was seen as a major
factor in the competition for the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase,
which might explain why the concentration on this area existed to the detriment of the
tactical system design. Part of the desire for the prototype to be representative of the
final system design appeared to stem from a fundamental misunderstanding on the
part of the contractor personnel in both programs regarding the Government’s process
for assessing technology maturity. The unproven technologies, not the integration of
components with understood technology, are what must be demonstrated. In reviews
on the programs, all components were assigned Technology Readiness Levels, but
only critical technology elements are designated with Technology Readiness Levels in
the Government’s assessment process (TRA Deskbook, 2010). There was a general
belief that the prototype must be representative of the final design which was driven
by previous programs that included prototype evaluations and the strategy of
demonstrating a low-risk production-ready solution to position the program for the
Engineering & Manufacturing Development competition.
In this situation, the prototype design becomes an anchor point and design changes
can be perceived as a weakness in the competition for the next phase, both internally
and externally to the contractor organization. Because prototypes by definition are not
required to meet all of the system requirements, use of the prototype design as a
technical baseline is inadvisable and could cause the ability of the system design to
perform the mission in operational environments to become suspect. The resulting
lack of knowledge regarding the system significantly increases risk for the next phase.
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5.3.2.4 Program Gaps
The existence of a gap between the Technology Development and Engineering &
Manufacturing Development phases of the program was found to significantly
increase risk levels on all of the programs studied, leading to the conclusion that these
gaps are valid barriers to successful program execution. The gaps disrupted the
continuity of effort from one phase to the next, sapping the program of the momentum
gained during the execution of the Technology Development phase. The primary risk
to the program appeared to be the fielding of the system within the timeline
established at the outset of the program.
Some of the immediate effects of this barrier were identified by a member of Program
E in response to one of the free-response questions:
“By letting the program go stale between TD and EMD, technology gets old, staffing
turns over, and the program becomes more subject to turmoil in the federal budget. At
best, the final system delivery to the warfighter gets delayed. At worst, the EMD phase
doesn't happen and the TD money is wasted.”
The primary driver of risk surrounding the gaps between program phases was the lack
of the Government’s ability to predict the length of the gap. In response to this
uncertainty, contractors were forced to either maintain the program team indefinitely
without assurance that there would be a contract awarded in the near future, or disband
the team to work on other efforts. Upon award of the next contract, if the vendor even
wins the competition, a program team must be reassembled. This team might
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experienced substantial turnover from the Technology Development team and would
likely include many new team members due to the larger size of Engineering &
Manufacturing Development phase contracts. The imposition of learning curves
resulting from the gap in execution could severely impact the efficiency of the
program, even for those that worked on the Technology Development phase and must
refamiliarize themselves with the development effort.
5.3.2.5 Government / Contractor Process Misalignment
The contractors’ processes are designed to facilitate success within the Government
process. Therefore, it is natural to assume that major sudden modifications to the
Government process would cause difficulty for the execution of the contractor
processes on programs. Neither the case study of Program B nor the survey data
revealed a substantial concern among contractor personnel that the development
processes of the organizations were misaligned.
As the inclusion of the question was primarily driven by one of the Systems
Engineering experts, the lack of concern among working-level personnel might
indicate that the effects at the program level are less pronounced. If there were a
barrier to program success that was primarily visible at higher levels, it would be more
likely to be reported to management and addressed than if the barrier only manifested
at the internal program level. Additionally, it is possible that the two processes were
aligned overall, but that there were specific elements that caused problems. This
analysis leads to the conclusion that the misalignment of contractor and Government
processes was not a major impediment to the execution of the Technology
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Development programs, though individual components of the process might have
disrupted program execution to some degree.
5.4 Updated Research Model
As a result of the conclusions regarding the enablers and barriers, the research model
was updated to support future studies. The revised model is presented in Figure 5.4-1.

Figure 5.4-1: Updated Research Model Based on Conclusions

The model has been respecified with the hypothesized relationships at the level of
interactions among operational measures. New hypotheses have been added to account
for the observed associations between Maturity Verification and Requirements
Validation and the negative correlation between Open-Systems Requirements and
Requirements Stability. The four barriers confirmed by the study have also been added
to the model and associated with the construct that they most appear to effect.
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5.5 Recommendations
In response to the research conclusions, recommendations were developed for
incorporation of the findings into program execution and future research.
5.5.1 Recommendations to Improve Program Outcomes
Based on the findings of this study, it is recommended that both the Government and
defense industry vendors modify their planning processes and approaches to program
execution adapt to the new environment. The goal of these recommendations is to
provide guidance to programs that leads to improved program outcomes within the
structure of the revised acquisition framework.
5.5.1.1 Recommendations to the Government
It is recommended that the Government take action to implement the following
recommendations. Each of these recommendations is a result of the research findings
and is intend to improve the execution and outcomes of acquisition programs.
5.5.1.1.1 Communication with Contractors
The Government should take action to increase the level of communication with
contractors before and during the Technology Development phase of programs. This
requires the Government to perform more planning activities for the Technology
Development phase prior to release of a request for proposals and to clearly identify
the goals of the program to contractors during pre-bid discussions. This information
will allow contractors to identify alternative activities that may require less time and
funds to complete while achieving the same objectives. For example, clear
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identification of the expectations and intended role of prototypes and their effect on
source selection for Engineering & Manufacturing Development might cause the
contractor to focus on the critical factors for the program rather than implementing
strategies that mighty not align to customer objectives. Processes that encourage
effective communication between the Government and contractors must be
implemented at the Technology Development phase contract award and followed
throughout the competitive stages of the program.
5.5.1.1.2 Prototype Testing and Source Selection
It is also recommended that the Government preclude the use of prototype test data as
a primary factor in source selection for development and production contracts. While
it is valid to use the results of technology maturation activities to determine risk levels
related to specific approaches, prototype performance testing during a Technology
Development phase is likely to provide a severely limited data set on which to base a
competition. Reliance on a small set of data does not ensure a robust system will be
produced in the end and might in fact negate the risk reduced by prototype
development in the first place. Additionally, building a small number of prototypes in
a few months is not representative of a firm’s ability to deliver and support large
production runs. Use of prototype testing in source selection encourages contractors to
focus on prototype representativeness and performance at the expense of requirements
development and design maturity prior to and during the Technology Development
phase.

199

5.5.1.1.3 Requirements Management
The Government is also recommended to implement improvements to the process for
modification of requirements in a competitive environment. For requirements that
have not been previously validated by pre-contract testing or are not critical to the
operational value of the system to the warfighter, objective and threshold values
should be established to allow contractors to independently make cost/benefit trades
during the system design. If substantial changes to the requirements are identified
during the Technology Development phase, they should be implemented on the
program prior to the Preliminary Design Review. If major changes are identified as a
result of issues discovered at the Preliminary Design Review, then the review should
not be closed until the issues are resolved.
5.5.1.1.4 Program Gaps
The Government should also acknowledge the realistic possibility and impacts of a
gap between Technology Development and Engineering & Manufacturing
Development phases prior to the start of the program. Steps to mitigate the effects
should include working with contractors to ensure that the Engineering &
Manufacturing Development phase is minimally impacted by the existence of the gap.
The suggested tactic is to identify value-added scope to be performed by each team
and appropriate funding levels based on team size. For instance, studies could be
conducted regarding future increments as part of these activities which would allow
for advancement of DoD evolutionary acquisition goals by performing requirements
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analysis activities to support an Analysis of Alternatives study for the next system
increment.
5.5.1.2 Recommendations to Defense Contractors
The following recommendations are presented for defense contractors to implement in
the interest of improving program outcomes.
5.5.1.2.1 Reduced Level of Focus on Prototypes
Contractors must ensure that prototypes are designed primarily to meet the needs of
the Technology Development phase, not what is believed to be the full system
production design prior to thorough requirements analyses and design trade-offs. A
prototype design that is intended to represent the production version of the system has
the potential to become an anchor point in the design process from which the
contractor would be discouraged to stray for fear that the advantage gained by such a
mature design be eroded. Development of production-representative prototypes early
in the program requires significantly more contractor investment prior to the
Technology Development phase than integration of off-the-shelf components with
novel critical technology elements. Additionally, because prototype development must
start prior to the Technology Development phase in order to support delivery and test,
the prototype design does not benefit from requirements refinement and knowledge
gained during the Technology Development phase. Use of the prototype as a baseline
therefore inhibits the production design from receiving these benefits as well.
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5.5.1.2.2 Presentation of Requirements Trade-offs
Contractors should be more forward in presenting requirements trades at Preliminary
Design Reviews or earlier events to identify cost and schedule drivers and show the
Government how it can reduce program risk in future phases. The fact that the
requirements included in system specifications prior to Milestone B often are not yet
validated requires that the parties involved determine where the requirements need to
be tailored to be implementable within cost and schedule constraints. Contractors
should not interpret requests to modify requirements as an inability to meet
requirements or a weakness in design acumen. Instead, requested requirements
changes that provide the opportunity to reduce costs or accelerate schedules without
sacrificing significant operational capability should be pursued throughout the system
development process.
5.5.1.2.3 Gap Planning
Contractors should identify independently funded activities to be executed during
program gaps to maintain the momentum gained during the Technology Development
phase. These activities could include risk management and mitigation efforts for the
next phase, studies of capabilities that could be implemented in future system
increments, and pursuit of other programs that would benefit from similar technology.
Additionally, contractors should assign personnel critical to the effort to adjacent
efforts, ensuring that critical knowledge is available at the beginning of the next phase.
In all cases, the activities should be planned in such a way as to provide value to the
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contractor if not awarded a contract for the Engineering and Manufacturing
Development phase.
5.5.2 Recommendations to Improve Research Methodology
Analysis of the survey results found the concept model to be specified at the incorrect
level. The model should be modified to reflect the existence of the constructs at a
lower level and to signify the potential existence of additional relationships among the
variables. H1 and H3 should continue to be tested as currently proposed with
modifications to the survey instrument to improve reliability. The questions used to
assess all of the operationalized measures except for Requirements Validation,
Manufacturing Readiness, Openness Assessment, and Disclosed Interfaces should be
refined to improve the reliability of the instruments. H2 should also be reassessed and
updated to incorporate Requirements Validation as a dependent variable.
5.5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
It is recommended that this research be extended to confirm or disprove the findings
via new sources of evidence. It is especially important that theory-building research
studies such as this be followed by additional inquiries to test the results. The
following sections identify suggestions for future work in this topic area.
5.5.3.1 Additional Programs
One of the simplest ways to extend the research would be to execute additional case
studies and surveys using the same methodologies and instruments to increase the size
of the research sample. In order to improve the applicability of the research, it is
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recommended that the methodology be applied to a larger and more diverse set of
programs as data becomes available. This includes programs currently in the planning
stages as well as those that were not available to the researcher. Additionally, cases
under the new process may be compared to previous cases or those that have received
waivers for the new regulations. While this research used historical data and trends
identified in the literature to establish “control” cases, side-by-side comparisons
between similar systems development efforts governed by the old and new processes
could provide further insight into the impacts of process changes at a deeper level.
This research was conducted primarily with regard to the opinions and perspectives of
defense contractor organizations. It would be beneficial to complete similar studies on
programs executed by different companies to determine the influence corporate
culture. Future studies could also be executed within a Government organization and
with data primarily gathered from Government personnel to assess the impacts of the
constructs from the acquiring organization’s point of view.
5.5.3.2 Long-term Case Studies
Unlike this study which sought to examine programs at a specific point in time,
longitudinal case studies provide the capability to determine how cases evolve and
adapt to circumstances over time. Long-term case studies could be conducted to assess
the impact of the acquisition process modifications throughout the lifecycle of the
system under development. Such a study would start prior to Milestone A and
conclude during the operations and support phase to assess whether the program
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experienced improved execution with regard to cost, schedule, and technical
performance.
5.5.3.3 Additional Program Types
This research focused on major programs of a manageable size due to resource
restrictions. To expand the research, additional program types may be examined to
determine if the constructs and relationships maintain their validity outside of the
structure of major DoD programs. Large-scale future programs such as the Next
Generation Bomber, Next Generation Fighter, Joint Multirole Helicopter, Joint Future
Theatre Lift Helicopter, future Ballistic Missile Defense systems, and naval shipbuilding programs should be assessed to better understand the dynamics of the new
regulations within this class of program.
Acquisition Category II and III programs are not required to follow the same process.
Studies of that class of program could be executed to determine to what degree, if any,
that the new process requirements would benefit less complex systems. While it is
unlikely that implementation of the entire process would provide benefit because of
overhead costs, some aspects of the process may be worth applying to smaller
programs.
5.5.3.4 Effect of the Managing Service
Customer processes vary among services and even among program offices within a
service. Different Government branches of the military stress different aspects of
systems and have diverse levels of risk tolerance. This research collected data from at
205

least one program from each of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, however, servicespecific factors were not addressed. Case studies that expressly analyze the differences
among the services with regard to their acquisition processes and outcomes could
facilitate better alignment of the individual methods, improving the ability of
contractors to work effectively with multiple services and the efficiency of joint
programs.
5.5.3.5 Programs Managed by Other Agencies
This study was limited to programs managed by the DoD, however other Government
agencies face similar challenges with regard to system acquisition. Comparisons of
DoD programs executed under the new process to programs administered by agencies
such as NASA, the Missile Defense Agency, intelligence agencies, law enforcement
agencies, and The Department of Homeland Security could be helpful in improving
their acquisition processes as well. High-profile international programs could also be
studied to determine the presence and relationships of the constructs in different
Governmental structures and cultures. Programs such as these can be studied to
identify the prominence and relationships among the constructs in the foreign defense
market.
5.5.3.6 Focus Studies on Specific Program Elements
Studies focusing on the specific hypotheses and barriers should be conducted to
understand these elements at a deeper level. In particularly, the effects of competitive
environments on communication and investigations into the roles and benefits of
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prototyping during Technology Development phases would be particularly useful to
both Government and industry.
5.5.3.7 Effect of TD Scope and Performance on Source Selection Decision
Inclusion of the factors in source selection decision-making process including
emphasis of factors in proposals and use of data gathered during the Technology
Development program. Such a study would require insight into multiple contractor
teams and would be best executed by Government personnel with access to all of the
relevant data. Additionally, the nature and factors included in Government proposal
requests may be impacted by this new process and should be considered.
5.6 Research Summary
The goal of this research was to identify and explore the components of the DoD
acquisition process execution that are critical to the success of individual programs as
well as the Department as a whole. The research included a review of the relevant
literature from academic, Government, and industry sources that identified three
primary factors of the revised acquisition process that are purported to improve
program knowledge at key decision points: Early Systems Engineering, Maturity
Verification, and a Modular Open Systems Approach. The presence and impact of
these factors was examined in two case studies of Major Defense Acquisition
Programs and a survey of five acquisition programs.
The case studies, which included documentation analysis and interviews,
demonstrated that the constructs identified in the conceptual model and the
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hypothesized relationships among them were valid for the sample data set. The case
studies also identified five potential barriers to program success that were to be
examined in the second phase of the study: lack of open communication due to
competition, requirements mismanagement, excessive prototype focus, gaps between
program phases, and misalignment between contractor and Government development
processes.
The goal of the survey phase was to obtain a larger population sample and determine
the generalizability of the case study findings. Statistical testing indicated that two of
the three hypotheses were supported by of the survey data from five programs. The
remaining hypothesis was only partially supported by the data. Direct questions
regarding the independent constructs and program risk levels supported these
conclusions. Additionally, four of the five barriers to program success were confirmed
to exist on the majority of the programs studied. It is recommended that the DoD and
industry incorporate these findings into their system development processes to
increase the efficiency of the acquisition system and improve program-level and
enterprise-level outcomes. The results of this study should be confirmed by
examination of a larger and more diverse set of programs to increase the
generalizability of the results.
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APPENDIX A: DOCUMENT ANALYSIS FOR CASE A
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Construct

Operational
Measure

QID
1

2
Review
Execution
3

4
Early Systems
Engineering
5

6
Review
Effectiveness
7

8

Document Review Question
Assessment of program status
during Systems Engineering
Reviews risk-based.
Budget and schedule impacts
of system design examined
during Systems Engineering
Reviews.
Systems Engineering Reviews
focused on requirements rather
than implementation details.
Appropriate Systems
Engineering Reviews held
during the Technology
Demonstration phase.
Risks identified and
documented as part of the
System Engineering Review
process.
Open requirements issues
resolved at Systems
Engineering Reviews.
Appropriate baselines
established at the conclusions
of Systems Engineering
Reviews.
Subject matter experts from
appropriate disciplines
involved in Systems
Engineering Reviews.

Rating
(1-4)
2

2

3

Evidence
Risk management section included in PDR. Most other sections did
not tie to risk. Minutes identify risks not in register. Action-items
rarely tied to risk (PDR)
TD phase budget discussed, but EMD budget and schedule detail
TBD. No CAIV/SAIV presented to tie requirements or scope to
budget & schedule. Overall program schedule, including EMD and
production, presented by Govt (PDR)
Reviews focused on requirements and architecture, respectively
(SRR & SFR) Requirements referenced in slides on design.
Requirements management section presented. Minutes and action
items focused on solution details rather than requirements feasibility
and impact. (PDR)

4

SRR, SFR, PDR, and a prototype-focused TRR held during TD
phase (SOW, SEMP, PDR)

1

No actions from PDR to include new risks on program register
despite reference to risks in minutes. (PDR)

2

One "TBD" included in allocated baseline at PDR. Not significant
source of risk. Multiple requirements presented that conflict and
open requests for change were present (PDR).

2

Requirements documents under contractor configuration control, but
not approved by Government. (PDR)

4

Subject Matter Experts and stakeholders in attendance covered
entire system footprint and life-cycle. (PDR)
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Construct

Operational
Measure

QID

9

10
Requirements
Stability
11

12
Development
Knowledge

Document Review Question
Requirements sufficiently
refined and clarified during
Technology Development
phase.
System requirements were
unchanged between the
Preliminary Design Review
and Milestone B consistent.
Disposition of optional
requirements and capabilities
determined.
"TBD/TBR/TBS"
requirements resolved during
the Technology Development
phase.

Rating
(1-4)
2

1

Minor requirements changed during TD. Multiple requests for
changes/clarification of requirements rejected by Government.
Some unverifiable/ambiguous requirements related to MOSA
deleted (SRR, SFR, PDR, Spec)
Significant new functionality added along with new interfaces.
Performance requirements were modified. While some were
relaxed, the net effect was a significant increase in system
development risk (Spec)

1

Optional capability not resolved during TD phase that depended on
CTE Deferred to proposal and Milestone B decision (Spec)

3

TBD's, primarily in Interface requirements, resolved during TD
phase through contractor/Govt interaction (PDR)

13

The system-level requirements
set is consistent and complete.

2

14

Verification criteria for
requirements established.

2

15

The system can be delivered
within the program budget and
schedule.

1

16

An achievable system
architecture that satisfies
requirements developed and
documented.

4

Requirements
Validation

Evidence
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Multiple ambiguous requirements identified, including key
performance capabilities. Requirements lack specificity and are not
well aligned with environments. (PDR)
Most test & verification activity focused on prototype (SOW).
Requirements verification nominally addressed at PDR. Significant
questions related to verification methods remain including
environments & objective measures of performance. (PDR)
Feasibility of schedule not addressed during TD other than
acknowledgement that schedule is extremely challenging and
optimistic. Budget for EMD/Production not established during TD
phase (PDR).
Architecture presented tied to functions and designs presented.
Architecture appears to be well aligned to required capabilities and
available technology and components. (SFR, PDR)

Construct

Operational
Measure

Prototype
Requirements

QID

Rating
(1-4)

Evidence
Prototype requirements marked as subset of system-level
specification CTE addressed by prototype requirements. (Spec).
System integration not addressed by
Functional and performance requirements essentially only
requirements applied to system. Performance to operational levels
are required, however real-time performance during prototype test
activities is not required. (Spec)
No size, weight, or power requirements for prototype hardware
included in Government prototype specification. (Spec). Size,
weight, and power not bounded by Government test parameters.
Prototype highly representative of final configuration (PDR).
No specific prototype manufacturing requirements present in
Statement of Work or Prototype specification. Only applicable
requirement pertains to compliance with federal laws, which has no
effect on the manufacturing plans or processes (Spec & SOW).
MRL required to be demonstrated during TD phase.
CTE is part of test program with multiple tests supporting
demonstration. However, multiple tests were conducted to assess
non-CTE capabilities and functions. Majority of testing was not
focused on CTE maturation (Spec, SOW, PDR)
Acceptance testing conducted in a lab environment by contractor
with Government witness prior to delivery of prototypes. Field
testing not used for verification of requirements (SOW, Spec) Testreadiness Review held for prototype prior to delivery (SEMP).

17

Prototype requirements focus
on areas of substantial risk.

3

18

Prototype performance and
functional requirements align
with system requirements.

3

19

Prototype requirements
address size, weight, and
power aspects of system.

1

20

Manufacturing requirements
for prototype align with
system requirements.

1

21

Prototype test program
addresses Critical Technology
Elements vs. previously
demonstrated capabilities.

2

22

Prototype requirements
compliance formally verified
by Government.

3

23

Technology Readiness
assessment activities required
by Government.

4

Formal Technology Readiness Assessment and multiple informal
technology maturity self-assessments required (SOW, SEMP).
Internal assessment results presented at PDR (PDR, SOW)

24

Manufacturing Readiness
assessment activities required
by Government.

4

Formal Manufacturing Readiness Assessment and multiple informal
required (SEMP, SOW). MRA and self-assessment results presented
at PDR (PDR, SOW)

Maturity
Verification

Maturity
Assessment

Document Review Question
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Construct

Operational
Measure

Technology
Readiness

Rating
(1-4)

Evidence

25

All designated Critical
Technology Elements
sufficiently demonstrated in an
operationally representative
environment.

3

Critical Technology Elements demonstrated in Governmentspecified environment during prototype testing. System did not meet
performance requirements, but demonstrated system functionality in
real-time. Compliant performance demonstrated in high-fidelity
simulation using data collected during prototype testing (SOW &
PDR)

26

Critical Technology Elements
have been previously used for
similar applications.

3

The CTE have been used for related purposes, but not for this
specific application. Framework for technology leveraged from
previous products (PDR)

3

Similar technology used in fielded systems for different purpose.
Some components repackaged from operational products. Only
unproven technology relates to optional capability (PDR).

4

Government TRA for CTE assessed at level 6 as required by statute.
Was TRL 5 prior to TD phase (TRA).

4

Make/buy for major components complete. Suppliers identified and
engaged in Technology Development phase activities (PDR).

4

Production environment detailed at PDR. Pilot lines established to
support prototype production. (PDR)

4

Prototype systems produced on pilot production lines. Multiple
components are commercial-off-the-shelf or modified-off-the-shelf.
(PDR)

4

MRL as evaluated through joint Government/contractor assessment
progressed from 4 (initial assessment) to 6 at the end of the
Technology Development phase. (PDR)

QID

Document Review Question

27

Implementation
Knowledge

28

29
30
Manufacturing
Readiness

31

32

Technologies critical to
meeting operational
requirements have been used
in fielded systems.
Technology Readiness Levels
increased to appropriate levels
during the Technology
Development phase.
Sourcing decisions for system
components complete.
Production environment for
the system has been defined.
System components have been
manufactured in a productionrepresentative environment.
Manufacturing Readiness
Levels increased to
appropriate levels during
Technology Development
phase.
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Construct

Operational
Measure

QID

33

34
Open-Systems
Requirements

35

36

Modular Open
Systems
Approach

37

38
Openness
Assessments
39

40

Document Review Question
Implementation of a Modular
Open Systems Approach or
equivalent required by the
program.
The contractor is discouraged
from using proprietary
interfaces.
The system required to use
Commercial Off The Shelf/
non-developmental
components for nonapplication-specific functions.
Verification methods for
MOSA requirements
sufficiently identified.
Program used market surveys
to determine available off-theshelf capabilities relative to
requirements.
Program identified
components with a high risk of
volatility.
Business case analysis used to
determine application of
interface standards and COTS
components.
Formal tools and processes
used for MOSA evaluations.

Rating
(1-4)

Evidence

4

MOSA-equivalent explicitly required by SOW and specification.
Some language was copied directly from Government MOSA
guidance. (Spec & SOW).

3

The contractor was required to identify any proprietary interface
implementations and provide justification. Specification required
that the system minimize proprietary interfaces. (Spec & SOW)

3

Use of Commercial-off-the-shelf and non-developmental
components strongly encouraged. Developmental items were
required to be identified and justified. Additionally, a plan was
required for transitioning to a commercial item. (SOW & Spec)

3

Verification methods for all requirements are identified by the
specification (primarily by analysis), however many of the MOSArelated requirements appear to be ambiguous and do not have
associated objective verification criteria. (Spec). MOSA Analysis
document required to support requirements verification (SOW).

4

Market surveys required by the SOW to be presented at systems
engineering reviews. Sufficient justification provided for internal
sourcing of non-mission-specific components. (SOW, SRR, & SFR)

4

Formal Government tool used by program with Government
participation to assess component volatility, cost of system
modification, and value of increasing openness (SFR).

3

Some business case analysis provided for interface and component
selection (reference of COTS use). COTS and interface standards so
prevalent that extensive justification not necessary. (SFR)

4

Openness assessments used multiple MOSA evaluation tools from
the Defense Acquisition University website. Such tools were
specified by the SOW and results presented at PDR. (SFR & SOW)

214

Construct

Operational
Measure

QID
41

42
NonDevelopmental
Items
43

44
Integration &
Sustainment
Knowledge
45

Disclosed
Interfaces

46

47

48

Document Review Question
Previously tested software
code is reused from other
programs.
Non-application specific
functionality is implemented
using commercial software
elements.
Non-application specific
functionality supported by
commercial or nondevelopmental hardware
components.
Non-developmental hardware
items from other programs are
used where feasible.
System components can be
replaced with similar
components from competitive
sources without impacting
system architecture.
System components that are
most susceptible to
obsolescence and upgrades are
isolated behind standard
interfaces.
Interface protocols allow for
long-term growth of system
capabilities and resources.
Interface standards employed
are well defined and widely
used.

Rating
(1-4)

Evidence

3

Extensive leveraging of existing software code proven in other
systems. Some software is reused, however most software in system
is recoded. (PDR)

4

Operating environment and software/hardware interfaces make
extensive use of COTS and open-source software (PDR).

4

Extensive use of commercial processing resources, memory, and
infrastructure. (PDR)

3

Significant hardware reuse from other programs. Some components
repackaged for form/fit. (PDR).

3

Extensive use of COTS components and standard interfaces
facilitates replacement of components. (PDR)

4

KOSS analysis identified commercial or open interfaces for all
major components with substantial obsolescence or upgrade risk.
(SFR & PDR)

4

Commercial interface supported by commercial market used for
majority of interfaces. Spare capacity included in system design.
(PDR)

4

Interfaces implemented using commercial or open standards with
significant market support and documentation. (PDR)
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APPENDIX B: DOCUMENT ANALYSIS FOR CASE B
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Construct

Measure

QID
1

2
Review
Execution

3

4
Early Systems
Engineering

5

6
Review
Effectiveness

Rating
(1-4)

Document Review Question
Assessment of program status
during Systems Engineering
Reviews risk-based.
Budget and schedule impacts of
system design examined during
Systems Engineering Reviews.
Systems Engineering Reviews
focused on requirements rather
than implementation details.
Appropriate Systems
Engineering Reviews held
during the Technology
Demonstration phase.
Risks identified and
documented as part of the
System Engineering Review
process.
Open requirements issues
resolved at Systems
Engineering Reviews.

2

1

All components "Low risk" regardless of maturity. Risks not tied
to design sections. Action items not in risk terms (PDR). Risks
managed discretely, not tied to overall program success (SEMP).
TD phase budget discussed, but EMD budget and schedule detail
TBD. No CAIV/SAIV presented to tie requirements/scope to
budget & schedule (PDR)

4

Requirements management section presented at PDR. Key
performance parameters tied to design. Driving requirements for
each component/capability identified. Requirements issues and
closure path identified. (PDR)

4

Combined SRR/SFR, System Software Review, multiple
subsystem PDRs, system-level PDR (SOW, SEMP)

2

4

7

Appropriate baselines
established at the conclusions of
Systems Engineering Reviews.

4

8

Subject matter experts from
appropriate disciplines involved
in Systems Engineering
Reviews.

4
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Evidence

Risk management presented at reviews, but risks not identified
during design sections. Risks assessed during review close-out.
Risks not added to register as part of SRR/SFR (PDR). Reviews
not noted as source of risk identification (SEMP)
Closure plan for multiple open environmental requirements
presented at PDR. Lower-level design requirements also
presented with closure path. (PDR)
Requirements and functional baselines presented at SRR/SFR
(SRR/SFR). Requirements and functional baselines accepted by
Government. Appropriate documentation submitted to
Government and under configuration control prior to PDR.
Allocated baseline presented at PDR (PDR).
Appropriate SME's from Govt, Contractor, and suppliers present
at subsystem PDR's and system-level PDR (PDR)

Construct

Measure

Requirements
Stability

Rating
(1-4)

Evidence

9

Requirements sufficiently
refined and clarified during
Technology Development
phase.

3

Contractor required to evaluate and suggest changes at PDR
(SOW). Contractor planned to refine environmental requirements
during TD phase (SEMP). Significant number of environmental
requirements evaluated and refined, however some remain to be
resolved during EMD (PDR)

10

System requirements were
unchanged between the
Preliminary Design Review and
Milestone B consistent.

2

Clarification of environmental requirements and identification of
new platforms included in EMD RFP specification. Did not
modify functionality or impact system design (Interview)

4

No optional requirements identified. Contractor identified
objective requirements and whether they would be incorporated
in baseline design (Spec & PDR)

4

No TBD's in Govt spec (Spec). Only one open contractor
requirement remained at PDR and closure path presented (PDR).

QID

11

Development
Knowledge

12

Requirements
Validation

Document Review Question

Disposition of optional
requirements and capabilities
determined.
"TBD/TBR/TBS" requirements
resolved during the Technology
Development phase.

13

The system-level requirements
set is consistent and complete.

3

Some environmental requirements not completely defined. EMD
testing required to obtain parameters (PDR, Spec)

14

Verification criteria for
requirements established.

3

Extensive verification plans required during Technology
Development phase (SOW). Verification matrix presented during
reviews (PDR).

15

The system can be delivered
within the program budget and
schedule.

2

TD phase to be completed within budget and schedule. Budget
and schedule for EMD and production phases, or achievement of
IOC not addressed (PDR)

16

An achievable system
architecture that satisfies
requirements developed and
documented.

4

Architecture presented at PDR linked to driving requirements.
Highly representative prototype built and tested (PDR)
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Construct

Measure

QID

Evidence

Prototype requirements focus
on areas of substantial risk.

2

No direct prototype requirements. Prototype requirements driven
by Government-dictated test scenarios which represent
significantly challenging demonstration of capability (SOW).

18

Prototype performance and
functional requirements align
with system requirements.

3

Scenarios are representative of mission and demonstrate critical
capabilities, but do not include all functions (SOW)

19

Prototype requirements address
size, weight, and power aspects
of system.

1

Prototype representative of final configuration. Mechanical
design mostly unchanged between prototype and preliminary
baseline (PDR). No SWaP requirements directly levied by
Government. (Spec & SOW). Test scenarios drive SWaP (SOW)

1

Manufacturing requirements of prototype not addressed by
specification or SOW (Spec & SOW).

4

CTE's focus of Government test requirements. Test scenarios
seek to demonstrate CTE-driven functionality in operational
environments (SOW)

20

21

Maturity
Assessment

Rating
(1-4)

17

Prototype
Requirements

Maturity
Verification

Document Review Question

Manufacturing requirements for
prototype align with system
requirements.
Prototype test program
addresses Critical Technology
Elements vs. previously
demonstrated capabilities.

22

Prototype requirements
compliance formally verified by
Government.

4

23

Technology Readiness
assessment activities required
by Government.

2

24

Manufacturing Readiness
assessment activities required
by Government.

3
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Acceptance testing conducted in a lab environment by contractor
with Government witness prior to delivery. Field testing not used
for verification of requirements (SOW, Spec) Test readiness
review held by Government. (SOW)
Technology readiness of components presented at PDR (PDR).
TRA performed by Government (SOW). Program maintained
roadmap of technology maturation including events and
associated predicted levels (SEMP).
Producibility studies required for select components (SOW).
Program held design-for-producibility workshop, though not
required (PDR). Formal MRL assessment conducted by the
Government (SOW).Program maintained roadmap of
manufacturing process maturation including events and
associated predicted levels (SEMP).

Construct

Measure

QID

25

Technology
Readiness

26

27

28
Implementation
Knowledge

Document Review Question

Rating
(1-4)

Evidence

4

Prototypes tested in highly representative mission scenarios with
platform integration (SOW). Contractor successfully
demonstrated integrated system during testing (Press Release)

3

All CTE's have been fielded in different configurations.
Combination of technologies is risk area (PDR)

4

System heavily leverages existing designs. New elements are
combinations of existing products. Technologies used in fielded
designs. (PDR)

3

TRA for only CTE assessed at level 6. Was TRL 5 prior to TD
phase (TRA).

All designated Critical
Technology Elements
sufficiently demonstrated in an
operationally representative
environment.
Critical Technology Elements
have been previously used for
similar applications.
Technologies critical to meeting
operational requirements have
been used in fielded systems.
Technology Readiness Levels
increased to appropriate levels
during the Technology
Development phase.

29

Sourcing decisions for system
components complete.

4

30

Production environment for the
system has been defined.

4

31

System components have been
manufactured in a productionrepresentative environment.

4

32

Manufacturing Readiness
Levels increased to appropriate
levels during Technology
Development phase.

4

Manufacturing
Readiness
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Subcontractors identified at PDR. Sourcing decisions complete
for entire system (PDR). Suppliers identified in organizational
charts (SEMP)
Manufacturing plan and other production documents complete
and provided to Government to support MRA. Prime and
subcontractor production lines assessed using modeling and
simulation. (PDR)
Significant number of off-the-shelf and reused hardware
components. Some components modified from existing products
and not expected to impact producibility. Very few newly design
components. (PDR)
Most components at least MRL 6 prior to PDR. Path shown to
achieve MRL 6 for all components by Milestone B. (PDR)

Construct

Measure

QID

33

Open-Systems
Requirements

34

35
Modular Open
Systems
Approach

36

37

Rating
(1-4)

Document Review Question
Implementation of a Modular
Open Systems Approach or
equivalent required by the
program.

4

The contractor is discouraged
from using proprietary
interfaces.
The system required to use
Commercial Off The Shelf/
non-developmental components
for non-application-specific
functions.
Verification methods for
MOSA requirements
sufficiently identified.
Program used market surveys to
determine available off-theshelf capabilities relative to
requirements.

3

Evidence
MOSA required along with partitioning of proprietary
components (SOW) "Open Systems Architecture" and modularity
required in design. Processors required to be upgradeable and
replaceable without modification of other components (Spec).
Open System Architecture described in SEMP mirrors SOW
language with no other mention of MOSA (SEMP)
Industry standard interfaces to be used where feasible. (Spec)
Open interface standards for reconfiguration and new capabilities
required (SOW).

3

Computing resources must be designed for modularity and
upgradeability (Spec).

2

All MOSA requirements are non-specific and verified via
analysis rather than defined tests (Spec). No details regarding
MOSA verification or analysis in SOW (SOW).

1

No market surveys required or presented at PDR in support of
make/buy or develop/reuse decisions (SOW, PDR)

38

Program identified components
with a high risk of volatility.

1

No requirement for or evidence of volatility assessments to assess
upgrade and obsolescence risk (SOW, PDR)

39

Business case analysis used to
determine application of
interface standards and COTS
components.

1

External interface selection based on legacy platform
requirements No business case presented for MOSA
implementation (PDR).

40

Formal tools and processes used
for MOSA evaluations.

1

No formal evaluations evident (SEMP, SOW, PDR)

Openness
Assessments
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Construct

Measure

QID
41

42
NonDevelopmental
Items

43

44
Integration &
Sustainment
Knowledge

45

Disclosed
Interfaces

46

47

48

Rating
(1-4)

Document Review Question
Previously tested software code
is reused from other programs.
Non-application specific
functionality is implemented
using commercial software
elements.
Non-application specific
functionality supported by
commercial or nondevelopmental hardware
components.
Non-developmental hardware
items from other programs are
used where feasible.
System components can be
replaced with similar
components from competitive
sources without impacting
system architecture.
System components that are
most susceptible to
obsolescence and upgrades are
isolated behind standard
interfaces.
Interface protocols allow for
long-term growth of system
capabilities and resources.
Interface standards employed
are well defined and widely
used.
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Evidence

3

Significant use of tested software from other programs, both
fielded systems and demonstrations (PDR).

3

Operating system is COTS. Most other software is missionspecific. (PDR)

3

Significant use of COTS processing modules (PDR)

4

Significant number of non-developmental hardware components
used from similar systems. Substantial modified designs also
used (PDR).

1

Processing resources are COTS and may be replaced. Most other
components are tightly coupled and do not support easy upgrade
with third-party solutions (PDR).

2

Very few standard interfaces. Most components communicate in
non-standard protocol or through discrete interfaces. (PDR)

2

2

Growth interface based on standards, however most other
interfaces are discrete lines or primitive serial protocols with little
growth capability (PDR).
Legacy external interfaces are well defined, but only used on
similar platforms. Some internal interfaces are based on
standards, but many are not. (PDR).

APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT
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Case ____ Subject____ Date_____ Time: ____
How would you characterize your role on the TD program?

How long have you been working in the field of national defense and what
roles have you performed?

How did the new TD/EMD structure affect the planning and execution of
the program?

How did the scope of the TD program impact the risk position of the
Government with regard to completing the acquisition of this system ontime and within budget?

How did completion of systems engineering reviews (e.g., PDR) during the
TD phase impact the risk position of the program for EMD and later
phases?

How did prototype development and testing during the TD phase impact
the risk position of the program for EMD and later phases?

How did the execution of Modular Open Systems scope during the TD
phase impact the risk position of the program for EMD and later phases?

What additional actions could the Government have taken during the TD
phase to improve the risk position of the program for EMD and later
phases?

What additional actions could the contractor have taken during the TD
phase to improve the risk position of the program for EMD and later
phases?

Is there anything else you would like to add regarding the acquisition
process or program execution that might benefit this research?

NOTES

224

APPENDIX D: SURVEY INSTRUMENT
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Potential Respondent:
You are invited to participate in a research survey to assess the impact of changes to the Defense
Acquisition System at the program level. Your participation is voluntary and you will incur no material
benefit, penalty, or risk whether you agree or decline to participate. It is anticipated that the survey will
take approximately 30 minutes complete. This study is conducted by Brig Bjorn as part of doctoral
research in the Department of Industrial Engineering and Management Systems at the University of
Central Florida. The supervising faculty member for this research is Dr. Timothy Kotnour.
This questionnaire seeks to determine the impact of activities conducted during the Technology
Development phase of the program on the levels of knowledge and risk during the Engineering &
Manufacturing Development, production, deployment, and operational phases of the program. The
survey is divided into the following segments:
I. Role, Experience, and Program Information
II. System Engineering Reviews and System Requirements
III. System Prototyping and Product Maturity
IV. Modular Open Systems Approach, Standards, and Non-Developmental Items
V. General Acquisition Process Modification Impacts
Please answer the questions openly and honestly in terms of the program risk position at the end of the
Technology Development phase. The questions are not intended to assess the Government source
selection process or decisions and it is requested that your answer not include information related to
source selection. If you do not wish to provide a response to any question or are unsure of your answer,
please leave it blank. Data gathered will be aggregated prior to presentation and any quotes from freeresponse questions used in the published results will be reported without attribution. The study results
will be reviewed prior the publication to ensure that they contain no proprietary or personally
identifiable information.
Research at the University of Central Florida is carried out under the oversight of the Institutional
Review Board. Questions or concerns about research participants' rights may be directed to the UCF
IRB office:
Phone: (407) 882-2276 or (407) 823-2901
Mail: University of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research
Parkway, Suite 501,
Orlando, FL 32826-3246.
If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about this survey or if you wish to withdraw your
participation after submission of the survey, please contact Brig Bjorn (BrigBjorn@knights.ucf.edu) or
Dr. Timothy Kotnour (Timothy.Kotnour@ucf.edu).
By clicking on the button below, you are granting consent to the collection and reporting of the data
provided in accordance with above conditions
Thank you for your consideration,
Brig Bjorn
Principal Investigator
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Page 2 – Program and Professional Experience Information
Please provide responses for the program in which you have participated that best fits the
following criteria:
- Designated as a Major Defense Acquisition Program to develop a tactical system
- The Government acquisition strategy includes a multi-vendor Technology Development
contract followed by a single-vendor Engineering & Manufacturing Development contract
- The Technology Development phase includes competitive prototyping
- The program Preliminary Design Review was held or is scheduled to be held prior to the end of
the Technology
Development phase
1. What type of system is under development?
 Aerospace Vehicle
 Land or Amphibious Vehicle
 Maritime Vehicle
 Communications
 Munition
 Sensor
 Radar
 If other, please specify
___________________________________
2. Which service is managing the procurement of this system?
 Air Force
 Army
 Navy
 If other, please specify
___________________________________
3. What is the Acquisition Category (ACAT) designation for the program?
 ACAT I
 ACAT II
 ACAT III
 Don't Know
4. What is the current program acquisition phase?
 Pre-Milestone A
 Technology Development (TD)
 Pre-Milestone B (between TD and EMD)
 Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD)
 Production
5. What Systems Engineering Reviews were held during the Technology Development phase of
the program?
 System Requirements Review
 System Functional (or Design) Review
 Preliminary Design Review
 Critical Design Review
6. What was the primary purpose of the prototype development and test efforts on the program?
 Evaluation of system performance to support the EMD source selection evaluation
 Evaluation of the maturity of critical technologies
 Evaluation of manufacturing capabilities
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 Evaluation of integrated production-representative components
 There was no prototyping during the TD phase
 If other, please specify
___________________________________
7. What is your primary role on the program?
 Program Manager
 Technical Manager
 Systems Engineer
 Software Engineer
 Hardware Engineer
 Logistics and Sustainment Engineer
 If other, please specify
___________________________________
8. How many years of experience in defense systems development do you possess?
___________________________________
9. What is the name of the system or program to which your responses pertain? (Optional)
___________________________________
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Page 3 – Early Systems Engineering and System Requirements
The following questions relate to the Systems Engineering Reviews that were conducted during
the Technology Development phase of the program and the characteristics of the system
requirements set at the end of the Technology Development phase. For the purposes of this
survey, Systems Engineering Reviews are defined as major program events where the
Government and contractor participate in an assessment of the program status and progress of
the design. Examples of Systems Engineering Reviews typically held during a Technology
Development phase include System Requirements Review, System Functional Review, and
Preliminary Design Review.
Please provide your assessment of the degree to which the following statements are/were true of
the program at the end of the Technology Development phase according to the following scale:
None - No inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program
Little - Nominal or marginal inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program
Moderate - Significant inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program
Large - Extensive inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program
10. System Engineering Reviews assessed program progress in terms of the risk to meeting cost,
schedule, and technical objectives.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


11. Systems Engineering Reviews accounted for cost and schedule in addition to technical aspects
of the program.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


12. Systems Engineering Reviews focused on requirements and the proposed system design's
ability to meet requirements.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


13. Systems Engineering Reviews addressed all phases of the system lifecycle.
None
Little
Moderate

 

 


Large


14. Systems Engineering Reviews identified and documented risks to be addressed during system
development.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


15. System Engineering Reviews facilitated resolution of open requirements issues.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


16. System Engineering Reviews facilitated establishment of baselines prior to system
implementation.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


17. Systems Engineering Reviews included appropriate subject matter experts and stakeholders.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


18. Requirements were sufficiently clarified during the Technology Development phase.
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None


Little
 



Moderate
 



Large


19. Requirements were stable between completion of PDR and the Engineering & Manufacturing
Development phase.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


20. Requirements are expected to be stable during the Engineering & Manufacturing
Development phase.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


21. Incomplete system-level requirements (i.e. To Be Specified/Determined) and optional
requirements were dispositioned prior to or during the Technology Development phase.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


22. The system-level requirements baseline was consistent and complete at the end of the
Technology Development phase.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


23. Verification criteria for system-level requirements were established by the end of the
Technology Development phase.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


24. The system-level requirements were achievable within program budget and schedule.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


25. An achievable system architecture that satisfies requirements has been developed and
documented.
None
Little
Moderate
Large
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Page 4 - System Prototyping and Product Maturity
The following questions relate to system prototyping efforts executed during the Technology
Development phase of the program and the maturity of the technical solution at the end of the
Technology Development phase.
Please provide your assessment of the degree to which the following statements are/were true of
the program at the end of the Technology Development phase according to the following scale:
None - No inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program
Little - Nominal or marginal inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program
Moderate - Significant inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program
Large - Extensive inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program
26. Prototype requirements were focused on areas of substantial risk rather than previously
demonstrated capabilities.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


27. Prototype performance requirements were aligned with system performance requirements.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


28. Prototype requirements addressed size, weight, power, and cooling considerations.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


29. Prototype manufacturing requirements were aligned with system manufacturing
requirements.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


30. Prototype demonstration activities were aligned with system technology risk.
None
Little
Moderate

 

 


Large


31. Prototype requirements were formally verified with Government involvement.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


32. Effective assessments of technology readiness were completed during the Technology
Development phase.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


33. Effective assessments of manufacturing readiness were completed during the Technology
Development phase.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


34. System technologies have been demonstrated in operationally relevant environments.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


35. The technologies employed by this system have been used previously for similar purposes.
None
Little
Moderate
Large
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36. The technologies implemented in the system have been demonstrated to be consistent in
multiple evaluations.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


37. The feasibility of using the system's technologies for the intended application have been
demonstrated.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


38. Sourcing decisions for system components have been completed and documented.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


39. The production environment has been sufficiently defined to support accurate producibility
and cost assessments.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


40. Manufacturing equipment to be used during system production has been identified.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


41. Manufacturing processes to be used during system production have been documented.
None
Little
Moderate
Large
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Page 5 - Modular Open Systems Approach, Standards, and Non-Developmental Items
The following questions relate to the implementation of a Modular Open Systems Approach
during the Technology Development phase of the program and the use of standards and nondevelopmental items (e.g. commercial hardware/software components or components used from
other programs) in the system solution. This survey considers "Modular Open Systems", "Open
Architecture", "Open Systems Architecture", and similar terms to represent equivalent concepts.
Please provide your assessment of the degree to which the following statements are/were true of
the program at the end of the Technology Development phase according to the following scale:
None - No inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program
Little - Nominal or marginal inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program
Moderate - Significant inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program
Large - Extensive inclusion of the activity or characteristic on the program
42. Implementation of a Modular Open Systems Approach or equivalent was required by the
program.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


43. The program discourages the use of proprietary interface implementations and data formats.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


44. The system is required to employ non-developmental items and/or commercial off-the-shelf
components for non-application-specific functions.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


45. Verification methods for Modular Open Systems technical requirements were sufficiently
defined.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


46. Market surveys were performed to determine availability of off-the-shelf components capable
of meeting requirements.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


47. The program identified system components and interfaces most likely to change in the future.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


48. Business case analyses were used to determine which system interfaces should be open and
which components should be non-developmental.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


49. Compliance with a Modular Open Systems Approach was assessed by the program using
formal tools and processes.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


50. The system design incorporates reuse of software source code developed on previous
programs.
None
Little
Moderate
Large
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51. The system design incorporates commercial off-the-shelf and/or open-source software for
non-application-specific functions.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


52. The system design incorporates commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware components for
non-application specific functions.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


53. The system design incorporates reuse of hardware component designs developed on previous
programs.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


54. System components can be replaced with similar components from competitive sources
without impacting the system architecture.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


55. Components that are most susceptible to obsolescence and upgrades are isolated behind
standard interfaces.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


56. Interface protocols chosen allow for long-term growth of system capabilities and resources.
None
Little
Moderate
Large

 

 


57. System interfaces are based on well defined and widely used standards.
None
Little
Moderate
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Large


Page 6 - General Acquisition Process Impacts
The following questions relate to the overall impact of the defense acquisition process
modifications on the outcomes of the program's Technology Development phase. Please answer
all questions in terms of how the execution of the Technology Development phase affects the risk
position of the program during Engineering & Manufacturing Development and later phases.
58. To what degree did the two-phase (TD/EMD) structure of the program improve the risk
position of the program?
 No Improvement
 Little Improvement
 Moderate Improvement
 Large Improvement
59. To what degree did the execution of a Preliminary Design Review prior to funding of full
system design implementation improve the risk position of the program at the end of the
Technology Development phase?
 No Improvement
 Little Improvement
 Moderate Improvement
 Large Improvement
60. To what degree did the execution of prototype development and testing in parallel with system
development activities improve the risk position of the program at the end of the Technology
Development phase?
 No Improvement
 Little Improvement
 Moderate Improvement
 Large Improvement
61. To what degree did the inclusion of Modular Open Systems Approach requirements and
related activities improve the risk position of the program at the end of the Technology
Development phase?
 No Improvement
 Little Improvement
 Moderate Improvement
 Large Improvement
62. To what degree was effective communication from the Government to the contractor
adversely affected by the competitive environment during the Technology Development phase of
the program?
 No Adverse Effect
 Little Adverse Effect
 Moderate Adverse Effect
 Large Adverse Effect
63. To what degree was effective communication from the contractor to the Government
adversely affected by the competitive environment during the Technology Development phase of
the program?
 No Adverse Effect
 Little Adverse Effect
 Moderate Adverse Effect
 Large Adverse Effect
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64. To what degree did the development and test of a prototype system during the Technology
Development phase adversely affect the focus on development of the design to be presented at the
Preliminary Design Review?
 No Adverse Effect
 Little Adverse Effect
 Moderate Adverse Effect
 Large Adverse Effect
65. To what degree was the prototype that was developed and tested during the Technology
Development phase representative of the intended production system design?
 No Representativeness
 Little Representativeness
 Moderate Representativeness
 Large Representativeness
66. To what degree were the internal company processes aligned with the Government’s current
acquisition process?
 No Alignment
 Little Alignment
 Moderate Alignment
 Large Alignment
67. To what degree were contractor-proposed changes to the Government’s system specification
incorporated during the Technology Development phase of the program?
 No Incorporation
 Little Incorporation
 Moderate Incorporation
 Large Incorporation
68. To what degree did the transition from the end of the Technology Development phase to the
beginning of the Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase add risk to the program?
 No Added Risk
 Little Added Risk
 Moderate Added Risk
 Large Added Risk
69. What could the Government have done during the Technology Development phase to improve
the risk position of the program for later phases?
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

70. What could the contractor have done during the Technology Development phase to improve
the risk position of the program for later phases?
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

Thank you for your participation in this research. It is intended that the results of this study will
be used to improve the effectiveness of the acquisition process to the benefit of contractors, the
Government, and ultimately the Warfighter. Please click the button below to submit the survey.
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